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[Abstract]  
 
 
This thesis discusses how the modern city can be understood as an experiential environment of 
critical subjective practice. Fictive textual representations of subjective spatial cultures and 
practices within the modern Athenian public realm are examined in reference to Walter 
Benjamin’s critical theory and aesthetics.  
Benjamin, inspired largely by early German Romantic art criticism that was based 
upon ideas about the self-reflective and self-transformative experience of form, developed a 
concept of ‘experience’: as critical process and practice. Exploring the relationship between 
modern urban experience and critical subjectivity, this thesis examines Benjamin’s concept of 
experience through his diverse writings on art, architecture and urbanism; the main references 
being drawn upon: the theses The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1928) and The Concept of 
Criticism in German Romanticism (1920); the essays, ‘The Storyteller’ (1936), ‘Theses on the 
Philosophy of History’ (1940), ‘Little History of Photography’ (1931) and ‘The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1935); as well as the urban writings Benjamin produced 
between the late 1920s and early 1930s, such as One-Way Street (1928).  
Benjamin’s philosophy of experience is subsequently employed to develop an 
epistemological and methodological framework for the interpretation of the selected fictive 
narratives. The short stories ‘In Pieces’ (Kommatakia) (1979), and ‘An avenue that is like me’ 
(Nomizo pos he leoforos Syngrou mou moiazei) (1999), written by the Greek authors Vangelis 
Raptopoulos and Manos Kontoleon respectively, describe Athenian spatial practices and 
cultures, as experienced, from the critical viewpoint of the experiencing subject/author. 
Although modern Athens was initially developed and planned under Western European 
influences, diversionary spatial and cultural practices characterised by improvisation and 
subjective appropriation have emerged. Informed by Benjamin’s ‘literary montage’, a method 
of textual juxtaposition; and to a lesser degree, by his idea of the ‘thought-image’, offering a 
particular approach to ‘city portraiture’; the thesis adopts an experimental structure in order to 
provide a platform for open-ended, critical interpretation of the fictive texts.  
 6 
This thesis aims to offer original contributions to key discourses in contemporary arts 
and design theory on spatial practices and representation, as well as to the broader scholarship 
in arts and design criticism and historiography. For this purpose, a discussion on modern urban 
aesthetics is constructed, articulating the idea that urban experience can inform critical spatial 
practice. Furthermore, the thesis proposes a specific interdisciplinary approach to textual 
representation and interpretation that fosters critical practice; thus, further demonstrating that 
contemporary critical writing within the arts and design disciplines can oscillate between 
different discourses and methods of writing (namely fictive narration, historiography and 
critical theory). 
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[Introduction] 
 
i: Position and Aims 
 
This thesis builds a discussion on modern urbanism from an experiential perspective. The 
main intention has been to develop the argument that the modern city, as experiential 
environment, can inspire and foster critical subjective practices and cultures. This research 
draws extensively upon the work of modern philosopher and cultural critic Walter Benjamin, 
in particular his concept of experience, which was influenced by early German Romantic 
ideas of self-reflection and self-transformation through the immediate experience of form. 
Throughout the period of his urban writings in the late 1920s and early 30s, Benjamin 
explored the critical aspects of experience in the context of modern urbanism, and the greater 
possibilities for critical practice fostered within a modern urban experience shaped by modern 
technology and aesthetics.  
Through reference to this framework, the thesis discusses literary representations of 
modern Athenian urbanism, which have described subjective spatial occupations and 
practices. Modern Athenian urbanism was selected as a ‘case study’, because of its particular 
spatial cultures, demonstrating improvisational and performative attitudes within the public 
realm. Although initially developed under modern Western European influences, especially in 
terms of city planning, modern Athens has largely deviated from the Western model. The 
cultural qualities identifiable within modern Athenian urbanism, and covering the period from 
1970 to present day as represented in the literature, resemble those inherent within the modern 
urban cultures of Naples, Marseilles and Moscow, as described by Benjamin in his essays on 
these cities1. More specifically, proximity, immediacy, mobility, tactility, and immersion were 
among the most prominent characteristics of the urban experience that Benjamin identified in 
                                                           
1 The essays: ‘Naples’ (1925), ‘Moscow’ (1927) and ‘Marseilles’ (1929). 
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these cities. Benjamin further advocated those characteristics as essential for a modern 
urbanism that would foster critical practices.  
As a consequence, the thesis simultaneously pursues a number of overlapping 
objectives. On the one hand, the thesis aims to develop a theoretical discussion inspired by 
Benjamin’s concept of experience, which can make an original contribution to contemporary 
discourses on spatial practices within the context of critical subjectivity. Furthermore, the 
thesis aims to contribute to discourses on methods of interpretation, criticism and 
historiography within the art and design disciplines. This research adopts a methodological 
approach inspired by Benjamin’s critical theory, in order to analyse textual representations, 
and to offer original interpretations of Athenian modern urbanism, which are not fixed to one 
authorial position, but are open to the reader’s critical and creative engagement. For this 
purpose, the second part of the thesis follows an experimental structure via a method of non-
hierarchal presentation, juxtaposing diverse material from analytical and non-analytical 
discourses (fictive narrative, historiographic, critical and other theoretical interpretations).  
 
ii:  Development of  the Research Questions  
 
Starting on a speculative note, the research undertaken for this thesis initially provided a 
means to pursue my interests in the interrelationship of subjectivity, space and the city. I have 
always been intrigued by concepts of space and their use in architecture and urban design. 
Drawing inspiration from several modern literary texts, I began to form research questions 
that would examine relationships between subjectivity, experience and spatial practice within 
the context of modern urbanism. By looking at texts of fiction I thought it would be possible to 
develop an alternative research inquiry, which would critique the abstract concepts of space 
traditionally used in architecture and other design disciplines.  
 9 
It soon became clear that stories written as first-person narratives, which described 
urban space from the view of the ‘I’, foregrounding the author’s subjectivity2, would be 
particularly useful. I selected texts with a semi-fictive, semi-autobiographical quality that 
emphasised how subjective experience manifests in the form of narrative. The stories 
selected, which narrativised experiences of modern Athens, provided an insight into the way 
modern urbanism is experienced through a nexus of subjectivities. The fact that the texts 
described activities that did not lie within prescribed spatial practices, and further described 
urban experience as a transformative process, was of particular interest to me. Therefore, it 
became clear that the texts could be examined to explore the operative role of urban subjective 
experience in inspiring subjective appropriations that challenge the prescribed, ‘normative’ 
spatial occupations. Following this line of inquiry, I examined a number of social and cultural 
theories of space that engage with subjectivity. 
As a consequence of this approach and many emerging questions, the thesis soon 
developed on a number of overlapping levels: first, it developed as a critique of modern urban 
space, by the examination of the dynamic relationship between urban space and subjectivity; 
second, as a discussion of the social and political through an examination of the operative role 
of the narrativisation of space; and third, as a critical history, through the employment of 
literature and interdisciplinary methods for analysis and interpretation.  
 
iii:  Epistemological  and Methodological  Rationale 
 
Furthermore, it became apparent that the work of Walter Benjamin, an influential writer who 
was interested in the critical role of art and literature, resonated with my emerging research 
questions. His work, intertwined with his equally interesting life, has had a continued impact 
upon contemporary cultural discourses. Although situated within the broad area of critical 
                                                           
2 Here I employ the word ‘subjectivity’ in a broad sense, to mean individual and multiple perspectives or 
experiences; and in opposition to the ‘objectivity’ derived from Descartes’ perspective of impartial ‘truth’ (Hall, 
2004: 3). However, it is within the scope of the thesis to discuss subjectivity as the experiential ‘self’, or the ‘I’, as 
influenced by Romantic ideas and Benjamin’s concept of experience. 
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theory and connected to the social theory of the Frankfurt School3, Benjamin’s work has 
become known for its unique approach to criticism. Benjamin was a proponent of intuitive 
judgment, and drew upon the areas of myth, ritual, memory and perception. Whilst studying 
the work of Benjamin and his contemporaries, as well as current scholars of his work4, I 
understood that his philosophy and critical theory developed largely around epistemological 
issues of knowledge and experience. Drawing upon Kantian and Romantic ideas, Benjamin 
proposed an epistemology that would combine “intuition and understanding” in an undivided 
manner5. Benjamin applied this epistemology to the examination of art and literature as 
mediums of communicating experience, and to their role in allowing access to the generation 
of knowledge. His subsequent argument for a new method of critique, which deviated from 
the descriptive and analytic approaches of conventional criticism, was largely derived from 
his skepticism of types of knowledge that were dissociated from experience. Furthermore, 
Benjamin critiqued the various European cultural forms of early 20th century modernity, 
including architecture and urbanism6.  
Consequently, Benjamin’s philosophy offered an appropriate epistemological context, 
within which I was able to develop my initial research inquiry and form an appropriate 
methodology for the interpretation of literature. Through further close readings of Benjamin’s 
texts, I was able to trace some of his main influences back to early Romantic thought7. 
Romanticism is considered to be a broad movement in terms of its origins, characteristics and 
                                                           
3 The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, founded in 1923, with leading members the Marxist thinkers 
Theodor Adorno, Jürgen Habermas, and Max Horkheimer (Geuss, 1981: 1). 
4 Such as Wolin (1994), Caygill (1998), and Gilloch (2002a).  
 
5 As cultural historian and Benjaminian critic Howard Caygill (1998: 2) argues, Benjamin questioned the basic 
assumptions of the Kantian concept that: a) there is a distinction between the subject and the object of experience, 
and b) that there can be no experience of the absolute. Caygill (1998: xiv) further notes that for this reason 
“Benjamin not only extended the neo-Kantian attempt to dissolve the distinction between intuition and 
understanding, but went further in seeking a concept of ‘speculative experience’.” See Section 1 for further 
explanation. 
6 In texts such as: ‘One-Way Street’ (1928), ‘Berlin Chronicle’ (1932), and The Arcades Project (1927-1939). 
 
7 Caygill (1998: 41) discusses Benjamin’s early doctoral thesis The Concept of Criticism in Early Romanticism as 
an attempt to extend and enrich Kant’s concept of experience through Romantic art criticism (mainly Friedrich 
Schlegel, Novalis and Johan Wolfgang von Goethe). 
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intentions. However, among its prominent, fundamental principles, was, a fascination with 
imagination and powerful feeling, and a wish to examine materiality as a manifestation of the 
transcendental8. Furthermore, in this context, the Romantics described processes of infinite 
self-configuration through the encounter with form9. Benjamin made references to the 
inseparability of reflection and cognition advocated by the Romantics, while he further 
recognised reflective thought as an infinite transformative activity that occurred on a formal 
level10.  
Therefore, in the context of Benjamin’s philosophy, the focus of my selected narratives 
on the subjective, experiential aspects of urban spatial practices and the transformative 
relationship between subject and space, enabled me to follow a ‘neo-Romantic’ approach11. 
Thus, a critical interpretation of the modern city through the narratives of self-reflective 
subjectivities could be made, allowing for the examination of non-normative spatial practices, 
inspired by emotions, perception, the imagination, and performative activities. By 
transgressing stylistic, functional, and sociologically oriented concerns, this approach further 
became a critical endeavour in itself; critiquing the established discourses in arts and design, 
derived from preoccupations with theories of subjectivity that encompass issues relevant to 
particular identity groups, such as gender and race. This thesis, whilst critical of modern 
capitalism, differs from other current critical analyses of space. Rather than adopting a purely 
                                                           
8 For more on the principles of Romanticism, see (Ruston, 2007).  
9 Taking observation as an example, the Romantics described a mutually transformative encounter, during which 
the object observed is brought to self-consciousness and revealed to the observer, who, through the heightening of 
his own consciousness, gets nearer to the object and finally draws it into himself. See further references to 
Novalis’s descriptions of observation in (Benjamin, 1996: 151-152)  
10 (Benjamin, 1996: 121-122) 
 
11 As Ruston (2007: 110) notes: “T.E. Hulme’s lecture ‘Romanticism and Classicism’, which was delivered in 
1911 or 1912, but published posthumously in 1924, argues that ‘after a hundred years of romanticism, we are in 
for a classical revival’. Often Romanticism is defined by its difference to that which preceded it, in this case the 
classical, or more properly neo-classical period of the eighteenth century. It is also possible, as Hulme’s essay 
proves, to define Romanticism in opposition to a period that postdated it, the period of the early twentieth century 
that we would now call Modernism.” Furthermore, Gilloch (2002a: 29) describes early Romanticism as the 
ancestor of modern criticism.  
 12 
rationalist approach12, this research turns to the literary narrative, proposing that the 
manifestation of subjective experience through the narrative can open-up critical perspectives.  
Therefore, by engaging with literary narratives on modern urban space by different 
subjects/narrators/writers, a different line of inquiry has resulted, dealing with urban space as 
a series of ‘subjective’ spaces, rather than as a designed total. By adopting this approach, I 
believe that the thesis informs current theories and practices that are critical of the city as a 
planned total, and the designed building-as-object. In this way, and broadly conceived, this 
research resonates with contemporary theories and practices that have addressed the human 
subject and agency in space, in terms of “their production of meanings, subjects, relations, 
uses or desires”; and, further considering space in relation to social practices, have placed an 
emphasis on the human subject and his/her everyday life activities13. Such theories and 
practices favour histories that focus on space that is produced and constituted by the practices 
of social life, and as a terrain of subjective experience. Furthermore, these approaches to 
criticism and historiography draw largely upon critical social theory, including that of 
Benjamin, in order to argue for a liberal socio-spatial politics14.  
Additionally, this thesis argues in favour of interdisciplinary methods of critical 
interpretation. Employing literature as interpretative and critical tool, I adopt a method of 
critique and interpretation that is close to Benjamin’s ‘immanent criticism’. Immanent 
criticism did not follow the established descriptive or analytic approaches that were derived 
                                                           
12 “The growth of capitalism brought unheard of changes within Western environments that caused profound 
unrest and anxiety and led to two kinds of revolutionary reaction and protest. One, the anti-capitalist reaction, was 
of the rationalist kind, already begun in the eighteenth century with the philosophers of the enlightenment and then 
passing from France to the political radicals of England and later turning into Marxist philosophy. The other 
reaction could be described as individualistic, anarchic, liberal, and romantic. This reaction began with such 
philosophers as Kant and Rousseau, passed to Schopenhauer and Byron, and finally acquired the most violent of 
its forms in the philosophy of Nietzsche.” (Lesnikowski, 1982: 147) 
13 (Borden, 2001: 12). Iain Borden (2001: 6) further argues in favour of non-traditional architectural histories and 
theories that consider space, time and social being equally, and with particular regard to everyday life and the 
human subject; whilst considering architecture as not itself space, but only a way of looking at space.   
14 Here I refer to art and design discourses, including criticism, which occupy a range of positions from post-
Marxism and post-structuralism; such as, the following publications: Iain Borden and Jane Rendell (eds) (2000) 
Intersections: Architectural Histories and Critical Theories; Iain Borden (2001) Skateboarding, Space and the 
City: Architecture and the Body; Neil Leach (2002) The Hieroglyphics of Space: Reading and Experiencing the 
Modern Metropolis. 
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from ‘objective’, ‘distantiating’ views of the artwork; rather, the essence of the artwork was 
considered to unfold from within itself at the very moment of experience15. In this sense, 
Benjamin and I share common aims; rather than making the choice to recover original 
authorial intentions, we search to uncover meanings as they are constantly reconfigured in 
different contexts. Thus, the thesis, by studying the selected literature, questions how modern 
urban architectural formations are subjectively reinterpreted. Consequently, the intentions or 
background of the authors are not discussed, since it is the very potential for the narratives to 
incite a critical reflectivity at the moment of reading that is of importance to my approach16.  
 
iv:  Critical Theories  of Modern Urbanism 
 
To develop further my proposal regarding Benjamin’s ideas on urbanism, I will now 
introduce three scholars that have been foundational to my subsequent discussion on Athenian 
urbanism. The theories on urbanism of Henri Lefebvre, Michel De Certeau and Steve Pile, 
like Benjamin’s own, have been preoccupied with the possibilities for critical practice that are 
intrinsic within modern urban experience. As Ben Highmore suggests, Benjamin, Lefebvre 
and De Certeau all recognised that modern everyday life is essentially urban  (Highmore, 
2002: 74); and went further to argue that within this everyday urban realm, there is a 
transgressive potential contained in a “non-conscious” dimension (Highmore, 2002: 59). 
Highmore (2002: 47) argues, “In epistemological terms, they reject a ‘rationalist’, 
traditionally ‘scientific’ approach to the modern city and the everyday, suggesting instead the 
possibility of a science of everyday life that would operate in the areas of myth and ritual.” 
                                                           
15 Benjamin was a proponent of anti-historicist critical methods that were based on immersion and immanence. He 
discussed such ideas in various writings. For instance, in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’, he argued that such criticism would operate through the rejection of the distance between the 
artwork and the public, which sustained the artwork’s value related to its ‘aura’ (its authentic uniqueness); and 
which further promoted the appreciation of art on a ritualistic, cult basis. For more on this, see (Benjamin, 1992: 
211-235). His ideas on ‘immanent’ criticism were influenced by the Romantics, as explained in (Gilloch, 2002: 21) 
16 “The immanent illumination and actualisation of the artwork in the present moment of reading.” (Gilloch, 
2002a: 33)  
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Indeed Lefebvre was highly critical of ‘abstract’ modern space. Considering space, 
ideologically and materially, as a social production, Lefebvre argued that space essentially 
formed part of a dialectical process: rather than existing a priori, space is produced by, and a 
product of, social being. In this context, he criticised modern space for servicing a side of 
human activity that is more akin to the production of objects, rather than to the production of 
social relations and different subjectivities. In architectural terms, Lefebvre posited that this 
condition of production in the modern city was characterised by the inability of city 
authorities to replace the unique symbolism and spaces of the traditional city with anything 
other than functional units and sites of circulation. He observed that the lack of symbolic 
meaning and qualitative difference in the city resulted in the banal monotonous experience of 
modern urban space; thereby, depriving inhabitants of the conditions necessary for creative 
occupation and appropriation.  
Lefebvre’s criticism that modern space did not address human activity in terms of 
experience, agency and meanings, calls upon the explication of the spatial dimension of 
subjectivity, since, for Lefebvre (1991: 18), there is “an interaction between ‘subjects’ and 
their space and surroundings”. In The Production of Space (1974), Lefebvre discussed the 
relationship between the internal world of the subjective self and social space, referencing the 
work of the Surrealists and Bataille. He further suggested that inner space should be decoded 
through an illumination of the transitional process that occurs from “subjective space to the 
material realm of the body and the outside world”; hence, to social space (Lefebvre, 1991: 
18). Lefebvre argued that human subjects, understood as psycho-corporeal ‘bodies’, are one 
of the primary sites, from which any kind of activity of redefinition and reproduction of the 
external world stems. His treatment of space as psycho-corporeal recognised that any activity 
that has an effect on the external world, simultaneously has an effect on the subjective self, 
and vice-versa. Therefore, for Lefebvre, space-production is the context for self-definition 
and for the production of the subject.  
 15 
Iain Borden has commented on “Lefebvre’s rejection of the terms ‘users’ and 
‘inhabitants’ for inferring marginality and underprivilege”; arguing instead, that the term 
‘subjects’ suggests socially constructed entities that do something: in this sense, space is not 
an intellectual projection, but is enacted (Borden, 2002: 27). Within the context of the 
Lefebvrian schema, a distinction is made between two kinds of activity that operate in the 
modern city: the popular everyday ‘appropriation’ of space; and the more official practices of 
spatial ‘domination’ by the nation-state, or capitalism. For Lefebvre, the latter can only 
reproduce the hegemonic forces of capital, while the former can be a transformative activity 
that operates through the seizure and re-functioning of space.  
I argue that Lefebvre advocated a neo-Romantic modern life17, “emphasising conflict, 
emotions, rejection of hierarchies, originality and spontaneity” (Borden, 2002: 28-29); 
qualities and experiences which were embedded into action: “The city is not only a language, 
but also a practice” (Lefebvre, 1991: 391). Lefebvre’s recognition of the inseparability of 
experience and practice can be understood to be essentially romantic: “On close scrutiny, 
then, romanticism appears not only as a contradiction but as an explosion of interconnected 
contradictions at varying levels of consciousness and depth […] the common element for the 
romantics and the national forms taken by romanticism would be the relation between 
possibilities and reality, a relation which was fictitious and dreamed of, but at the same time 
lived out in praxis: in other words, the relation between possibilities and historical 
contradictions” (Lefebvre, 1995: 312). 
 De Certeau, too, was preoccupied with the relationship between subjective 
experience, agency and everyday practices; he was interested in the potential for 
‘transgressions’ in the modern city to counter what he saw as the capitalist, homogeneous, 
banal, decorporealised lifestyles of the modern city. For De Certeau, as for Lefebvre, it is 
through the ‘body’ that one can escape “the imaginary totalisations produced by the eye” (De 
                                                           
17 This is apparent, I believe, in The Production of Space, but more explicitly so in his earlier book Introduction to 
Modernity (1962). This book closes with a chapter entitled ‘Twelfth Prelude: Towards a New Romanticism?’, in 
which Lefebvre makes links between modernity and early 18th century French culture, deeply influenced by 
German Romanticism. See (Lefebvre,1995: 239-388). 
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Certeau, 1984: 93) and subsequent environments of capitalist commodification. Everyday 
spatial practices, which involve the ‘body’, such as walking, instead “refer to a specific form of 
operations…to ‘another spatiality’ (an ‘anthropological’, poetic and mythic experience of 
space), and to an opaque and blind mobility characteristic of the bustling city” (De Certeau, 
1984: 93).   
 Following on from the above, De Certeau also described the ‘enactment’ of urban 
space through subjective practice. De Certeau’s view of space as enacted, or ‘practiced’ (De 
Certeau, 1984: 117), was informed by his interests in literature, archival research and the 
narrative. Highmore (2002: 169) suggests that there is a relationship between De Certeau’s 
own research and writing practices18 – keeping archival material from heterological sources 
and attempting to make ‘polyphonic’ (multi-voiced) texts – and his theoretical approach to the 
practices of everyday life. This is especially apparent in his discussion of modern urban space 
as the ‘enactment’ of stories, or the ‘performance’ of narratives. For De Certeau, the 
enactment and performance of stories and narratives can be transformative; by transforming 
the ‘subject’ into an ‘agent’, or ‘actor’ in everyday urban life, thus further weaving private 
and public into a unitary, and ever-changing, network of meanings: “Stories […] traverse and 
organise places; they select and link them together […] Every story is a travel story – a spatial 
practice” (De Certeau, 1984: 115). 
Contemporary psychogeography is likewise interested in the kind of urban politics 
that is situated in everyday practices: “The first and most prominent of these is the activity of 
walking [...] This act of walking is an urban affair and, in cities that are increasingly hostile to 
the pedestrian, it inevitably becomes an act of subversion. Walking is seen as contrary to the 
spirit of the modern city with its promotion of swift circulation and the street-level gaze that 
walking requires allows one to challenge the official representation of the city by cutting 
across established routes and exploring those marginal and forgotten areas often overlooked 
                                                           
18 De Certeau considered literature to be intertwined with historical writing. In his essay ‘The Freudian Novel’, he 
discusses Freud’s own ‘historical’ writing (e.g. in Moses and Monotheism) as a ‘conversion to literature’, a 
Freudian reevaluation of the relationship between literature and history, which proposes literature as “the ‘logical’ 
discourse of history, the fiction which allows it to be thought.” (De Certeau, 1986: 18).  
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by the city’s inhabitants. In this way the act of walking becomes bound up with 
psychogeography’s characteristic political opposition to authority.” (Coverley, 2006: 12) It is 
within such a context that Steve Pile examines the inherent contradiction of political 
structures that attempt to encompass subjective everyday practices: “Subjectivities are about 
feelings – fears, desires, repulsions – which are not so easily contained within a narrowly 
structural analysis of politics.” (Pile, 1997: 23) In his article ‘Masculinism, the Use of 
Dualistic Epistemologies and Third Spaces’, Pile argued that such contradictions are due to an 
underprivileging of ‘space’; which occurs through the association of space with the concepts 
of emotion, the body, and the feminine. The underprivileging of space is dichotomist, derived 
from both, the Kantian separation of ‘Time’ and ‘Space’, and the antithetical separation of 
‘Reason’ and ‘Emotion’ in the Enlightenment subject: “Dualistic epistemologies permit one 
side of the dichotomy to be valued (time, Reason, mind, male) and the other (space, Emotion, 
body, female) to be debased” (Pile, 1994: 259).  
To counteract the dualism inherent within the context of urban politics, Pile proposes 
a ‘psychogeographical’ approach, which draws upon a “psychoanalysis of space” (1996: 244). 
Pile recognises the ‘partial’, ‘virtual’, ‘double’ and ‘performed’ relationships between objects, 
subjects and spaces; furthermore, he states that “social sanction, social power and the 
possibilities of radical politics” accompany these relationships (Pile, 1996: 244-245). From 
this perspective, an urban ideology of resistance “does not rely so much on acts, but on the 
meanings that social actions may take on in the practice of everyday life” (Pile, 1997: 14); 
and therefore, “urban planning as a spatial technology of domination” (Pile, 1997: 3) can be 
resisted through the creation of new meanings out of imposed meanings. In this way, the 
recreation of meanings enables a re-working of space (Pile, 1997: 16), which occurs at 
different scales (the body, locality, region, nation etc) (Pile, 1997: 13).  
Although the theorists discussed above draw upon a host of different philosophies 
and theoretical influences (including, but not limited to: Marxist, psychoanalytic, existential 
and/or phenomenological discourses), I believe they share a ‘common ground’. Recognisable 
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in this common conceptual ground, are Benjaminian and Romantic ideals of the 
intertwinement of experience, reflection and practice, subjects and objects; and a privileging 
of immediacy and contradiction. Above all, and in the spirit of their spatial theories, they 
could all potentially agree with Lefebvre and his following statement: “The user’s space is 
lived – not represented (or conceived). When compared with the abstract space of the experts 
(architects, urbanists, planners), the space of the everyday activities of users is a concrete one, 
which is to say, subjective” (Lefebvre, 1991: 362).  
 
vi:  Thesis  Overview  
 
The thesis is comprised of two parts. Part [I], drawing upon Benjamin’s philosophy, develops 
the scholarly discussion that forms the methodological and epistemological investigation of 
the research. Part [II] employs an experimental interpretative structure, applying the above 
methodological investigations to propose critical interpretations of four fictive narratives on 
modern Athens.  
Drawing upon my own interpretive readings of Benjamin’s writings, via English 
translations, and contemporary Benjaminian scholarship within the English-speaking 
academy, part [I] is comprised of two sections. Section 1 traces links between the writing 
practices of criticism, history and literature. Opening with an introduction to Benjamin’s 
philosophical position on the relationship between methods of art and literary criticism and 
historiography, with a specific focus on Benjamin’s anti-historicism, the chapter examines 
Benjamin’s ideas on the communication of experience through storytelling and narration. The 
chapter closes with a discussion on the impact that Benjamin’s aforementioned ideas have had 
upon methods of modern and contemporary historiography. The main references to 
Benjamin’s philosophy, in this chapter, are taken from the essays ‘Theses on the Philosophy 
of History’ (1940), and ‘The Storyteller’ (1936), as well as his book The Origin of German 
Tragic Drama (1928). Shaped by Romantic ideas of infinite self-configuration through the 
experience of, and reflective encounter with, form, Benjamin’s concept of experience is a 
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central point of discussion. I argue that such a conception of experience precludes critical 
reflection from a fixed subjective position (e.g. the authorial); instead, advocating a critical 
interpretation that is open to reconfiguration and re-evaluation.  
Section 2 explores Benjamin’s ideas on the modern city, in particular how his thought 
developed under the influence of modern technology and art, as expressed in his urban 
writings during the late 1920s and 1930s. Benjamin acknowledged that, deeply embedded in 
modernity, were potentials for a new kind of critical experience, which could provide a break 
from traditional views of history, politics and subjectivity. As Benjamin argued in essays such 
as ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1935), ‘The Author as 
Producer’ (1934) and ‘Little History of Photography’ (1931), this new experience would be 
formalised in new art, literature and philosophy, which would further embrace modern 
technologies. Benjamin argued that modern techniques, such as the cinematic ‘montage’, 
when incorporated into traditional forms, such as historiography, would produce critical 
writing and encourage creative reading through texts that are open to reconfiguration and re-
evaluation.  
It is in this light, when discussed in its spatial and architectural formalizations that, 
for Benjamin, the modern city fosters a critical attitude. Thus, a specific emphasis is placed 
on how this critical attitude manifests through the practice of urban writing; building on the 
discussion of the critical possibilities of experience posited by Benjamin, as covered in 
section 1. Furthermore, I discuss the broader context of Benjamin’s philosophy of experience, 
and how his ideas were influenced by Romantic theory on experience and knowledge, which 
hinged upon concepts of observation and empathetic responses to space and the observed 
object. For this purpose, I examine closely Benjamin’s thesis The Concept of Criticism in 
German Romanticism (1920). 
Part [II], also comprising of two sections, discusses Athenian public space through 
the stories of two contemporary Greek authors: ‘In Pieces’ (Kommatakia) (1979), by Vangelis 
Raptopoulos, and ‘An avenue that is like me’ (Nomizo pos he leoforos Syngrou mou moiazei) 
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(1999), by Manos Kontoleon. Alongside the literary narratives, the sections include my own 
experimental interpretive analysis, which, by reference to the literature, draws upon cultural 
and other theoretical perspectives on modern urbanism. Utilising the methodological and 
epistemological discussions set out in part [I], historical and critical perspectives are explored 
in reference to the specific conditions that influenced the spatial cultures of modern Athenian 
urbanism. Thus, part [II], is structurally heterogeneous, developing an experimental and 
interdisciplinary method of discursive interpretation that follows the critical practice of 
‘literary montage’19 as propagated by Benjamin. In addition, I loosely follow Benjamin’s 
technique of textual city portraiture, the ‘thought-image’, which is made from the assemblage 
and juxtaposition of ephemeral impressions of the city street. Part [II] is comprised of diverse 
material that is presented in the form of juxtaposed textual fragments. Therefore, this part 
aims – as far as possible – to, “merely show” (Benjamin, 1999c: 460), and inspire the reader’s 
own critical interpretations.  
 
v: The ‘Case Study’  
 
Within the spirit of Benjamin’s philosophy, modern Athens was selected as an appropriate 
‘case study’ for this thesis. Modern Athens was largely planned and developed under Western 
European influences, as they were manifested in the neoclassical and early modern 
architecture and planning. For this reason, and as Kenneth Frampton (1987: 14) argues, 
“Athens is a good example of a modern city, especially in the sense that the prototypical 
neoclassical nineteenth century city, since the 1950’s has gradually developed to follow an 
equally strictly modern typology”20. However, modern Athenian urbanism, in its physical 
form, largely deviated from modern Western European principles, mainly due to socio-
                                                           
19 “Method of this project: literary montage. I needn’t say anything. Merely show. I shall purloin no valuables, 
appropriate no ingenious formulations. But the rags, the refuse – these I will not inventory but allow, in the only 
way possible, to come into their own: by making use of them.” (Benjamin, 1999c: 460) 
20 The original Greek text is translated by the author of this thesis. 
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economic constraints of the modern Greek state, as well as the established Greek practices of 
small plot ownership21. Moreover, the urban remnants of the old Ottoman town and the 
classical antiquities added a palimpsestic quality to the cityscape. Under these conditions, a 
particular modern urban environment has developed, characterised by small scale urban 
spaces and buildings, and by diverse, incoherent spatial forms that co-exist in great proximity. 
As Jean Attali (2002: 121) states: “Athens imposes a regime of paroxysmal proximity 
between the constituents that are assumed to be the most opposed within its urban landscape: 
antique sites, Bavarian neoclassical buildings, modern buildings (sometimes superb), 
interminable construction sites, incomplete and abandoned edifices, congested arteries and 
signage of every kind long the roadside”.   
Furthermore, this particular spatial environment has been indispensably linked with 
the predominant modern Athenian socio-cultural attitudes, providing an urbanism that is 
strikingly different to any other. Comparing Athens to prototypical modern American cities, 
such as New York and San Francisco, James Faubion (1993: 65) argues that Athens is in 
complete contrast to these “disciplinary cities”, as he calls them with reference to De Certeau, 
which are “formalist […] progressivist and technocratic”. According to Faubion (1993: 65), 
this is largely due to specific Athenian cultural attitudes that have been resistant to modernist 
ideologies of ‘improving’, ‘enhancing’, or ‘cleansing’ the built and social environment; 
instead “in Athens, traditions are particularly tenacious; particularistic “pollutions” crop up 
everywhere”. However, this does not occur in the historicist manner of preservation for 
stylistic or paradigmatic reasons, or further striving for historical coherence, but, rather 
following its own “idiosyncratic” principles, and via highly improvised processes22. For these 
reasons, and as Faubion (1993: 70) points out: “Athens […] may be a vast collection of 
protosocial or inchoately cultural little villages. It holds a plurality of places of class and of 
life-style [...] greater Athens had no true ghettoes, whether religious, ethnic, cultural, 
valuational, or even gustatorial.”  
                                                           
21 Philippides (1984: 70)  
 
22 See (Faubion, 1993: 65-66) 
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These key characteristics of Athenian urbanism resonate with urban qualities, such as 
proximity, immediacy and anti-historicism, which Benjamin identified as inherent within 
modern urbanism, and recognised as informative to critical spatial attitudes. However, as it 
will be discussed, Benjamin observed that these qualities were more prominent in certain 
early twentieth century cities, such as Moscow, Marseilles and Naples. He further described 
how modern urban planning was employed in Western European cities, such as Berlin and 
Paris, to counteract certain modern urban qualities for political and ideological reasons.  
In the context of this thesis, the above ideas will be discussed through an examination 
of literary representations of modern Athenian urban experience. Written by two 
contemporary Greek authors between the 1970s and 1990s, the literary stories examined 
describe experiences of Athenian public space. Following a Benjaminian approach, the thesis 
discusses these experiences as inherent within the spaces described, and as representative of 
spatial cultures and practices, which have emerged within the modern Athenian public realm. 
More specifically, the first chapter entitled «One-way street is my street now», discusses a 
network of streets in central Athens, which evolved from the original plans for the modern 
Greek capital. The pattern of streets was originally designed in the nineteenth century, 
according to neo-classical principles, and, although subject to later amendments at different 
stages in Athens’s modernisation, to present day it has largely remained untouched. It is this 
inner-city site that is critically discussed within the context of modern urban planning, 
especially in relation to issues of restriction of spatial mobility. The discussion is inspired by 
the narratives of an Athenian street walker, who, I argue, performs an imaginative re-citation 
of the official, planned public space. The second chapter, entitled «An avenue that is like 
me», discusses one of the first modern motorways constructed in Athens in the early 1900s. 
The chapter critically examines modern urban planning practices, such as car-oriented road 
construction, and the control and distribution of uses through ‘zoning’. The critique is 
inspired by the writer’s narrative descriptions of his empathetic and embodied experiences of 
the complex spatial and socio-cultural environment that has developed along the avenue.   
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Although the chapters represent two different historical phases in the development of 
modern Athenian urbanism, it is not within the scope of the thesis to provide a comprehensive 
or linear history; or, as Benjamin would put it: a history that ‘flows’. Rather, I aim to present 
a history that “stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions” (Benjamin, 1992: 254). In 
addition, as a previous resident of Athens, my experience allows me to identify clear links 
between my own subjective experience and those narrated by the authors; further reinforcing 
Benjamin’s proposal to develop a criticism that is based on immediate experience. 
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Section [1]: 
Epistemo-Logy or Epistemo-Critique?23 
 
 
Neither in knowledge nor in reflection can anything whole be put together, since in the former 
the internal is missing and in the latter the external; and so we must necessarily think of science 
as art if we expect to derive any kind of wholeness from it. Nor should we look for this in the 
general, the excessive, but, since art is always wholly represented in every individual work of 
art, so science ought to reveal itself completely in every individual object treated.24 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe  
 
It is as if something that seemed inalienable to us, the securest among our possessions, were 
taken from us: the ability to exchange experiences.25 
Walter Benjamin 
 
The historian is a prophet turned backward.26 
Friedrich Schlegel 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
23 The title refers to Benjamin’s title ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ in (Benjamin, 1998: 27) 
24 Goethe is quoted in (Benjamin, 1998: 27) 
25 (Benjamin, 1992: 83) 
26 Schlegel is quoted in (Heath, 1999: 172) 
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Chapter 1: 
Walter Benjamin and the Critical Potential  
of Art and Literature 
 
A large amount of the diverse and highly eclectic work of the philosopher, cultural and 
literary critic Walter Benjamin, is inspired by questions of epistemology. Although his main 
intellectual aspiration was to recreate criticism – and specifically, literary criticism – as a 
genre27, a number of questions persistently reappear as the theoretical background in his 
writings. Such questions concern, firstly, the relationship between knowledge and experience 
and, secondly, the role of art and literature in establishing access to and generation of 
knowledge. Benjamin’s life-long search for methods of art criticism other than the 
descriptive-analytic art history of his day, is underpinned by his skepticism of the methods, 
validity and scope of knowledge: “Truth resists being projected into the realm of 
knowledge”.28 
This skepticism is apparent in his early work, such as in his first and only completed 
book entitled The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1928)29. Famously, Benjamin’s thesis on 
the seventeenth-century German baroque drama went well beyond its specific subject matter, 
ambitiously theorising on a plethora of issues, such as on art, science, philosophy and 
representation. Bearing in mind the strict scholarly conventions of early twentieth-century 
German philosophy, Benjamin opened the thesis with the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’, 
which includes a quote by the Romantic literary writer Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Goethe 
                                                           
27 Graeme Gilloch (2002a: 1) mentions that Benjamin was explicit about his aspirations as literary critic in his 
correspondence to his friend and Judaic scholar Gershom Scholem. 
28 Benjamin (1998: 29) argues: “Truth, bodied forth in the dance of represented ideas, resists being projected, by 
whatever means, into the realm of knowledge”. I used a shorter version of the above quote, which can be found in 
(Sontag, 1979: 25). 
29 George Steiner (1998: 10-11) mentions that this book was initially written as Benjamin’s doctorate thesis, his 
Habilitationsschrift, at the University of Frankfurt, but was rejected by the university examiners as 
incomprehensible. In his correspondence to a friend, Benjamin expressed his skepticism towards scholarship by 
claiming that the necessary research and discipline of scholarly form makes of “every completed-work the death-
mask of its intention”. Steiner (1998: 7) also notes that, despite being unsuccessful academically, the book was 
published in Berlin in 1928 under the German title Ursprung des deutchen Trauerspiels. Richard Wolin (1994:79) 
further argues that the ‘Epistemo-Critical’ prologue of the thesis probably represents one of the few independent 
statements by Benjamin solely concerned with the theory of knowledge and epistemology.  
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compares art, to knowledge and reflection in order to praise art as a worthy endeavour that 
brings on a “wholeness”; since it combines the “internal” and the “external”, whilst also 
reflecting something of the “general” in the “individual work”. Goethe further proposes to 
“think of science as art” (Benjamin, 1998: 27). Later on from the quote, Benjamin expresses 
his doubt, further questioning whether philosophical writing should conform to an exclusive 
“doctrine” of “historical codification” (Benjamin, 1998: 27). Instead, Benjamin argues, that 
similarly to art, philosophical writing faces “the task of representation” due to the essentially 
symbolic nature of language: philosophy uses words to represent ‘ideas’30. Benjamin goes on 
to extend this discussion to art criticism and critical writing, which he envisaged to be beyond 
the schematic, deductive and dissociative criticism that was oriented towards the ‘genre’ or 
‘style’. Instead, as he saw it, it was a creative exchange between the critic and the unique 
work of art; an exchange through which the truth and meaning of the artwork is revealed and 
re-presented as an ‘idea’ by the critic.31  
Benjamin’s preoccupation with representational issues within philosophical and 
critical writing was partly inspired by his studies of early Romantic thought. He recognised a 
certain critical potency within the ideas of Romanticism that proposed a rejection of 
                                                           
30 As Benjamin (1998: 27) stated: “It is characteristic of philosophical writing that it must continually confront the 
question of representation”. Moreover, Benjamin (1998: 32) argued that: “If it is the task of the philosopher to 
practice the kind of description of the world of ideas which automatically includes and absorbs the empirical 
world, then he occupies an elevated position between that of the scientist and the artist”. 
31 Criticising German physiologist Karl Friedrich Burdach, Benjamin (1998: 41) claimed: “But in the last analysis 
a methodology must not be presented in negative terms, as something determined by the simple fear of inadequacy 
on a factual level, a set of warnings. It must rather proceed from convictions of a higher order than are provided by 
the point of view of scientific verism.” Benjamin (1998:43) also made references to Benedetto Croce and his 
criticism of the deductive concept of genre in the philosophy of art; more specifically, he quoted form Croce’s The 
Essence of Aesthetic (1913): “Any conceivable theory of the division of the arts is untenable. The genre or the 
class is, in this case, a single one: art itself, or the intuition; the individual works of art, on the other hand, are 
infinite in number: all are original, and none can be translated into another...Considered philosophically, nothing is 
interposed between the universal and the individual, no sequence of genres or species, no generalia.”  
As Steiner (1998: 21) notes: “What Benjamin polemicises against is the unworried dissociation between 
scholarly-critical styles of analysis and the privileged, irreducibly autonomous objects of such analysis, a 
dissociation that is particularly damaging in respect of works of art and letters. Category will locate and classify 
form, but form generates category. Being itself composed of language, the poem or play must elicit from its 
interpreter, who is working in and with words, a co-active, formally and substantively cognate, indeed mirroring 
response.” Wolin (1994: 82) also makes references to Benjamin’s concept of the ‘truth content’ of the work of art, 
by noting that this was “an aspect which had been, since the German romantics, wholly neglected in German 
critical and aesthetic discourse”. Furthermore, he quotes Benjamin from the German publication Briefe (edited by 
Scholem and Adorno): “Criticism is in relation to these considerations (where it is identical with interpretation and 
in opposition to all current methods of understanding art) the presentation of an idea.” (Wolin, 1994: 83) 
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Enlightenment ideals and, by virtue, an emphasis upon the mystical;32 as discussed by Graeme 
Gilloch (2002a: 28) below: 
 
Breaking with the prevailing artistic orthodoxies of neoclassicism, the 
early Romantics explored and developed new modes of aesthetic 
appreciation and a conceptual vocabulary appropriate to the modern 
spirit of intellectual critique and revolutionary transformation [...] This 
forward-looking, pioneering sensibility of the Romantics was not that of 
Enlightenment thought, with its emphasis on the disenchantment of 
nature, scientific rationality and calculation. Rather – and for Benjamin 
this was of the utmost significance – early Romanticism retained a 
deeply mystical understanding of art and criticism as emanations and/or 
reminders of a pure, poetic original language. 
 
It is within such an intellectual context that Benjamin proposes the method of ‘immanent 
critique’, which he intends to unfold meaning from within the artwork. The Romantics had 
first conceived of such a method, inspired by Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s idea of the subject 
coming to self-consciousness and self-understanding through an infinite process of self-
reflection; thus, the work of art comes to “reflect upon itself” through criticism33. Through this 
process, the meaning of the artwork is disclosed. However, the meaning is not fixed, nor 
relevant to an initial authorial intention, but is continually construed anew through the 
practice of critique, which reveals conceptual associations between works of art. As Gilloch 
                                                           
32 As Gilloch (2002a: 27) mentions, between 1917 and 1919, before starting writing his thesis on German Baroque 
drama, Benjamin wrote his doctoral dissertation entitled The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism. 
Gilloch (2002a: 29) further explains that: “Early Romanticism combined an emphasis upon forms of mystical 
illumination and intuitive insight which were anathema to Enlightenment thought with an insistence upon critical 
rigour and sobriety that distinguished it from the irrationalism of more recent movements.”  
33 “In the Romantics’ conception of ‘immanent critique’, Fichte’s idea of the human individual coming to self-
consciousness and self-understanding through a never-ending process of self-reflection is transposed to the work 
of art. For the Romantics, criticism provides the successive mirrors in which the artwork comes to reflect upon 
itself and thereby disclose its meaning and truth.” (Gilloch, 2002a: 21) 
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(2002a: 21) states, for the Romantics, “The self-disclosure of the truth of the work of art 
occurs during its ‘afterlife’, conceived as ongoing criticism and final dissolution.”34 As other 
authors, including Gilloch (2002a: 21) himself have noted, Benjamin’s study of the German 
baroque play sets forth an early experimental form of immanent critique. He deviated from 
the then conventional study of the subject within the established historicist contexts of, say, 
the genre of classical tragedy or the baroque style. Instead, Benjamin looked for the 
conceptual grounding and purpose underlying the work, advocating a mode of ‘melancholy’ 
(Benjamin, 1998: 147-149) as the method of understanding the “secret bonds of association” 
(Benjamin, 1996: 141), crucial for the non-reductive method of critique and interpretation that 
he advocated.35 
As has been shown so far, Benjamin lays the foundations for his critical theory as 
well as for modern criticism, by setting forth a number of key methodological and 
epistemological questions. George Steiner, in his introduction to the English translation of 
Benjamin’s The Origin of German Tragic Drama, notes:  
 
How can there be a general and generalising treatment of artistic-
literary objects which are, by definition, unique? Is it possible to escape 
historical relativism or the vacant dogmatics of historicism while, at the 
                                                           
34 Gilloch (2002a: 21) further explains that: “In the Romantics’ conception of ‘immanent critique’, Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte’s idea of the human individual coming to self-consciousness and self-understanding through a never-ending 
process of self-reflection is transposed to the work of art. For the Romantics, criticism provides the successive 
mirrors in which the artwork comes to reflect upon itself and thereby disclose its meaning and truth. Truth does not 
reside in the intentions of the author, but is continually constituted anew through the work of critique until, 
recognising its relationship with other works of art, the artwork takes its rightful place within the pantheon of art, 
dissolving itself into the idea of Art.”  
35 This aspect of Benjamin’s philosophy was influenced by the Romantics, and in particular by Friedrich Schlegel, 
who was one of the leaders of the early Romantic school. In The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism, 
Benjamin discussed extensively Schlegel’s ideas, especially his views on epistemology and art criticism. Schlegel, 
an ‘artist-philosopher’ as Benjamin (1996: 137) called him, was critical of an approach to knowledge via a 
systematisation according to formal categories. Instead, he was a proponent of a conceptual and intuitive approach, 
which values ‘immediate’ knowledge that is not dissimilar to knowledge that is acquired through perception 
(Benjamin, 1996: 147). Schlegel found the possibility for ‘immediacy’ in language itself. As Benjamin wrote: 
“...words often understand themselves better than do those who use them...that there must exist among 
philosophical words...secret bonds of association...and that one gets the purest and most genuine 
incomprehensibility precisely from the science and the art that are intrinsically absorbed by the process of 
comprehending and of rendering comprehensible – that is from philosophy and philology.” (Benjamin, 1996: 141) 
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same time, being faithful to the temporal specificity, even 
unrecaptulability of one’s documents? Can the interpreter interpret 
‘outside’ his own self and moment? (Benjamin, 1998: 23) 
 
Benjamin’s preoccupation with the process of interpretation has often been interpreted itself 
as being a clear indication of his resonance with the Frankfurt School of social critical theory 
– although, as noted in Gilloch (2002a: 18-19) and in Highmore (2002: 60), the fit between 
Benjamin and the School is a far from neat one; and in fact it is highly complex. Put simply, 
the Frankfurt School for Social Research, which consisted of several early modern, 
psychoanalytically inspired, Marxist thinkers, elucidated a critical approach that endeavoured 
to transform society through enlightenment and by emancipation. Although both Benjamin 
and the school propagated a self-reflective attitude, social critical theory focused mainly upon 
the processes that constructed and produced cultural phenomena in modern society36. 
Ultimately, the School’s emphasis on process, which can be traced back to Kant’s 
philosophy37, was to remain highly significant and influential. In one sense, Benjamin’s 
interest in self-reflective criticism certainly places him within this context. He acknowledges 
this at various instances by condemning, other, non self-critical approaches. For example, he 
claims that, “The reasons for the uncritical use of inductive methods have always been the 
same: on the one hand the love of variety and, on the other hand, indifference to intellectual 
rigour” (Benjamin, 1998: 39-40). However, as already mentioned, his ideas on immanent 
criticism drew also upon the metaphysical tradition of Romantic thought, distinguishing him 
                                                           
36 Raymond Geuss (1981: 1-2) discusses the particular approach of the ‘Frankfurt School’, which included German 
philosophers such as Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Max Horkheimer. In his discussion, Geuss points at 
the ‘emancipatory’ and ‘enlightening’ intentions of the critical social theory of the ‘Frankfurt School’. 
Furthermore, he mentions that this theory differs to scientific theories, which are ‘objectifying’, because it is 
‘reflective’. 
37 In particular Kant’s idea that philosophy involves self-critical activity, and the focus of his philosophy on the 
construction and production of human experience, as they were expressed in the Critique of Pure Reason. See 
Caygill’s introduction in (Kant, 2003: v-xxvi). 
 31 
from the Frankfurt School’s more orthodox Marxist critical theories.38 Furthermore, as I will 
discuss in the following subchapters, Benjamin’s ideas offer a distinct approach to history and 
historiography. 
 
1.a: Historicism and Interpretation 
 
Benjamin saw criticism as interconnected with history. In much of his writing, he was 
preoccupied with methods of historiography and their dependence upon methods of 
epistemology. For Benjamin, there is an intrinsic engagement of the art critic with history, 
which he argued, should not, however, follow historicist practices: 
 
What concerns me is the idea of how works of art are related to historical 
life. What is certain to me is that there is no such thing as art history [...] 
The attempt to situate the work of art in historical development does not 
open perspectives which lead to its intrinsic being... Current 
investigations in the history of art lead only to the history of form or 
content, for which works of art appear only as examples or models, as it 
were; a history of the works of art themselves never comes into question. 
There is nothing which links them both extensively and intensively... 
The specific historicity of works of art is in any event one which is never 
revealed in ‘art history’, but only in interpretation. In interpretation 
mutual relations between works of art emerge which are a-temporal, 
though not without importance from a historical point of view. Namely, 
                                                           
38 Peter Demetz in (Benjamin, 1986: vii-viii) notes Benjamin’s affinity for “the traditions of Romantic 
metaphysics”, whilst he also mentions that Gersom Scholem, Benjamin’s closest friend, suggested in his memoirs 
that Benjamin was “a religious if not a mystical thinker who may have been tempted, against the grain of his 
sensibilities, to superimpose the terms of Marxist discourse upon his metaphysical vision of God, language, and a 
society ontologically in need of salvation”. Also Gilloch (2002a: 19) describes tensions in Benjamin’s 
relationships with Siegfried Kracauer and Theodor Adorno of the Frankfurt School, because of “Benjamin’s 
theological vocabulary”, and, mostly, his idea of immanent criticism, which, according to Adorno, could provide 
“highly subjective (mis)readings”.   
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the same powers which in the world of revelation (which is history) 
become temporal in an explosive and extensive way, appear intensively 
in the world of reticence (which is the world of nature and works of art).39    
 
In this sense, and by concentrating on the “intrinsic being” of the work, interpretation and 
history are intertwined: through the interpretation of the work of art, the ‘idea’ behind the 
work becomes apparent; thus, linking it with other works of a different historical time, which 
nonetheless share a similar philosophical ‘origin’40. Therefore, such a conceptual-interpretive 
approach to the artwork sheds light on the a-temporal relations between different works: in 
the sense that the works are not of a similar chronological period, or attributable to a 
chronological timeframe of linear succession. By tracing the philosophical links between 
different artworks, their ‘formal’ similarities and characteristics can be understood as 
autonomous from specific chronological periods. Benjamin termed this as ‘philosophical 
history’41; he further praised this kind of history for possessing dialectical qualities that 
distinguish it from descriptive histories of ‘evolutionary’ progression: 
 
In literary-historical analysis differences and extremes are brought 
together in order that they might be relativised in evolutionary terms. In 
a conceptual treatment they acquire the status of complementary forces, 
                                                           
39 This excerpt from Benjamin’s ‘Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften’ is translated and quoted in Wolin (1994: 83). 
40 Benjamin employed the term ‘origin’ throughout the thesis. In the following excerpt included in Benjamin 
(1998: 47), he specifically relates this concept to history: “There takes place in every original phenomenon a 
determination of the form in which an idea will constantly confront the historical world, until it is revealed 
fulfilled, in the totality of its history. Origin is not, therefore, discovered by the examination of actual findings, but 
it is related to their history and their subsequent development. The principles of philosophical contemplation are 
recorded in the dialectic, which is inherent in origin. This dialectics shows singularity and repetition to be 
conditioned by one another in all essentials.” 
41 Benjamin (1998: 47) used the term ‘philosophical history’; he further explained that: “Philosophical history, the 
science of the origin, is the form which, in the remotest extremes and the apparent excesses of the process of 
development, reveals the configuration of the idea – the sum total of all possible meaningful juxtapositions of such 
opposites.” 
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and history is seen as no more than the coloured border to their 
crystalline simultaneity. (Benjamin, 1998: 38) 
 
In one of his later essays, entitled ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ (1940), Benjamin 
further expanded his critique of historicism. He described the traditional historiographer as “a 
chronicler who recites events without distinguishing between major and minor ones” and 
“acts in accordance with the following truth: nothing that has ever happened should be 
regarded as lost for history” (Benjamin, 1992: 246). For Benjamin, the uncritical recording of 
events that is considered to document the past “the way it really was” (Benjamin, 1992: 247), 
provides only a universal history; which usually favours the ruling classes. Although the 
Marxist influence is more apparent in this piece of writing, Benjamin here remains consistent 
with his earlier ideas on a philosophical interpretation of the past; as he further argued: 
 
Historicism rightly culminates in universal history. Materialistic 
historiography differs from it as to method more clearly than from any 
other kind. Universal history has no theoretical armature. Its method is 
additive; it musters a mass of data to fill the homogeneous, empty time. 
Materialistic historiography, on the other hand, is based on a 
constructive principle. Thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts, 
but their arrest as well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a 
configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, 
by which it crystallises into a monad. A historical materialist approaches 
a historical subject only where he encounters it as a monad.42  (Benjamin, 
1992: 254)  
                                                           
42 Wolin (1994: 96) comments that Benjamin’s “theoretical reliance on the metaphysical tradition becomes 
especially apparent in his employment of the categories of ‘origin’ and ‘monad’ to illustrate the being of ideas.” 
Wolin (1994: 99) further explains, quoting Benjamin, that: “The category of ‘monad’ serves as an additional 
illustration of the being and specificity of the idea. Like origin, the monad knows history not in terms of its 
extensive empirical being, but as something integral and essential: ‘Its history is inward in character and is not to 
be understood as something boundless, but as something related to essential being, and it can therefore be 
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1.b: The Storyteller and the History-teller 
 
In another essay from the later period of Benjamin’s work, called ‘The Storyteller: 
Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov’ (1936), historiography outside historicism is 
also discussed, but this time in relationship to storytelling. Referring to one of the first 
historiographers, the Greek Herodotus, Benjamin (1992: 89) argued that Herodotus’s work is 
essentially that of a storyteller: “The first storyteller of the Greeks was Herodotus. In the 
fourteenth chapter of his Histories there is a story from which much can be learned.” 
Benjamin went on to further argue that historiography could be the framework for all epic 
forms:  
 
Any examination of a given epic form is concerned with the relationship 
of this form to historiography. In fact, one may go even further and raise 
the question whether historiography does not constitute the common 
ground of all forms of the epic. Then written history would be in the 
same relationship to the epic forms as white light is to the colours of the 
spectrum. (Benjamin, 1992: 95)  
 
Here, Benjamin describes historiography as a common framework between certain literary 
forms, drawing upon his discussion of storytelling as a means of passing on experience. As 
Benjamin (1992: 96-97) explained, in the classical tradition of the Greeks, memory was the 
muse of the epic arts. Furthermore, memory keeps record of a happening; thus, aids the 
passing on of the event to future generations. If the process of recording events is essential to 
historiography and the epic, then it is reasonable that the writing of an epic story might 
                                                                                                                                                                         
described as the past and subsequent history of this being. The past and subsequent history of such essences is, as a 
sign of their redemption or collection in the preserve of the world of ideas, not pure history, but natural history’.” 
He further comments on Benjamin’s note: “The idea is a monad – that means briefly: every idea contains the 
image of the world. The purpose of the representation of the idea is nothing less than an abbreviated outline of this 
image of the world” (Benjamin, 1998: 48). Wolin (1994: 100) discusses further this extract, claiming that: “The 
concept of monad therefore attempts to stress the irreducible individuality of the ideas as opposed to their 
traditional hierarchical ordering within the philosophical system.”  
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resemble the writing of history. Or put another way, like a historiographer, the storyteller 
constructs ‘stories’ from experiences:  
 
The storyteller takes what he tells from experience – his own or that 
reported by others. And he in turn makes it the experience of those who 
are listening to his tale. (Benjamin, 1992: 87) 
 
In order to delve deeper into Benjamin’s meaning of experience discussed above, it is 
important to note that the German lexicon defines ‘experience’ in two separate ways, 
represented by the wording: Erlebnis and Erfahrung. Thus, a differentiation is formed 
between the experience that relates to the practical encounter with an event (Erlebnis), and the 
experience that relates to knowledge acquired over time (Erfahrung); as argued by Ben 
Highmore (2002: 66-67) in the following: 
 
As for many German writers, for Benjamin the investigation of 
experience plays on the nuanced distinction between experience as that 
which is simply lived-through (Erlebnis) and experience as something 
that can be accumulated, reflected upon and communicated (Erfahrung). 
If Erlebnis is immediate it also tends towards being incohate (it is pre-
language, pre-reflection). Erfahrung on the other hand is what makes 
Erlebnis socially meaningful; it is the point at which experience is 
examined and evaluated. 
 
It is clear when making a closer reading of Benjamin’s ‘The Storyteller’, that the distinction 
between ‘lived-through’ and ‘accumulated’ experience underlies his definition of storytelling. 
For Benjamin, storytelling in the modern world serves as a way of reconnecting with what he 
calls ‘communicable experience’ – a world where experience as Erfahrung has lost its value:  
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Less and less frequently do we encounter people with the ability to tell a 
tale properly. More and more often there is embarrassment all around 
when the wish to hear a story is expressed. It is as if something that 
seemed inalienable to us, the securest among our possessions, were 
taken from us: the ability to exchange experiences. (Benjamin, 1992: 83-
84) 
 
Subsequently, Benjamin explained that parallel to the continued decline of communication 
and exchange of experiences within modern society, there has been a decline in the value and 
use of narrative: “The art of storytelling is reaching its end because the epic side of truth, 
wisdom, is dying out” (Benjamin, 1992: 86). 
Moreover, Benjamin attempted to trace how the decline of communication of 
experience as accumulated knowledge has influenced the processes of writing modern 
history. Thus, he reflected on the condition of information in the modern world, by discussing 
the relationships, between, the chronicler and the modern historian. For Benjamin, the 
evolving role of information in modern society as a “new form of communication” is 
interrelated with the increased value of “prompt verifiability” – the immediate – and 
“plausibility” – the factual (Benjamin, 1992: 88). However, history in its epic form, even 
when considered in the less literary version of the classical chronicle, does not provide 
plausible accounts. The chronicler of the Middle Ages, as Benjamin (1992: 95) argued, 
creates “historical tales” that cannot be considered to demonstrate accuracy or a definite 
explanation (of events). Rather, he considered the chronicler’s factuality to be replaced by 
interpretation as it is conditioned by “the divine plan of salvation” ubiquitous within Medieval 
practices of scholarship:  
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By basing their historical tales on a divine plan of salvation – an 
inscrutable one – they have from the very start lifted the burden of 
demonstrable explanation from their own shoulders. Its place is taken by 
interpretation, which is not concerned with an accurate concatenation of 
definite events, but with the way these are embedded in the great 
inscrutable course of the world. (Benjamin, 1992: 95) 
 
Although the chronicler is the precursor of the modern historian in tone and style of writing, 
the chronicler has, in this sense, more in common with the storyteller: he is a teller of history, 
a “history-teller” (Benjamin, 1992: 95). 
 Characteristically of Benjamin, ‘The Storyteller’ essay is written in a fragmented and 
aphoristic way; therefore, no explicit argument is developed.43 However, I propose that, in 
fact, throughout the essay, Benjamin adopts an implicit critical position towards modern 
historiography, as the balance of his argument is against the reduction of interpretative 
narrative in historiography.44 Furthermore, I believe that Benjamin is consistent in his 
implication that, for modernity, historiography as historicism that communicates information 
has largely replaced historiography that serves as narrative. Thus, Erfahrung has been 
dominated by Erlebnis, and with that has come the decline of historian as history-teller; as 
Benjamin wrote: 
 
Every morning brings us the news of the globe, and yet we are poor in 
noteworthy stories. This is because no event any longer comes to us 
                                                           
43 What Susan Sontag (2001: 129) calls ‘freeze-frame baroque’. Sontag (2001: 129) remarks that, in Benjamin's 
texts, “sentences do not seem to generate in the ordinary way; they do not entail”, therefore they do not create an 
obvious line of reasoning. Instead, it is as if each sentence “had to say everything, before the inward gaze of total 
concentration dissolved the subject before his eyes”.  
44 In the essay ‘The author as producer’ (1934), Benjamin argued more explicitly in favour of the political role of 
literature in modern life; as he stated: “You will find this confirmed: only the literalisation of all the conditions of 
life provides an accurate conception of the range of this melting-down process, just as the state of the class 
struggle determines the temperature at which – more or less perfectly – it is accomplished.” (Benjamin, 1999b: 
776)  
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without already being shot through with explanation [...] Actually, it is 
half the art of storytelling to keep a story free from explanation as one 
reproduces it. Leskov is the master at this. The most extraordinary 
things, marvelous things, are related with the greatest accuracy, but the 
psychological connection of the events is not forced on the reader. It is 
left up to him to interpret things the way he understands them, and thus 
the narrative achieves an amplitude that information lacks. (Benjamin, 
1992: 89) 
 
Benjamin picks up on the tension between modern storytelling and historiography. In 
reaction, he proposes a historiography that is open to an interpretive critical reading that could 
be largely inspired by the form of literary narrative that does not put forward a particular 
explanation or view of events as truthful. Instead, it allows for the reader’s interpretations, 
whilst offering something “useful”:  
 
All this points to the nature of every real story. It contains, openly or 
covertly, something useful. The usefulness may, in one case, consist in a 
moral; In another, in some practical advice; In a third, in a proverb or 
maxim. (Benjamin, 1992: 86) 
 
‘The Storyteller’ is clearly inspired by the work of Nikolai Leskov, a Russian writer 
influenced by the tradition of storytelling, who produced work spanning across journalism, 
novel and short story writing. According to Benjamin, the authorship of Leskov, inclusive of 
openly subjective commentary, humour and irony, is a model example of writing, which 
allows for the interpretative and critical engagement of the reader.45 Benjamin’s advocacy of a 
                                                           
45 Benjamin had previously discussed journalistic writing in a similar context, in the essay ‘The author as 
producer’. This essay focused on the work of another Russian journalist and literary writer, Sergei Tretiakov. 
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writing that is open to an interpretive critical reading is related to his Marxist, anti-capitalist 
views; as stated in his essay ‘The Author as Producer’ (1934): “For in Western Europe the 
newspaper does not constitute a serviceable instrument of production in the hands of the 
writer. It still belongs to capital” (Benjamin, 1999b: 772). Finally, the last part of this section 
will discuss Benjamin’s philosophical understanding of the role of storytelling and literature 
for critical writing.  
 
Chapter 2: 
The ‘Experiencing Subject’ as Narrator, Writer and Critic 
 
So far, I have discussed Walter Benjamin’s ideas on criticism and historiography, with 
mention of the influences from his philosophical engagement with art and literature. I have 
begun to examine how his conception of art and literature within an epistemological 
framework shaped his ideas on historiography and criticism against and beyond historicism: 
“The critic has nothing in common with the interpreter of past cultural epochs” (Benjamin, 
1996: 460). Various critics have described Benjamin as a thinker that did not strive for a 
coherent position.46 This attitude resonates with his view of the past, which is not a 
historicism, nor a total construct or a ‘grand narrative’, but consists of historical fragments 
that relate to each other in a conceptual and metaphysical way through reference and 
interrelation.  
Furthermore, I have drawn upon Benjamin’s discussion of storytelling in order to 
demonstrate how literary writing may provide an example, or even a background, for 
historical writing. Upon closer examination of Benjamin’s literary theory, it becomes clear 
                                                           
46 As Sontag (1979: 27) notes: “Passionately, but also ironically, Benjamin placed himself at the crossroads. It was 
important for him to keep his many ‘positions’ open: the theological, the Surrealsit/aesthetic, the communist. One 
position corrects another: he needed them all. Decisions of course, tended to spoil the balance of these positions, 
vacillation kept everything in place.”  
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that he dismisses the formalistic preoccupations of writing, in order that it can be reconsidered 
in its historical dimensions. As Benjamin claimed in ‘The Author as Producer’:  
 
There were not always novels in the past, and there will not always have 
to be; there have not always been tragedies or great epics. Not always 
were the forms of commentary, translation, indeed even so-called 
plagiarism playthings in the margins of literature; they had a place not 
only in the philosophical but also in the literary writings of Arabia and 
China. (Benjamin, 1999b: 771)  
 
From this perspective, as long as the writer is aware of the historical, and often ideological, 
nature of writing, he/she can be critical of formal notions; and “the conventional distinction 
between genres, between writer and poet, between scholar and populariser [...] between 
author and reader” (Benjamin, 1999b: 772). Therefore, writing that oscillates between 
differing stylistic conventions opens up to the reader’s interpretation. 
Crucially for the argument put forward in this dissertation, I have integrated an aspect 
of what Benjamin describes as the blurring between different categories of writing. I am 
specifically interested in how the roles of historiography, criticism and storytelling can be 
interchangeable. Furthermore, I wish to expand upon my earlier discussion by drawing upon 
the Benjaminian idea of experience to explore the notion of the ‘experiencing subject’ as 
narrator/storyteller, historiographer, and critic.  
 The idea of experience is central to Benjamin’s critical theory and philosophy, which, 
as I have already discussed, sought to establish, among other things, an epistemological 
connection with Romanticism. Howard Caygill has situated Benjamin’s critique within the 
context of Romantic art criticism, which he sees as an extension to Kantian aesthetics: 
“Benjamin saw the Romantics extending a speculative side of critique that was latent but 
underdeveloped in Kant’s transcendental philosophy. In this he identified the beginnings of 
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art criticism as opposed to the judgment of art” (Caygill, 1998: 41-42). Within this process, 
Benjamin had to re-conceive experience beyond Kantian transcendentalism; as Caygill (1998: 
2) argues: 
 
In his critique of Kant’s concept of experience, Benjamin not only 
extended the neo-Kantian attempt to dissolve the distinction between 
intuition and understanding, but went further in seeking a concept of 
‘speculative experience’. This recast the distinction between 
intuition/understanding and reason into an avowed metaphysics of 
experience in which the absolute manifests itself in spatio-temporal 
experience, but indirectly in complex, tortuous and even violent forms.  
  
Furthermore, according to Caygill (1998: 3), such a re-conceptualisation of experience “put 
into question a further assumption of the critical philosophy, namely the distinction between 
the activity of reason and understanding and the passivity of intuition, as well as that between 
the visual (geometrical) axioms of intuition and the acroamatic (discursive/linguistic) 
categories of the understanding.” In the context of storytelling, experience takes the form of 
the story. Traditionally, this is communicated and circulated orally; as Benjamin (1992: 84) 
stated, “Experience which is passed on from mouth to mouth is the source from which all 
storytellers have drawn.” As mentioned above, in the Benjaminian sense, “experience is not 
primarily linguistic, it does not take place within the field of linguistic signification” (Caygill, 
1998: xiv). Therefore, I would suggest that experience, in the Benjaminian context, is instead 
a lived and concrete reality, intrinsically connected with human life. Benjamin went further to 
compare the storyteller to a craftsman that works with “raw material”: 
 
In fact, one can go on and ask oneself whether the relationship of the 
storyteller to his material, human life, is not in itself a craftsman’s 
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relationship, whether it is not his very task to fashion the raw material 
of experience, his own and that of others, in a solid, useful, and unique 
way. (Benjamin, 1992: 106-107)  
 
It is perhaps paradoxical to conceive of something linguistic as a physical reality. However, I 
believe that this idea is revealing of the complexity of Benjamin’s concept of experience, and 
its ambition to bridge over the intuitive and the rational. Such an understanding further 
justifies Benjamin’s characterisation of the storyteller as ‘craftsman’ several times in the 
essay47: 
  
The storytelling that thrives for a long time in the milieu of work – the 
rural, the maritime, and the urban – is itself an artisan form of 
communication, as it were. It does not aim to convey the pure essence of 
the thing, like information or a report. It sinks the thing into the life of 
the storyteller, in order to bring it out of him again. Thus traces of the 
storyteller cling to the story the way the handprints of the potter cling to 
the clay vessel. Storytellers tend to begin their story with a presentation 
of the circumstances in which they themselves have learned what is to 
follow, unless they simply pass it off as their own experience. (Benjamin, 
1992: 91)  
 
It is significant to note the Romantic influence that is particularly obvious in this extract. In 
his thesis The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism (1920)48, Benjamin (1996: 121) 
                                                           
47 In the same essay, Benjamin quoted Russian writer Nikolai Leskov, who claimed that “Writing is to me no 
liberal art, but a craft.” (Benjamin, 1992: 91) 
48 This was Benjamin’s doctoral dissertation at the University of Bern, which was published in 1920. According to 
Caygill (1998: 41), this thesis, a predecessor of The Origin of German Tragic Drama, was initially conceived as an 
attempt to “extend and enrich Kant’s concept of experience”. However, as Caygill (1998: 41) further mentions, 
Benjamin soon realised that “Kant’s aesthetics constitute the underlying premise of Romantic art criticism”, 
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discussed the early Romantic view that reflection and cognition are inseparable. He further 
drew upon Fichte’s idea of reflective thought as a transformative practice that operates on a 
formal level: “Thus, by ‘reflection’ is understood the transformative – and nothing but 
transformative – activity of reflecting on a form” (Benjamin, 1996: 122). This is clearly 
relevant to storytelling, which, as we have discussed, is for Benjamin the form by which 
experience is communicated. In ‘The Storyteller’, the story is described as something that is 
constantly reconfigured through the experience of communication, thus, the telling of the 
story; which can be considered as a reflective process. Furthermore, there is the implication 
that this activity of reconfiguration via storytelling can be potentially infinite49 – as long as the 
story is being told, it is being transformed. Benjamin describes this process as almost 
mystical50: 
 
Seen in this way, the storyteller joins the ranks of the teachers and sages 
[...] For it is granted to him to reach back to a whole lifetime (a life, 
incidentally, that comprises not only his own experience but no little of 
the experience of others; what the storyteller knows from hearsay is 
added to his own). His gift is the ability to relate his life; his distinction, 
to be able to tell his entire life. The storyteller: he is the man who could 
let the wick of his life be consumed completely by the gentle flame of his 
story. (Benjamin, 1992: 107)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
therefore the thesis focused on a reading of Kant through the early Romantics, mainly F. Schlegel, but also Novalis 
and Goethe.  
49 Benjamin (1996: 123-124) discussed extensively Fichte’s conception of the reflective and positing ‘I’. In this 
discussion, he mentioned that Fichte recognised “two infinite modes of action for the ‘I’, adding to reflection the 
action of positing…The active deed is a positing reflection or a reflected position: ‘a self-positing as positing…but 
in no way a mere positing’…According to Fichte, the ‘I’ sees an infinite activity as its essence, which consists in 
positing.” (Benjamin, 1996: 123) 
50 Commenting on Leskov, Benjamin (1992: 105) wrote: “The lower Leskov descends on the scale of created 
things the more obviously does his way of viewing things approach the mystical. Actually, as will be shown, there 
is much evidence that in this, too, a characteristic is revealed which is inherent in the nature of the storyteller”.  
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Discussing further Benjamin’s concept of experience, Caygill notes that, in the context of the 
Romantic view of reflection as transformative infinite process, “reflection occurs in a medium 
and is not the product of a subject” (Caygill, 1998: 42); therefore experience cannot be 
thought in terms of an ‘acting I’, but rather as ‘subject-less’: “The view of experience as 
infinite configuration dissolves any notion of a subject able to occupy a fixed position from 
which to reflect, since all reflections are already infinitely mediated by other reflections” 
(Caygill, 1998: 43-44). Considering this, Benjamin’s account of storytelling as a ‘craft’, and 
as lived practice beyond subjective interpretation, can now be related to his discussion of 
critical historiography.51 By this understanding of storytelling, the ‘experiencing subject’ 
operates outside of the traditional idea of subjectivity that presupposes a fixed perspective; 
instead the perspective of the ‘experiencing subject’ is constantly reconfigured through his or 
her encounter with the story. Therefore, the storyteller-as-narrator of past events, recounts 
those events through a reflective lived practice; involving, and retaining the potential to 
involve, multiple subjectivities: those of ‘tellers’ or ‘listeners’. To conclude, Benjamin’s 
conception of history; firstly, as a tracing of a-temporal relations between different historical 
objects; and secondly, as a critical history that is open to interpretation; sits well within his 
conception of experience: where reflective thinking and infinite interpretative process come 
together. In this context, strorytelling can be conceived to be an open-ended and collective 
process of making history, where the ‘experiencing subject’ plays a fundamental role as a 
critical narrator of history.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
51 Sontag (1979: 18) claims that: “Benjamin’s propensity is to go against the usual interpretation; since ‘all human 
knowledge takes the form of interpretation’, he understood the importance of being against interpretation wherever 
it is obvious; his most common strategy is to drain symbolism out of some things…and pour it into others, where 
nobody suspects its existence”.  
 45 
 
 
Section [2]: 
The Critical Aesthetics of Modern Urbanism 
 
 
 
 
 
The process of observation is at the same time a subjective and objective process, an ideal and 
real experiment.52  
Novalis 
 
Romanticism was substituting for reasoned appreciation of architecture, an attitude affective, 
emotional, and indirect in the extreme.53 
Henry-Russell Hitchcock 
 
Why should there be anything wrong about feeling at home in a world that appears to be the 
result of our own activity?54  
Maurice Blanchot 
 
Experiences are lived similarities.55 
Walter Benjamin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
52 Novalis is quoted in (Benjamin, 1996: 148) 
53 (Hitchcock, 1970: 11) 
54 (Haase and Large, 2001: 57)  
55 (Benjamin, 1999b: 553) 
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Chapter 1: 
Space and Subjectivity in Early Modern German Aesthetics 
  
The widely held, contemporary, view of space as an integral constituent of architecture is only a 
relatively recent conception. It is well established, in contemporary discourses of architectural 
history, that, until the nineteenth century, the notion of space was understood solely as a 
metaphysical concept, without ever being thought of in aesthetic, physical – or real – terms. 
However, the appropriation of the notion of space within the plastic arts, such as architecture 
and sculpture, has roots in modernity; as is claimed by Adrian Forty (2000: 256): 
 
As a term, ‘space’ simply did not exist in the architectural vocabulary until 
the 1890s. Its adoption is intimately connected with the developments of 
modernism, and whatever it means, therefore, belongs to the specific 
historical circumstances of modernism, just as is the case with ‘space’s’ 
partners, ‘form’ and ‘design’.  
 
In addition, Cornelis Van de Ven locates the appearance of spatial notions in the plastic arts and 
architecture in the late 1800s:  
 
One will not find one architectural treatise from before the last half of 
the nineteenth century, in which the idea of space is regarded as 
essential if at all. Until then it remained a thought in abstracto, clearly 
reserved for the realm of the philosopher and scientist. (Van de Ven, 
1987: xi)  
  
One of the key themes that interested Van de Ven was how the abstract and intellectual ideas 
of space were expressed in modern German language. Specifically, he analysed the 
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etymology of the German word for ‘space’; raum, which comes from the tectonic ruum, and 
that has informed (through the Germanic line) the English: ‘room’. Significantly, these 
meanings differ from the more abstract term ‘space’, which instead comes from the Latin 
term spatium (Van de Ven, 1987: xiii). Based on this analysis, Van de Ven further argued that 
the German interior, ‘raum’, had provided the first material formalisation of the abstract 
notion of space. Implicit in the formulation he identified, Van de Ven (1987: xiv) saw a re-
conceptualisation of space, as “a sensory perception of reality and an intellectual idea […] 
fused together”.  
 Furthermore, both Van de Ven and Forty advocate an architectural history, which 
attributes this unification, of abstract philosophical concept and architectural form, to German 
aesthetic theories of the late nineteenth century; arguing that this subsequently influenced 
modern architecture and planning.56 In a seminal volume of key essays on early modern 
German aesthetics, translated into English, entitled Empathy, Form and Space (1994), Harry 
Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou discuss the fundamental preoccupation with subjectivity 
that influenced the German aesthetic theory of that period. They claim: “the issues of form 
and space can just as well be viewed preeminently as nineteenth-century aesthetic problems” 
(Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 1). Furthermore, they argue that although bound by Kantian 
enquiry57, German aesthetics demonstrate an original approach to form and space, which 
reflects a particular “modern sensibility” (Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 2); one that 
considers the appreciation of form and space as occurring on a “psychological” level: 
 
                                                           
56 As particularly significant for modern architecture, they discuss the theories of Adolf Hildebrand and August 
Schmarsow, both published in 1893. Forty (2000: 260) discusses Hildebrand’s idea of space as a three dimensional 
continuum containing objects, as being very influential for 1920s architecture. Van de Ven (1987: xiv) mentions 
both theorists as influential for modern architecture; whilst he (1987: 104) further discusses the influence of 
Schmarsow’s ideas on the architect and planner Camillo Sitte. 
57 Mallgrave and Ikonomou (1994: 5-8) refer extensively to Kant’s philosophical schema, including his ideas on 
‘form’ as “pure form of intuition” and “form of thought”, as they were developed in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
They further discuss his notion of ‘purposiveness’ in aesthetic judgments, which was developed in his Critique of 
Judgment. In relation to Kant’s concepts of form, they state that: “Germane to both was the presumption that we 
actively constitute form and space in our schematisation of the world. They are, in effect, mental constructions of 
the observer, the subjective condition under which we sense perception operates.” (Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 
1994: 5)   
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The erstwhile philosophical and physiological problem of how we 
perceive form and space in effect gave way to the fledging psychological 
problem of how we come to appreciate or take delight in the 
characteristics of form and space. Implied in this subtle but at the same 
time dramatic shift was the analogous problem of how we might 
artistically exploit pure form and space as artistic entities in themselves. 
(Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 2) 
 
This attempt to consider space in a less abstract, or a priori manner, but with a continued 
reference to subjective experience, is evident throughout early modern German aesthetic 
theories. Moreover, fundamentally, the conceptions of space that were informed by such 
theories assumed the existence of a psychological, and specifically empathic, response to space 
and form. As Mallgrave and Ikonomou (1994: 17) note, for many of the theories developed 
between the 1870s and 1890s, the idea of subjective feeling was intimately connected with 
spatial and formal perception. Furthermore, they acknowledge the specific role of Robert 
Vischer’s concept Einfühlung – or ‘empathy’, in its approximate English translation – in 
articulating these aesthetic concerns into a theory. Vischer’s Einfühlung (literally ‘in-feeling’), 
describes the process of perception as a combination of sensation and feeling: a physical, but, 
equally, mental and emotional response (Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 22). According to 
Vischer, this process is similar to an emotional ‘transference’, or, a process of reading one’s 
self into an object; or, more broadly speaking, into form and space: 
 
Here it was shown how the body, in responding to certain stimuli in 
dreams, objectifies itself in spatial forms. Thus it unconsciously projects 
its own bodily form – and with this also the soul – into the form of the 
object. From this I derived the notion that I call ‘empathy’. (in Mallgrave 
and Ikonomou, 1994: 92) 
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Although the interpretation of spatial experience as intrinsic to intense emotional activity was 
not without precedent, Vischer’s ideas had an especially significant impact58. Within discourses 
of art history and aesthetics of the time, Vischer’s theory of empathy acquired a popular 
interpretation that drew upon the emphasis on psychological aspects of spatial experience59; as 
noted by Vischer’s contemporary, Hermann Lotze: “For all spatial forms affect us 
aesthetically only insofar as they are symbols of a weal or woe personally experienced by us” 
(in Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 21). However, when considered over the longer-term, the 
idea of empathy can be seen to have had an ambivalent reception. Later German art 
historians, such as Theodor Lipps and Wilhelm Worringer, proposed aesthetic theories that 
incorporated empathy within a central position. Nevertheless, they advocated notions of 
abstraction and geometry in activities of artistic creativity and aesthetic judgment60, which, 
furthermore, could counteract what were held to be negative aspects of empathetic 
experience. In particular, Worringer’s “urge for abstraction” proposed that the search for 
abstract space was in reaction to the so-called horror vacui61. Significantly, Vischer’s 
empathetic theory was associated with early psychoanalytic theories of perception62. In their 
                                                           
58 Mallgrave and Ikonomou (1994: 21) claim that: “In the early 1870s, when doctoral candidate Robert Vischer 
selected as his dissertation topic the problem of emotional projection – for which he coined the new term 
Einfuhlung -   he did so with the philosophical terrain relatively well prepared.” However, further on they state that 
Vischer’s thesis “radically altered the aesthetic discussion of an era” (Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 22). 
59 “Thus Vischer’s early musings on the notion of ‘empathy’ were soon eclipsed by the wealth of psychological 
writings popularising this concept” (Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 2).  
60 Van de Ven (1987: 81) explains that Lipps observed two kinds of space, a ‘geometric’ and an ‘aesthetic’ space: 
the former is what remains after the elimination of the mass, while the latter is the ‘forceful’, ‘vital’ formed space. 
According to Van de Ven (1987: 99-100), Worringer follows the same pattern when he talks about ‘abstraction’ 
and ‘empathy’, the two vital forces in the human mind. Van de Ven (1987: 100) quotes Worringer, claiming that, 
empathy, “man’s desire for organic, naturalistic form”, springs from “a happy pantheistic relationship of 
confidence between man and the phenomena of the external world”; whilst abstraction, the urge for anorganic, 
stylized geometry, is the result of “a great inner unrest, inspired in man by the phenomena of the outside world”. 
Van de Ven (1987: 81) also quotes Lipps, who proposed the elimination of the material carrier, “so that the spatial can 
exist purely”. 
61 In his book Abstraction and Empathy (1908) as mentioned in (Forty, 2000: 236). Van de Ven (1987: 97) claims 
that the idea of the ‘dread of space’ was employed in the theories of Hildebrand, Riegl, Wolfflin, and later 
Worringer. Vidler (2000: 44) also discusses Worringer’s abstraction as a reaction towards the modern mental 
condition of ‘agoraphobia’. 
62 Here, I refer to the psychoanalytic theories of introjection, projection, and identification. As Mallgrave and 
Ikonomou (1994: 24, 28) note, in fact, Freud and Vischer both drew upon the same writings on dream interpretation, 
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discussion of spatial experience as emotional projection, early psychoanalysis described the 
destabilising affect of space upon the subject. Sigmund Freud used the term ‘un-homely’, 
from the unheimlich in German, to describe negative feelings of repulsion and distress; caused 
by familiar architectural settings, such as the house; also manifesting in the modern mental 
diseases related to the experience of modern public space (such as agoraphobia or 
claustrophobia).63   
 Understood simply, the theory of empathy considers the “subjective content” of the 
viewer’s aesthetic contemplation (Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 21). This view is of 
particular importance for the understanding of Benjamin’s ideas on criticism and experience. 
However, before expanding upon these links, I will first take a closer look at the Romantic 
influences on empathetic theory. Thus, I will trace the tensions between ‘empathy’ and 
‘abstraction’, and ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity’, within early German modern aesthetics back 
to Romantic thought.  
 
1.a: Form and the Reflective Subject64  
 
As described in section 1, for the Romantics, reflection through observation of the object was 
considered to be, both subjective and transcendental: subjective, as an immediate cognition and 
transcendental, as a reflective critical process. Furthermore, this process was understood to be 
continuously transformative for the object and the subject. Examining Vischer’s ideas in 
relation to experience of the object, a number of notable resonances with the early Romantics 
                                                                                                                                                                         
such as philosopher’s Karl Albert Scherner The life of the dream (1861) and Johannes Volkelt’s Dream Fantasy 
(1875).  
63 Sigmund Freud (2001: 300) stated that: “Space may be the projection of the extension of the psychical 
apparatus. No other derivation is probable. Instead of Kant’s a priori determinants of our psychical apparatus. 
Psyche is extended; knows nothing about it. – Note of August 22, 1938” 
64 I refer here to Schlegel’s idea of the reflective ‘self’, and Fichte’s idea of the reflective ‘I’, which I will be 
discussing further on. 
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are evident. Vischer’s ‘empathy’ involved more than a purely emotional contact with the 
object:  
 
In sensing and imagining the object, the activity of perception does not, 
however, imply a truly emotional contact with that object. Sensation has 
yet to advance through its partial or total implication with ideas to the 
stage of psychic feeling.  
Before this can happen, a spiritual value or vital force has to be 
perceived within the phenomenon; the human being must pass through 
the realm of experience and education. (Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 
102-103)  
 
Vischer described a hierarchical schema where cognition and perception could be understood 
to occur at distinct stages of relative value. Vischer considered physical sensations to occupy 
the lowest stages. Subsequently, at the second stage, physical sensations are enhanced through 
mental images, or ‘ideas’. At the third and highest level, he placed empathy for the form of 
the object, which he described as a ‘mental-sensory ego’ that was projected into the object 
(Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 23). His schema theorises processes that are beyond the 
cognitive and psychological aspects of experience; thus, resonating with early Romantic ideas 
on ‘reflection’. 
Examining the origins of the theory of empathy, Mallgrave and Ikonomou (1994: 17, 
27-28) state that early Romantic thinkers, such as Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis, were key 
influences on Vischer. As it has been discussed, the Romantics believed in the reciprocity 
between reflective thinking and immediate cognition65. This was first formulated in Fichte’s 
                                                           
65 Benjamin (1996: 121 – 122) mentioned the “reciprocal givenness of reflective thinking and immediate 
cognition” in Romantic thinking. 
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formalist conception of reflection: because reflection is always a reflection on a form66, 
reflection requires a cognitive/perceptual knowledge that is immediate. As Benjamin (1996: 
147) explained in The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism: 
  
It is clear that this theory of knowledge cannot lead to any distinction 
between perception and knowledge and that, in essence, it attributes the 
distinctive features of perception to knowledge as well. According to this 
theory, knowledge is immediate in the same high degree as only 
perception can be; and the readiest grounding of the immediacy of 
perception likewise proceeds from a medium common to the perceiver 
and the perceived, as the history shows in the case of Democritus, who 
describes perception on the basis of a partly material interpretation of 
subject and object. Thus, Novalis likewise proposes that ‘the star appears 
in the telescope and penetrates it… The star is a spontaneous luminous 
being, the telescope or eye a receptive luminous being’.   
 
Here Benjamin points at the Romantic idea of the impossibility of distinguishing between 
cognition and reflection. Benjamin (1996: 147) further stated that ‘observation’ (bearing the 
often applied synonym ‘experiment’) was integral to the epistemology of early Romanticism. 
To highlight this, he commented on Novalis’s theory of natural science that was closely 
linked to the idea of observation. According to Benjamin (1996: 148), Novalis’s descriptions 
of the observation of a natural object demonstrate a process which is both reflective and 
perceptual; when one observes a natural object, it essentially means that one must “arouse it 
to self-recognition”, therefore nature “reveals” itself to the observer via the object. However, 
                                                           
66 Benjamin (1996: 122) explained that Fichte “defines ‘reflection’ as ‘reflection of a form’ and in this way proves 
the immediacy of the knowledge given in”. 
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this is only possible if “the experimenter is capable, through the heightening of his own 
consciousness [...] of getting nearer to the object and finally drawing it into himself” 
(Benjamin, 1996: 148). This process of “magical observation”, as Benjamin (1996: 148) 
called it, consists of an interaction between ‘subject’ and ‘object’, which involves a merging 
of the two, after a degree of incorporation of the object by the subject has occurred. 
For Benjamin, the aforementioned process resonates with the concept of Romantic 
reflection, as “the transformative activity of reflecting on a form” that was first developed by 
Fichte (Benjamin, 1996: 122). Nevertheless, as Benjamin further explained in The Concept of 
Criticism, the concept was appropriated by Novalis, as well as by the later Romantic Friedrich 
Schlegel; the latter clearly differentiated himself from Fichte, by stating his interest in 
reflection as mere thought, “as a phenomenon”, rather than as the thought of the ‘I’ 
(Benjamin, 1996: 128). In this sense, according to Benjamin, the infinity embedded within 
reflection “for Schlegel and Novalis is not an infinity of continuous advance” of an ‘I’, as in 
Fichte, but an “infinity of connectedness” between ‘selves’ (Benjamin, 1996: 126); taking as 
‘self’ everything (Benjamin, 1996: 128), even natural objects as in Novalis’s schema67. 
Knowledge is then possible only through this interconnectedness68 of ‘selves’; all bearing 
their own ‘self-knowledge’, which is further enriched via the connection to others: 
 
How is knowledge outside of self-knowledge possible – that is, how is 
knowledge of objects possible? In fact, on the principles of Romantic 
thinking, it is not possible. Where there is no self-knowledge, there is no 
                                                           
67 Benjamin (1996: 145) argued: “All knowledge is self-knowledge of a thinking being, which does not need to be 
an ‘I’. Moreover, the Fichtean ‘I’, which is set in opposition to the ‘not-I’, to nature, signifies for Schlegel and 
Novalis only an inferior form among an infinite number of forms of the self...” He further quoted Novalis: “In all 
predicates in which we see the fossil, it sees us” (in Benjamin, 1996: 145) and explained that “It is not only 
persons who can expand their knowledge through intensified self-knowledge in reflection; So- called natural 
things can do so as well, the concept.” (Benjamin, 1996: 146) 
68 In The Concept of Criticism, Benjamin (1996: 126) noted: “To begin with, the infinity of reflection, for Schlegel 
and Novalis, is not an infinity of continuous advance but an infinity of connectedness…they understood the 
infinitude of reflection as a full infinitude of interconnection: everything in it is to hang together in an infinitely 
manifold way”. These theories served as a background for Benjamin’s philosophy of ‘constellation’; see Gilloch 
(2002a). 
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knowing at all; where there is self-knowledge, there the subject-object 
correlation is abrogated – there is a subject, if you will, without a 
correlative object. In spite of this, reality does not form an aggregate of 
monads locked up in themselves and unable to enter into any real 
relations with one another. On the contrary… They are so far from being 
shut up in themselves and free of relations that through the 
intensification of their reflection… they can incorporate other beings, 
other centres of reflection, more and more into their own self-knowledge. 
(Benjamin, 1996: 145-146)  
 
The distinction between ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ fades within this philosophical schema, and 
one is forced to reconsider the role of reflection in terms of the thinking ‘subject’, or ‘I’; and, 
as Gilloch (2002a: 31) sums up: 
 
The self is a product of reflection, rather than reflection being a 
consequence of self [...] Secondly, in reflection the distinction between the 
subject and object of knowledge is dissolved. The ‘I’ is both subject and 
object of knowledge. It is the subject/object of knowledge. Finally, this 
reflection is ‘an infinite process’, an endless becoming of the self.69  
 
In the same context, we can also reconsider the process of reflection of a form, understanding 
this to occur through the ‘opening up’ of the reflective subject to the world; thus, a 
transcending of the self. Vischer acknowledged this transcendental aspect of aesthetic 
experience was, arguing that empathetic feelings towards a form were derived from a human 
impulse to connect with nature; thus, to essentially transcend oneself. Commenting on 
                                                           
69 Gilloch (2002a: 34-35) also notes that: “A central feature of the Romantic concept of criticism, for Benjamin, 
was its rejection of the subject-object relation”. 
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Vischer’s remark: “He can tolerate no obstacle; He wants to roam the whole world and feel 
himself as one with it”; Mallgrave and Ikonomou (1994: 26) argue that, for Vischer, the 
conception of empathy lies less on a purely psychological level, and, hence, is less of a 
subjective emotional response to form. Instead, they argue, empathy occurs more on a 
philosophical level, and, thus, is a transcendental process that aims at a radical rethinking of 
the subject and its separability from the object of empathy; or, in terms of its finite 
‘singularity’.  
Vischer, whilst making explicit such ideas, discusses “the spatial understanding of 
forms”, which he describes in detail as operating through processes of “seeing” and 
“scanning”, occurring at varying degrees of consciousness and attributable value (Vischer, 
1994: 93-94). At the highest level, “seeing”, an emotional response is involved, which 
Vischer (1994: 94) sees as a transcendental process; where ‘Being’ is ‘Becoming’, resulting 
in a new unity: 
 
And now, once I have accomplished the process of scanning, the 
impression of seeing is repeated on a higher level. What I have 
seemingly separated I have reassembled into an ordered and restful 
unity. Again I have an enclosed, complete image, but one developed and 
filled with emotion. The chaotic ‘Being’ I called ‘Become!’ – and my 
Summons brought Light and behold, it was Good. 
 
Mallgrave and Ikonomou characterise Vischer’s view of the experience of architectural form, 
as a phenomenological attitude, since, it concentrates on the phenomenal aspects of 
architecture. However, they make clear that Vischer’s approach is intensified and transformed 
through the empathetic process. This they describe as an “energetic reading” that involves a 
physio-mental transference, from the perceiver onto architectural space and form, 
transcending and altering the perceiver-self (Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 27). They also 
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make explicit reference to the Romantic influences upon this aspect of Vischer’s theory, 
further, emphasising the transcendental operation of the empathetic process (Mallgrave and 
Ikonomou, 1994: 26-27). As they conclude: 
 
Although the notion of empathy in English can suggest a simple 
projection of emotions or the emotional response we may feel toward an 
object, it denotes for Vischer a more radical and thoroughgoing 
transference of our personal ego, one in which our whole personality 
(consciously or unconsciously) merges with the object. In essence, we fill 
out the appearance with the content of our soul. And whereas in 
aesthetic contemplation this merger of the self with the object may take 
place consciously, it more generally takes place unconsciously in our day-
to-day activities. It is a pervasive attitude, an openness that we maintain 
with the world. (Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 25)  
 
In architectural terms, such ideas bear many interesting implications. After all, architecture is 
experienced on an everyday level; therefore, empathetic/reflective experience can acquire 
greater significance for architecture, than, say, for an artwork. Subsequently, in the following 
chapter 2, I will explore these ideas through Walter Benjamin’s writings on modern urbanism, 
further drawing upon his ideas of immanent criticism and experience that were discussed in 
section 1. 
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Chapter 2:  
The Experience of the City  
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction  
 
Experiences are lived similarities. 
    There is no greater error than the attempt to construe experience – in 
the sense of life experience – according to the model on which the exact 
natural sciences are based. What is decisive here is not the causal 
connections established over the course of time, but the similarities that 
have lived. 
     That experience and observation are identical has to be shown. See 
the concept of ‘romantic observation’ in my dissertation. – Observation is 
based on self-immersion. (Benjamin, 1999b: 553)   
 
Evident in the above fragment, entitled ‘Experience’, are many of the themes that underpin 
Benjamin’s philosophy. The themes previously discussed in section 1, are: anti-historicism, 
conceptual rather than formal connections, experience as observation. It is significant to note 
that Benjamin wrote the above fragment in the early 1930s, which was during an important 
period for the development of his writings on cities.70 His fascination with cityscapes, first 
demonstrated in his 1925 essay on Naples, had consistently grown into an interest in urban 
experience; especially in relation to the new, dynamic setting of the modern European city. 
During the same year as ‘Experience’, Benjamin wrote ‘Berlin Chronicle’, a fragmentary but 
extensive piece on his native Berlin, as well as a number of shorter essays, mainly on South 
European cities71. Similarly to his previous urban works, the texts bear motifs of memory, 
                                                           
70 Benjamin wrote this essay – which remained unpublished in his lifetime – in 1931 or 1932 (Benjamin, 1999b: 
553). 
71 Benjamin started drafting and completed ‘Berlin Chronicle’ in 1932, recounting his memories of his childhood 
and youth. After Benjamin’s death, Scholem published those memoirs under the current title. The essays ‘Ibizan 
Sequence’, ‘Spain’, and ‘Hashish in Marseilles’ date from the same period and were inspired by Benjamin’s 
travels. See (Benjamin, 1999b: 843-846). 
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observation, dream, and word-play (Gilloch, 2002a: 90), interlaced into fragmented 
narratives. These later texts, however, show more obvious signs of ‘juxtaposition’: dreams of 
Berlin interpenetrate descriptions of Ibizan interiors; memories of Paris illuminate scenes 
from the Berlin streets; Marseilles, experienced under the influence of hashish, is described as 
a mosaic of contradictory images.  
Benjamin’s explorations of diverse urban experiences, until then, had occurred in a 
comparative way; or, as he claimed in his essay on Moscow, ‘through’ each other: “More 
quickly than Moscow itself, one gets to know Berlin through Moscow” (Benjamin, 1999a: 
22). As Caygill (1998: 118) mentions, Benjamin selected other cities that were oriented 
geographically around his home city of Berlin, with the aim to critique Northern European 
urbanism; with particular interest in the changes occurring under the forces of modernisation. 
Benjamin’s urban writings formed a critique of the modernisation of the urban environment, 
and more broadly, a critique of bourgeois Western European culture. For instance, this can be 
seen in his writings such as: One-Way Street (1928), which contains references to Paris’s 
radical change under the modern urban planning of Baron Haussmann during the Second 
Empire72; and ‘Berlin Chronicle’ (1932), with its descriptions of industrial architecture and 
‘left-over’ spaces of modern urbanism73. The use of ‘juxtaposition’ as an epistemo-
methodological strategy reflected Benjamin’s critical intention, which became intensified in 
the 1930s, when he began exploring the impact of modern technologies on art and perception; 
which can be seen in his essays ‘Little History of Photography’ (1931) and ‘The Work of Art 
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1935). He was fascinated with the new techniques 
of montage, close-up and printing reproduction, which came with film and photography. 
                                                           
72 The dedication at the beginning of the book constitutes the most explicit reference; it reads: “This street is 
named Asja Lacis Street after her who as an engineer cut it through the author” (Benjamin, 1996: 444). Gilloch 
(2002a: 92) argues that this was also a reference to the “more contemporary ‘urban surgery’ advocated by Le 
Corbusier”.  
73 Such as railway stations and avenues; see (Benjamin, 1999b: 606, 609).  
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These inspired Benjamin to review his concept of experience and to further relate it to the 
experience of modern urban space74.  
 
2.a: The City as Montage of Images 
 
One-Way Street, written in parallel to the latter stages of The Origin of German Tragic 
Drama, represents the starting point for Benjamin’s turn away from scholarly discourse. 
Benjamin focused instead on applying his philosophical ideas to modern urban life75 and on 
experimenting with new writing methods, more akin to the spirit of modernity. One-Way 
Street is well known for its documentary-like qualities, following a structure that appropriates 
the technique of cinematic ‘montage’: it is a selection of textual fragments that describe 
observations and thoughts inspired by Berlin and other cities. In this way Benjamin aimed to 
introduce a new kind of criticism favouring immediate experience – even the kind of 
immersive experience evoked when watching a film. As he stated in the fragment of One-Way 
Street called ‘This Space for Rent’: 
 
Criticism is a matter of correct distancing. It was at home in a world 
where perspectives and prospects counted and where it was possible to 
adopt a standpoint. Now things press too urgently on human society. The 
«unclouded», «innocent» eye has become a lie, perhaps the whole naive 
mode of expression sheer incompetence. Today the most real, mercantile 
gaze into the heart of things is the advertisement. It tears down the 
stage upon which contemplation moved, and all but hits us between the 
                                                           
74 According to Caygill (1998: 118), the city writings “should not be read as a discrete and identifiably separate 
part of Benjamin’s authorship but as a development and intensification of the speculative concept of experience 
informing his philosophical, critical and aesthetic writings”. 
 
75 One-Way Street was written between 1923 and 1926, and was published in 1928. Benjamin completed his, 
unsuccessful, doctorate thesis, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, in 1925, and eventually published it in 1928; 
the same year as One-Way Street. See (Benjamin, 1996: 487, 512). 
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eyes with things as a car, growing to gigantic proportions, careens at us 
out of a film screen. And just as the film does not present furniture and 
facades in completed forms for critical inspection, their insistent, jerky 
nearness alone being sensational, the genuine advertisement hurls 
things at us with the tempo of a good film. Thereby ‘matter-of-factness’ is 
finally dispatched, and in the face of the huge images spread across the 
walls of houses, where toothpaste and cosmetics lie handy for giants, 
sentimentality is restored to health and liberated in American style, just 
as people whom nothing moves or touches any longer are taught to cry 
again by films. (Benjamin, 1996: 476)  
 
Benjamin argued for an emergent criticism generated by the experience of the artwork at the 
very moment it is experienced. As seen in The Origin Of German Tragic Drama, he was less 
favourable towards the dissociative criticism that was based upon accepted stylistic or other 
formal classifications. In One-Way Street, Benjamin’s approach to criticism is situated within 
the differing context of the modern urban environment, which he sees as developing and 
being transformed through modern technologies. In the above quote, Benjamin claims that 
proximity, immersion and immediacy are inherent within the experience of the modern city. 
In a cinematic manner, the city offers fragmented, distorted, out-of-scale views; therefore, it 
makes reflection upon a ‘thing’ by distant, or, overall perception, impossible. This immersive, 
immediate experience of the city encourages a new kind of criticism. Commenting on One-
Way Street, Gilloch (2002: 90) states:  
 
Here one encounters an unequivocal demand for a new, vital critical 
practice informed by the techniques of modern media – film, journalism 
and advertising – and by the experience of the contemporary 
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metropolitan environment. Velocity, tactility, proximity – these were to 
be the principles of a radical new criticism.  
 
In the subsequent essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, Benjamin 
criticised the traditional forms of art, stating that the value of the artwork lies in its ‘aura’, its 
authentic uniqueness76; thus, appreciation of art is promoted on a ritualistic, cult basis 
(Benjamin, 1992: 217). Furthermore, Benjamin declared the imminent breakdown of such 
forms of art in modernity, celebrating the appearance of art in a newer form produced by the 
modern techniques of reproduction, which he argued stood to promote politics instead of 
ritual: 
  
[...] for the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction 
emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual. To 
an ever greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of 
art designed for reproducibility [....] But the instant the criterion of 
authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the total 
function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to 
be based on another practice – politics. (Benjamin, 1992: 218)  
 
Benjamin argued that the political potential of the new, ‘unauratic’ art came about when the 
distancing of the artwork from the masses, created and sustained for the sake of its ritualistic 
value, began to break down. As Caygill claims quoting Benjamin: 
 
Tradition worked by distancing its objects as past in order to bring them 
to presence in the present; Technology however destroys this distance. 
Benjamin sees this phenomenon as based in two social circumstances, 
                                                           
76 In ‘Little History of Photography’, Benjamin (1999b: 518) claimed: “What is aura, actually? A strange weave of 
space and time: the unique appearance or semblance of distance, no matter how close it may be.”  
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‘both of which are related to the increasing significance of the masses in 
contemporary life. Namely, the desire of contemporary masses to bring 
things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly, which is just as ardent as their 
bent towards overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its 
reproduction’. 77 
 
The fact that modern technologies enabled the social desire to bring art ‘closer’ to the masses, 
for Benjamin, led to a radical political reconfiguration of art. Benjamin started exploring such 
ideas in the essay ‘Little History of Photography’, in which he discussed the new 
technological medium of photography and its potential to alter traditional conceptions of art. 
In this essay Benjamin advocated that greater attention be paid to ‘art-as-photography’, rather, 
than to ‘photography-as-art’:  
 
It is indeed significant that the debate has raged most fiercely around 
the aesthetics of photography-as-art, whereas the far less questionable 
social fact of art-as-photography was given scarcely a glance. And yet the 
impact of the photographic reproduction of artworks is of very much 
greater importance for the function of art than the greater or lesser 
artistry of a photography that regards all experience as fair game for the 
camera. (Benjamin, 1999b: 520) 
 
The article discusses how new photographic techniques, such as enlargement, slow motion 
and the close-up, can alter one’s perceptual awareness and understanding of the world; whilst 
at the same time opening up possibilities for art to transcend its traditionally representational 
function. Furthermore, Benjamin comments on how reproduction, through print, annihilates 
                                                           
77 In the essay ‘Benjamin, Heidegger and Tradition’, Caygill (2000a: 24) quotes Benjamin from ‘The Work of Art 
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’. 
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the auratic status of the artwork; thus, bringing it closer to the masses. ‘Little History of 
Photography’ introduced ideas that would eventually be further explored in ‘The Work of Art 
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, which, however, would be focused on the 
technologies of film. Benjamin regarded film as bearing an even greater potential for the 
reconfiguration of art and its sociopolitical role beyond auratic ends78. Benjamin argued that 
film “comprises certain factors of movement which are in reality those of the camera, not to 
mention special camera angles, close-ups, etc.”, subjecting its ‘object’ – often the 
performance of the actor – to “a series of optical tests” (Benjamin, 1992: 222); therefore, 
destroying any ‘wholeness’ or ‘continuity’ in the perception of the ‘object’, along with its 
‘aura’79. Benjamin further stated that, in this way, the audience is prevented from becoming 
passive participants in a ritual, but instead, are forced “to take the position of a critic” 
(Benjamin, 1992: 222). A crucial trigger for the critical processes developed via film is 
‘montage’: the editing together of different images. This specifically cinematic technique 
creates the juxtaposition of images, or views, of one single ‘object’, in a continuous streaming 
mode. According to Benjamin, this brings the spectator to a state of ‘shock’, which reinforces 
a reflective, critical attitude: 
 
I can no longer think what I want to think. My thoughts have been 
replaced by moving images.’ The spectator’s process of association in 
                                                           
78 Benjamin (1992: 215) argued: “By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique 
existence. And in permitting the reproductions to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it 
reactivates the object reproduced. These two processes lead to a tremendous shattering of tradition which is the 
obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of mankind. Both processes are intimately connected with the 
contemporary mass movements. Their most significant agent is the film. Its social significance, particularly in its 
most positive form, is inconceivable without its destructive, cathartic aspect, that is, the liquidation of the 
traditional value of the cultural heritage.” However, Benjamin (1992: 221) further recognised that film can be used 
for auratic ends: “The film responds to the shriveling of the aura with an artificial build-up of the ‘personality’ [of 
the actor] outside the studio. The cult of the movie star, fostered by the money of the film industry, preserves not 
the unique aura of the person but the ‘spell of the personality’, the phony spell of a commodity.” (Benjamin, 1992: 
224); and: “It is instructive to note how their desire to class the film among the ‘arts’ forces these theoreticians to 
read ritual elements into it...Yet when these speculations were published, films like L’ Opinion Publique and The 
Gold Rush had already appeared. This did not keep...Severin-Mars from speaking of the film as one might speak of 
paintings by Fra Angelico. Characteristically, even today ultra reactionary authors give the film a similar 
contextual significance – if not an outright sacred one, then at least a supernatural one.”  
79 “The aura that envelops the actor vanishes, and with it the aura of the figure he portrays” (Benjamin, 1992: 223).  
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view of these images is indeed interrupted by their constant, sudden 
change. This constitutes the shock effect of the film, which, like all 
shocks, should be cushioned by heightened presence of mind. (Benjamin, 
1992: 231-232) 
 
On further examination of his city writings, it becomes clear that Benjamin’s view of the 
experience of the modern city was informed by his discussion of new artistic technologies and 
processes. ‘This Space for Rent’ finishes with the following aphorism:  
 
What, in the end, makes advertisements so superior to criticism? Not 
what the moving red neon sign says – but the fiery pool reflecting in the 
asphalt. (Benjamin, 1996: 476)  
 
Such a juxtaposition of images has become a common part of the contemporary or modern 
experience of the city. For instance, by reference to the above quote, the reflection of a neon 
advertisement sign on the tarmac of the city streets requires a radically new perceptual 
understanding of modern urban space; which, in turn, opens up possibilities for a radically 
new kind of criticism. It is within this framework that Benjamin conceived of his ‘thought-
images’ as a critical way of describing the modern city. As Gilloch argues, the ‘thought-
images’ – or Denkbilder in German (Gilloch, 2002b: 164) – are textual city portraits, which 
are made from the assemblage and juxtaposition of ephemeral impressions of the city street: 
“its architecture, objects, and spaces; its milling crowds and deafening traffic; its teeming 
markets and bazaars; the various theatrical performances of street vendors, swindlers, beggars 
and other eccentric characters; its encounters, contingencies and seductions.” (Gilloch, 2002b: 
94) Benjamin believed that, through this process, the true character of the modern city could 
be revealed80. Philosophically speaking, here Benjamin is in accordance with his concept of 
                                                           
80 Gilloch (2002b: 94) describes the ‘thought-images’ as “monadological fragments”. 
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art criticism as developed in The Origin Of German Tragic Drama: similarly to the immanent 
critique of an artwork, the ‘thought-images’, as immediate responses to the fleeting 
impressions of the modern city, can disclose the nature of modern urbanism81. Whilst writing 
his ‘thought-images’, Benjamin was determined to resist the abstraction of theorisation. 
Writing on his 1927 essay ‘Moscow’, he stated:  
 
My presentation will be devoid of all theory. In this fashion I hope to 
allow the ‘creatural’ to speak for itself...I want to write a description of 
Moscow at the present moment in which ‘all factuality is already theory’ 
and which thereby refrain from any deductive abstraction, from any 
prognostication, and even within certain limits, from any judgment. (in 
Gilloch, 2002b: 93)  
 
I argue that, from a broader perspective, Benjamin’s approach to art criticism, which focused 
on the ‘object’ of criticism itself, be it artwork, architecture or urbanism, bears resonances 
with early modern German aesthetics. As Mallgrave and Ikonomou (1994: 4) explain, a shift 
from Hegelian inspired historicism, which viewed history “in terms of great relationships of 
race, culture, and spirit” occurred within German aesthetics, which instead placed emphasis 
on the work of art itself. Although he was skeptical towards their tendency to pure 
formalism82, Benjamin showed interest in German aesthetics, especially in his writings on art. 
In the essay ‘The Rigorous Study of Art’ (1932), Benjamin paid tribute to Alois Riegl’s 
‘materialist’ approach to art history and criticism83. The focus on materiality in Riegl’s work 
was for Benjamin the only way to overcome the dualism between “a flat, universalising history 
                                                           
81 In the same way that the ‘idea’ of the artwork is disclosed through immanent criticism; a criticism that is 
focused on the artwork itself, and on the critic’s immediate experience of the artwork. 
82 In particular towards Heinrich Wofflin’s formalism; see (Benjamin, 1999b: 666, 668). 
83 Alois Riegl was an Austrian art historian, whose book The Late Roman Art Industry exerted an enormous 
influence on Benjamin; see (Benjamin, 1999b: 637).  
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of the art of ‘all cultures and times’, on the one hand, and an academic aesthetic, on the other” 
(Benjamin, 1999b: 666). Fundamental to Riegl’s theory was the idea that art (including 
architecture) should be understood historically in relation to changes in human perception of 
the material world at successive stages of history (Forty, 2000: 264). Based on this, he 
described a historical transition from tactile to optical modes of perception, which occurred 
between early antiquity and the late Roman period (Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 63).  
The “physiological basis” of Riegl’s aesthetics (Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994: 65) 
can be easily discerned in Benjamin’s criticism of the modern city, with its focus on the 
sensational and the imagistic. In ‘Berlin Chronicle’, written the same year as ‘The Rigorous 
Study of Art’, Benjamin mentioned his then recent reading of Riegl’s book The Late Roman 
Art Industry. He further described and defined the ‘image’ as a determinant of his memories 
of his home city: 
 
The limitation of my own feeling for the Berlin that is not circumscribed 
by a few facts about the Stratau Fair and King Frederick in 1848 – that 
is, for the topographic tradition representing the connection with the 
dead of this ground – results entirely from the fact that neither of my 
parents families was native to Berlin. This sets a limit to the child’s 
memory – and it is this limit, rather than childhood experience itself, 
that is manifest in what follows.  Wherever this boundary may have been 
drawn, however, the second half of the nineteenth century certainly lies 
within it, and to it belong the following images, not in the manner of 
general representations, but of images that, according to the teachings of 
Epicurus, constantly detach themselves from things and determine our 
perception of them. (Benjamin, 1999b: 613) 
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Benjamin’s city writings attempted to select and arrange urban ‘images’ that served as 
perceptual and affective responses to the complex material manifestations of the modern city. 
In this sense, I argue that his ‘thought-images’ were intrinsically anti-historicist. In these 
writings, Benjamin rejects an experience of the modern city that draws on the distancing 
perspective of the ‘banal tourist’ (Benjamin, 1996: 415): the city ‘viewed’ as a site of 
historical significance within the schema of tradition. Instead, Benjamin advocates an 
immediate, almost intimate, immersion within the cityscape; an experience that draws more 
upon inhabitation, rather than detached observation. To represent immediate experience, 
Benjamin would adopt a methodological strategy inspired by the new art of cinema; as 
described in his later Arcades Project: 
 
Method of this project: literary montage. I needn’t say anything. Merely 
show. (Benjamin, 1999c: 460) 
 
With the ‘thought-images’, Benjamin created and established a new kind of urban criticism of 
“contingency”, of “the here and now” (Benjamin, 1999b: 510). This criticism was based on 
immediate experience and immanence, whilst it was formalised through methods introduced 
by modern artistic technologies. As Gilloch (2002a: 93) sums up: 
 
Interpretation and analysis, commentary and critique – these are to be 
eschewed in favour of an approach which can ‘grasp the concrete’ and 
enable it to speak for itself. The task of the writer is, through selection 
and arrangement, to show, to demonstrate without comment. Composed 
of a plethora of carefully gathered, juxtaposed particulars, the ‘thought-
images’ are not so much single snapshots as kaleidoscopic 
representations, miniature mosaics, or, in the language of the ‘Arcades’ 
production cycle, cinematic ‘montages’ [...] methodological innovations 
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and textual strategies: tactile intimacy, concreteness, immediacy, and 
imagistic and fragmentary construction.  
 
The ‘thought-images’ can further be situated within the broader context of Benjamin’s 
philosophy of experience. As discussed in section 1, Benjamin’s ideas on historiography and 
criticism were expressed in his concept of experience as concrete, lived reality; further 
extending beyond the subjective in its particularity, therefore forming conceptual links 
between different subjectivities, as well as historical objects. For instance, in the case of 
storytelling, experience is formalised in the story, through which it subsequently passes on 
from generation to generation; being at the same time a lived, as well as an a-temporal and 
non-subjective, practice. As further discussed, Benjamin’s concept of experience bears 
influences characteristic of early Romantic ideas about experience as reflection and cognition, 
a rational and an intuitive process, combined together; further having a transformative effect 
on the experiencing subject. Similarly, in the Benjaminian ‘thought-images’, modern urban 
experience is addressed in a ‘concrete’ manner: it is sensational and immediate, enabling an 
anti-historicist approach to the city based on immanence. But at the same time, it is conceived 
as a transcendental process, since it can provide insight into the ‘true’ character of modernity, 
revealing connections with other historical periods in a conceptual, rather than historicist, 
manner. I will now make a closer examination of two attributes that were fundamental to 
Benjaminian modern urban experience.  
 
2.b: Immersion and Mimicry 
 
In the ‘thought-images’, Benjamin proposes a way of perceiving the modern cityscape that 
involves immersion within its physical spaces and other everyday ‘concrete’ particulars: 
noises, colours, smells, tastes. In the essay ‘Naples’ he juxtaposes an overall, distant view of 
the city with the experience of walking in the city streets: 
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Fantastic reports by travelers have touched up the city. In reality it is 
gray: a gray-red or ocher, a gray-white. And entirely gray against sky 
and sea. It is this, not least, that disheartens the tourist. For anyone who 
is blind to form sees little here. The city is craggy. Seen from a height not 
reached by the cries from below, from the Castell San Martino, it lies 
deserted in the dusk, grown into the rock [...] Nevertheless, no city can 
fade, in the few hours of Sunday rest, more rapidly than Naples. It is 
crammed full of festal motifs nestling in the most inconspicuous places. 
When the blinds are taken down before a window, the effect is similar to 
that of flags being raised elsewhere. Brightly dressed boys fish in deep-
blue streams and look up at rouged church steeples. High above the 
streets, wash lines run, with garments suspended on them like rows of 
pennants. Faint suns shine from glass vats of iced drinks. Day and night 
the pavilions glow with the pale, aromatic juices that teach even the 
tongue what porosity can be. (Benjamin, 1996: 415-416, 417-418) 
 
Here Benjamin makes evident the difference between a distancing, ‘touristic’ experience of 
the city, drawing on the formal aesthetics of a visual panoramic overview, and the experience 
of the city derived from close observation whilst one is immersed in its physical quotidian 
reality. ‘Naples’ was the first ‘thought-image’ and an exemplary city portrait and 
manifestation of Benjamin’s particular approach to urban criticism. It is not by accident that 
the subject of the essay was the city of Naples, which itself was at the time an exemplary city 
for the kind of urban experience that Benjamin advocated. Quoting from Benjamin’s essay, 
Gilloch (2002a: 94) claims: “It is in Naples, above all, that urban orientation and navigation 
are a sensuous, tactile experience, where one must ‘feel’ one’s way through ‘the tightly 
packed multiplicity’ and the ‘anarchical, embroiled, village-like’ centre, into which ‘large 
networks of streets were hacked only forty years ago’.” The tactile proximity that this kind of 
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urban environment imposes on one’s experience calls for immersion. A few years later, 
Benjamin would discover that, similarly to Naples, the urban cityscape of Moscow possessed 
some characteristics that could only be accessed through immersive experience. Although 
Moscow and Naples were different modern cities in terms of their socio-cultural and political 
context, as well as their other physical aspects such as urban fabric and climate, for Benjamin, 
they both possessed qualities that encouraged immersion. To be immersed, one needs to 
become receptive to and appreciative of public urban experiences: to share “a familiarity and 
reciprocity with [the city’s] jostling crowds, a proximity to its profusion of objects, an 
expectancy and excitement in its encounters” (Gilloch, 2002a: 96). Both cities enabled and 
fostered such intimate engagement with public space; perhaps more so in comparison to 
Benjamin’s home city of Berlin: 
 
But what fullness this street has, which overflows with more than just 
people, and how deserted and empty Berlin is! In Moscow, goods burst 
everywhere from the houses; they hang on fences, lean against railings, 
lie on pavements. Every fifty steps stand women with cigarettes, women 
with fruit, women with sweets. They have their wares in a laundry 
basket next to them, sometimes a little sleigh as well. A brightly 
coloured wooden cloth protects apples or oranges from the cold, with two 
prize examples lying on top. Next to them as sugar figures, nuts, candy. 
One thinks: before leaving her house a grandmother must have looked 
around to see what she could take to surprise her grandchildren. Now 
she has stopped on the way to have a brief rest in the street. Berlin 
streets know no such places with sleighs, sacks, little carts and baskets. 
Compared to those of Moscow, they are like a freshly swept, empty 
racecourse on which a field of six-day cyclists hastens comfortlessly on. 
(Benjamin, 1999a: 23) 
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As Benjamin explained, Berlin’s apparent ‘emptiness’ is associated with the bourgeois 
attitude of maintaining distance from the masses in the streets, whilst instead, occupying, 
either exclusive cultural spaces, or private interiors (Gilloch, 2002a: 96). This attitude turns 
the city into a setting of “princely solitude, princely desolation”, despite it being adorned with 
“unspeakable luxury” (Benjamin, 1999a: 23). In Naples, however, the lack of strict 
boundaries between private and public space results in one’s constant mingling with others, 
and things; a condition Benjamin called ‘porosity’:  
 
Similarly dispersed, porous, and commingled is private life [...]  
So the house is far less the refuge into which people retreat than the 
inexhaustible reservoir from which they flood out. Life bursts not only 
from doors, not only into front yards, where people on chairs do their 
work [...] From the balconies, housekeeping utensils hang like potted 
plants. From the windows of the top floors come baskets on ropes, to 
fetch mail, fruit and cabbage. 
Just as the living room reappears on the street, with chairs hearth, 
and altar, so – only much more loudly – the street migrates into the 
living room. Even the poorest one is as full of wax candles, biscuit saints, 
sheaves of photos on the wall, and iron bedsteads as the street is of carts, 
people and lights. Poverty has brought about a stretching of frontiers 
that mirrors the most radiant freedom of thought. There is no hour, often 
no place, for sleeping and eating. (Benjamin, 1996: 419-420)  
 
While in Moscow, traveling around the city offers a similar experience – on the streetcar:  
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Travel by streetcar in Moscow is more than anything else a tactile 
experience. Here the newcomer learns perhaps most quickly of all to 
adapt himself to the curious tempo of this city and to the rhythm of its 
peasant population [...] A tenacious shoving and barging during the 
boarding of a vehicle usually overloaded to the point of bursting takes 
place without a sound and with great cordiality [...] Once everyone is 
inside, the migration begins in earnest. Through the ice-covered 
windows, you van never make out where the vehicle has just stopped. If 
you do find out, it is of little avail. The way to the exit is blocked by a 
human wedge. (Benjamin, 1999a: 32)  
 
Or the sleigh: 
 
The passenger is not enthroned high up; he looks out on the same level 
as everyone else and brushes the passers-by with his sleeve. Even this is 
an incomparable experience for the sense of touch. Whereas Europeans, 
on their rapid journeys, enjoy superiority, dominance over the masses, 
the Muscovite in the little sleigh is closely mingled with people and 
things. If he has a box, a child, or a basket to take with him – for all such 
things the sleigh is the cheapest means of transport – he is truly wedged 
into the street bustle. No condescending gaze: a tender, swift brushing 
along stones, people, and horses. You feel like a child gliding through the 
house on his little chair. (Benjamin, 1999a: 33)  
 
This Benjaminian idea of urban experience as tactile proximity with spaces, people, and 
physical particulars, is clearly influenced by Riegl’s theory of the tactile appreciation of 
architectural space. Riegl distinguished between a ‘tactile-close’ vision and an ‘optical-
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distant’ vision in the experience of architectural space. Although he favoured tactility and 
proximity, he identified the ‘tactile-close’ vision with a spiritual dread of space (Van de Ven, 
1987: 93): the same horror vacui that other early modern German historians, like Worringer, 
identified within the empathetic experience of space. Benjamin did not use the word 
‘empathy’ in his city writings; nevertheless, his idea of immersion comes as close as it could 
to an empathetic spatial experience. I see further resonances with Riegl’s work within 
Benjamin’s association of such experiences with childhood: “The instant you arrive, the 
childhood stage begins” (Benjamin, 1999a: 23). Considering childhood as a time when one is 
“closely mingled with people and things” (Benjamin, 1999a: 33), Benjamin suggested that the 
child may be more aware of the close, tactile appreciation of the urban environment. 
Benjamin further discussed mimicry as a characteristic of children’s ability to identify with, 
and assimilate to the environment. For example, as read in the fragment ‘Enlargements’ that is 
included in One-Way Street, Benjamin described how children employ mimicry in their play 
of hide-and-seek: 
 
Here he is enclosed in the material world. It becomes immensely distinct, 
speechlessly obtrusive [...] Standing behind the doorway curtain, the 
child becomes aware of the reality of rope and wood. Standing behind the 
doorway curtain, the child himself becomes something floating and 
white, a ghost. The dining table under which he is crouching turns him 
into the wooden idol in a temple whose four pillars are the carved legs. 
And behind a door, he himself is the door – wears it as his heavy mask, 
and like a shaman will bewitch all those who unsuspectingly enter. 
(Benjamin, 1996: 465) 
 
 In 1933, Benjamin wrote two short essays on the theme of mimicry, one called ‘Doctrine of 
the Similar’, as well as another shorter version, entitled ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’. In these 
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two texts he discussed mimicry as an intrinsic human faculty and an important learning 
process, first appearing in childhood: 
 
Children’s play is everywhere permeated by mimetic modes of behaviour, 
and its realm is by no means limited to what one person can imitate in 
another. The child plays at being not only a shopkeeper or teacher but 
also a windmill and a train. Of what use to him is this schooling of his 
mimetic faculty? (Benjamin, 1999b: 720) 
 
There are obvious similarities between the empathy with inanimate objects that Benjamin saw 
in children’s play and the immersive urban experience described in his city writings. In the 
essay ‘Walter Benjamin, mimesis and the dream world of photography’, Neil Leach employs 
the photographic metaphor, referring to Benjamin’s descriptions of Berlin’s architecture as 
“snapshots of the physical fabric of Berlin, on to which has been etched, as though through 
some photosensitive process, a deeply personal sense of meaning” (Leach, 2000: 28). In the 
context of this empathetic architectural experience, Leach further defines Benjamin’s idea of 
mimicry as the involvement of a creative engagement with an object; thus, being in contrast to 
the original Platonic notion of mimesis: 
  
Benjamin reverses the hierarchy between object and its representation. 
He challenges the earlier Platonic notion of mimesis as an essentially 
compromised form of imitation that necessarily looses something of the 
original. For Benjamin mimesis alludes to a constructive 
reinterpretation of an original, which becomes a creative act in itself. 
Furthermore, it potentially becomes a way of empathising with the 
world, and it is through empathy that we can – if not fully understand 
the other – at least assimilate to the other. (Leach, 2000: 32)   
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In summary, Leach argues that the mimetic attitude constitutes a creative process, which can 
be particularly useful for architectural representation – especially through the medium of 
photography. However, on a more philosophical level, Caygill has recognised the relationship 
between the experience of colour and immersive urban experience in Benjamin’s work. 
Caygill argues that colour within Benjamin’s philosophy of experience has an immanent 
character, because it does not bear any fixed values, since it gains meaning from the 
surrounding colours. Therefore, in contrast with form, colour can be infinitely configured. 
Furthermore, Caygill describes how Benjamin discussed the importance of colour during 
childhood. In the short essay ‘A Child’s View of Colour’ (1914/15), Benjamin argued, how 
for children colour is not “a deceptive cloak for individual objects existing in time and space”, 
“a lifeless thing and a rigid individuality”, but rather a “winged creature that flits from one 
form to the next” (Benjamin, 1996: 50). In addition, in this context he suggested that colour 
can be thought as a medium of intuition, prior to the forms of space and time, which is related 
to feeling: “For the fact is that the imagination never engages with form, which is the concern 
of the law, but can only contemplate the living world from a human point of view creatively 
in feeling; this takes place through colour” (Benjamin, 1996: 51). So, “for the person who 
sees with a child’s eyes” (Benjamin, 1996: 50), the city could be perceived, in ‘feeling’, 
through the medium of colour, rather than through spatial form:  
 
All the colours of Moscow converge prismatically here, at the centre of 
Russian power. Beams of excessive brilliance from the car headlights 
race through the darkness. The horses of the cavalry, which has a large 
drill ground in the Kremlin, shy in their light. Pedestrians force their 
way between cars and unruly horses. Long rows of sleighs haul snow 
away. Single horsemen. Silent swarms of ravens have settled in the 
snow. The eye is infinitely busier than the ear. The colours do their 
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utmost against the white. The smallest coloured rag glows out of doors. 
(Benjamin, 1999a: 24) 
 
According to Caygill (1998: 11), in Benjamin’s experience of colour “the two components of 
Kant’s account of experience – sensibility and the understanding – collapse into each other, 
and the experiencing subject which would contain them dissolves into its experience”. For 
this definition, Caygill refers to an early essay-fragment by Benjamin, yet unpublished in 
English, describing a dialogue between a painter and his friend about the immersive 
experience of colour84; as well as citing a footnote in the essay ‘On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire’ (1939), which describes Impressionist painting as performing a reorganisation of 
urban experience through colour85 (Caygill, 1998: 152). 
What is most interesting in the immersive urban experience described by Benjamin – 
whether involving mimicry or colour perception – is the potential for creative appropriation of 
the cityscape; as Benjamin (1996: 450) points out: “Colour is fluid, the medium of all 
changes” (Benjamin, 1996: 50); and “Children thus produce their own small world of things 
within the greater one”. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
84 The fragment is entitled Der Regenbogen: Gespräch über die Phantasie (in English: ‘The Rainbow: A Dialogue 
on Phantasie’) and was written in 1915; Caygill (1998) makes references in pages 10-12, and 82-83. Moreover, 
Caygill (1998: 11) quotes Benjamin: “Margarete describes herself, in Kantian vocabulary, as losing her identity 
and finding herself transformed into a colour in the landscape: «I too was not, nor my understanding, that resolves 
things out of the images of the senses. I was not the one who saw, but only seeing. And what I saw were not 
things...but only colours. And I too was coloured into this landscape».”; and, in Caygill (1998: 82), another quote 
reads as follows: “On hearing her nocturnal experience of colour, he replies ‘I know these images of phantasy. I 
believe that they are in me when I paint. I mix the colours and I see nothing but colour, I can almost say, I am 
colour.” 
85 In the essay ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, Benjamin (1992: 193) notes: “...the technique of Impressionist 
painting, whereby the picture is garnered in a riot of dabs of colour, would be a reflection of experiences with 
which the eyes of a big-city dweller have become familiar. A picture like Monet’s ‘Cathedral of Chartres’, which 
is like an ant-heap of stone, would be an illustration of this hypothesis.” 
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Chapter 3: 
Critical Subjectivities of Modern Urbanism 
 
This chapter aims to develop a discussion that examines the critical potential of modern urban 
experience, with a focus upon the experience of physical and spatial forms, such as 
architecture. The discussion, so far, has considered modern urbanism within the early modern 
context of art theory and criticism, referring to ideas of spatial empathy from the late 
nineteenth century German aesthetics, and drawing upon Walter Benjamin’s early twentieth 
century criticism. In particular, I have focused upon Benjamin’s theory of modern urban 
experience as sensational and immediate, tracing links between this aspect of Benjamin’s 
theory, and early modern German aesthetics and early Romantic epistemology. Drawing upon 
the above, I will now discuss the critical potential of modern urban experience to inform 
subjectivity. 
 In chapter 2 of this section, I discussed how the modern technologies of art media, such 
as photography and film, have informed Benjamin’s criticism, inspiring him to examine the 
modern city in a manner that privileged proximity, observation and immanence. This is in direct 
contrast to the distancing, abstract theorisation, and stylistic classification of the historicist 
tradition. According to Benjamin, proximity, for example, comes as a lesson from 
photography: 
  
Now, to bring things closer to us, or rather to the masses, is just as 
passionate an inclination in our day as the overcoming of whatever is 
unique in every situation by means of its reproduction. Everyday the 
need to possess the object in close-up in the form of a picture, or rather a 
copy, becomes more imperative. (Benjamin, 1999b: 519)  
 
Furthermore, Benjamin’s view of photography was of a new media that offered a new strategy 
for historicisation: “Yet at the same time, photography reveals in this material physiognomic 
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aspects, image worlds, which dwell in the smallest things – meaningful yet covert enough to 
find a hiding place in waking dreams, but which, enlarged and capable of formulation, make 
the difference between technology and magic visible as a thoroughly historical variable” 
(Benjamin, 1999b: 512). Especially in the way certain photographers approached their 
subjects, he saw an anti-historicism, which recalled a resonance with Romantic influences: 
 
The photographer did not approach this enormous undertaking as a 
scholar, or with the advice of ethnographers and sociologists, but, as the 
publisher says, ‘from direct observation.’ It was assuredly a very 
impartial, indeed bold sort of observation, but delicate too, very much in 
the spirit of Goethe’s remark: ‘There is a delicate empiricism which so 
intimately involves itself with the object that it becomes true theory.’86 
(Benjamin, 1999b: 520) 
 
As I discussed in subchapter 1.a, a strong belief for the access to knowledge through 
empirical observation was a key characteristic of Romanticism. Additionally, early Romantic 
thought recognised a critical process within the practice of reflection that occurred through the 
observation of an object. This critical process essentially operates through a reconfiguration of 
the subject and the object through their interaction with each other. As further discussed in 
subchapter 2.a, Benjamin’s early work shows a preoccupation with the concept of criticism in 
Romanticism and its applicability to his own emergent critical theory87. He was particularly 
interested in the idea of ‘critical reflection’ as a foundational aspect of Romantic criticism: 
 
For the Romantics and for speculative philosophy, the term ‘critical’ 
meant objectively productive, creative out of thoughtful deliberation. To 
                                                           
86 Benjamin wrote this commenting on the work of German photographer August Sander. 
87 “Of all the technical terms of philosophy and aesthetics in the writings of the early Romantics, the words 
‘criticism’ and ‘critical’ are easily the most often encountered” (Benjamin, 1996: 142). 
 79 
be critical meant to elevate thinking so far beyond all restrictive 
conditions that the knowledge of truth sprang forth magically, as it were, 
from insight into the falsehood of these restrictions. In this positive 
sense, the critical procedure attains the closest conceivable affinity with 
the reflective procedure and, in utterances like the following, the two 
merge. (Benjamin, 1996: 142) 
 
This aspect of Romantic criticism is evident in Benjamin’s ideas on immersion as a part of art 
appreciation:  
 
A man who concentrates before a work of art is absorbed by it. He enters 
into this work of art the way that legend tells of the Chinese painter 
when he viewed his finished painting. (Benjamin, 1992: 232) 
 
As described above, whilst an individual is critically reflecting upon an artwork, a certain 
transference from subject to object takes place. I argue that one can call this ‘immersion’, 
‘absorption’ or ‘empathy’. As discussed previously in subchapter 2.b, these concepts are 
interconnected. According to Benjamin, the experience of the urban environment also 
involves such a critical and transformative process, which further, under the specific 
conditions of modernity, encourages a new kind of criticism based on subjective intimate 
engagement. Gilloch appropriates Benjamin’s reference to the ‘critic-as-engineer’ (Benjamin, 
1996: 444), to describe the emerging modern critic, who: as “an exponent of a new 
technology, constructs a new relationship between human beings and nature, one based upon 
neither the ecstatic excesses of irrationalism nor the calculating instrumentalism of 
Enlightenment science”, but instead on “the erotic, the mimetic and the lucid, experiences and 
activities which point to an intimacy between human beings and their environment based upon 
reconciliation, reciprocity and harmonious intercourse” (Gilloch, 2002a: 104). When conceived 
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in this way, the philosophy of the modern critic is imbued with Romantic principles of 
subjective intimate engagement; experiencing the world through a combination of heightened 
cognition and reflection. As has been discussed, the Romantics saw in this process of critical 
subjective reflection, a transcending of the subjective ‘self’ as a separate singularity, leading to 
connections with other ‘selves’, which include inanimate objects and architectural form. Not 
unlike a modern Romantic, Benjamin undergoes such a process: through close observation – 
‘close-ups’ – on the physical urban fabric. During his city wanderings, he reads critically the 
‘traces’ of social life ‘imprinted’ on materiality:  
 
Walls. Admirable, the discipline to which they are subject in this city. 
The better ones, in the centre, wear livery and are in the pay of the 
ruling class. They are covered with gaudy patterns and have sold their 
whole length many hundreds of times to the latest brand of aperitif, to 
department stores, to ‘Chocolat Menier’, or to Dolores del Rio. In the 
poorer neighbourhoods they are politically mobilised, and post their 
spacious red letters as the forerunners of red guards in front of 
dockyards and arsenals.88 (Benjamin, 1999a: 235) 
 
As has been previously discussed, Benjamin clearly stated that such an approach to the urban 
environment would be encouraged by modernity. Caygill (2000: 25) notes that, for Benjamin, 
because of the impact of modern technology upon our experience of space and time, new 
modes of receptivity and representation of urbanism would be required. Especially important 
were the changes in experience that came along with the new medium of film, as Benjamin 
notes in his essay on ‘Moscow’: 
 
                                                           
88 This is an extract from the essay ‘Marseilles’.  
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Now the city turns into a labyrinth for the newcomer. Streets that he 
had located far apart are yoked together by a corner, like a pair of horses 
reined in a coachman’s fist. The whole exciting sequence of topographical 
deceptions to which he falls prey could be shown only by a film: the city 
is on its guard against him, masks itself, flees, intrigues, lures him to 
wander its circles to the point of exhaustion. (Benjamin, 1999a: 24) 
 
In the essay ‘Cosmos in Film: On the concept of space in Walter Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ 
essay’, Gertrud Koch (2000: 213) argues that Benjamin’s view of cinematic technology 
considers a reconfiguration of time as “immobilisation of time in the spatial image”: “The fact 
that cinematic technology does not actually present but rather represents it illusionistically 
through a series of photographically fixed moments, turns it, in the wake of photography, into 
a medium in which time is immobilised in space” (Koch, 2000: 210). Koch further states that 
through this ‘spatialisation’ of time, a transformation of subjectivity takes place that re-
conceives the subject as corpus instead of body; thus, as related to the universe – the cosmos – 
rather than the anthropocentric humanity89.  In this context, ‘tactility’ and ‘proximity’ as 
modes of experience, which Benjamin was a proponent, acquire a special importance, 
enabling the emergence of a transformed, liberating relation between subjectivity and urban 
space: 
 
By close-ups of the things around us, by focusing on hidden details of 
familiar objects, by exploring commonplace milieus under the ingenious 
guidance of the camera, the film, on the one hand, extends our 
comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives; on the other hand, 
                                                           
89 As Gertrud Koch (2000: 210) states: “Only in this immobilisation does the corpus emerge out of the 
anthropologically untenably constructed body, explosively liberated into the image of the ‘heavenly’ from the 
space of the ‘optical-unconscious’.” Furthermore, Koch (2000: 206) quotes from Benjamin’s essay ‘Schemas of 
the psycho-physical question’: “With body and corpus, man is bound to universal connections. But differently in 
each case: in body, he is related to humanity, in corpus, to God”; she further explains that Benjamin refers here to 
the Gnostic dualism in theology and cosmology, where the body is seen as separate from the corpus. 
 82 
it manages to assure us of an immense and unexpected field of action. 
Our taverns and our metropolitan streets, our offices and furnished 
rooms, our railroad stations and our factories appeared to have us locked 
up hopelessly. Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder 
by the dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its 
far-flung ruins and debris, we calmly and adventurously go traveling. 
(Benjamin, 1992: 229) 
 
In his article ‘Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition’, Caygill further explores 
the impact of such a re-conceptualisation of subjectivity to history. According to Caygill, 
Benjamin considered that with the appearance of modern technologies, which would destroy 
“the ritual confirmation of tradition” (2000: 24), “a new political configuration of the site of 
tradition” (2000: 23) would become possible. This kind of reconfigured tradition would 
correspond to a ‘topological’, or, I would argue, ‘spatialised’, subject, instead of the 
traditional ‘historico-political’ subject90 (Caygill, 2000: 24). Caygill (2000: 209) observes that 
Benjamin, enthused by the possibilities of film, envisaged “the construction of history as a 
kinetically activated space in which the camera moves through different levels”. This 
conception is against the historicist linear succession of past, present and future, furthermore 
subverting traditional notions of time. Instead, past, present and future, gather together in 
‘moments’ to form ‘constellations’, which fundamentally link with ‘prehistory’, a “primeval 
moment’ [...] which spreads its roots into the present” (Caygill, 2000: 209). In this sense, new 
notions of subjectivity, intimately entangled with space, challenge historicist configurations 
as they transcend traditional conceptions of time.  
In addition, I argue that, within Benjamin’s broader critical schema, this ‘topological’ 
subjectivity relates to the idea of the critical ‘experiencing subject’, as discussed in chapter 2 
                                                           
90 Here Caygill refers to Heideggerian ontology, whilst he distinguishes Benjamin’s philosophy as being contrary 
to the preoccupation of ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’. 
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of section 1, and in further reference to Caygill (1998: 44)91. Benjamin’s view of experience 
as an infinite configuration precludes the notion of the subject as ‘acting I’, who experiences 
and reflects from a fixed position, replacing it with the notion of the subject as constantly 
reconfigured through their reflective/perceptual encounter with form. If this is ‘spatial form’, 
critical subjectivities can emerge from the experience of space. Koch and Caygill similarly 
interpret Benjaminian modern subjectivity as shaped by technology, both arguing for the 
critical potential of this subjectivity to inform humanistic discourses and historiography. 
Furthermore, I argue that the immersive, tactile experience of modern urban space; firstly, 
encourages a critical subjectivity; and secondly, fosters multiple critical subjectivities that are 
open to reconfiguration. I believe this is evidenced by Benjamin’s ‘thought images’; but, like 
in much of Benjamin’s work, the development of the ideas is only on a speculative level. In 
fact, Caygill (2000:29) acknowledges this inconclusive aspect in Benjamin’s philosophy: 
 
When the question is asked what the new configurations of tradition 
might be, what shape the new gathering of past, present and future 
might take, Benjamin is almost silent. He does make some comments 
about the emergence of a new mode of perception emphasizing tactile as 
opposed to visual experience, but these remain sketchy [...] He saw the 
reconfiguration of tradition through technology as a momentous 
revolution, one fraught with danger, but also with the potential for 
establishing new terrains of politics and subjectivity. Yet these remained 
unexplored.  
 
Benjamin is more conclusive in terms of how modern critical subjectivity could manifest in 
new critical writing. As Gilloch (2002a: 101) observes, “what One-Way Street articulates first 
                                                           
91 “The view of experience as infinite configuration dissolves any notion of a subject able to occupy a fixed 
position from which to reflect, since all reflections are already infinitely mediated by other reflections. In this 
quasi-Leibnizian configuration of monads, each reflection contains the infinity of reflections, including its own 
reflection upon this infinity” (Caygill, 1998: 44). 
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and foremost is an ‘urbanisation’ of the text’, since it “mimics urban forms and experiences”. 
This new kind of writing favours “immediacy, brevity, proximity, tactility, strategy” – which 
are all modern urban imperatives (Gilloch, 2002a: 101). Introducing the writing method of 
‘literary montage’, One-Way Street provides an application of Benjamin’s theory of criticism, 
which favours interdisciplinarity and openness to interpretation. Furthermore, One-Way Street 
is demonstrable of the idea that modern writing is a practice that is fundamentally and 
exclusively linked with social life and experience: 
 
The construction of life is at present in the power far more of facts than 
of convictions, and of such facts as have scarcely ever become the basis of 
convictions. Under these circumstances, true literary activity cannot 
aspire to take place within a literary framework; this is rather the 
habitual expression of its sterility. Significant literary effectiveness can 
come into being only in a strict alternation between action and writing; it 
must nurture the inconspicuous forms that fit its influence in active 
communities better than does the pretentious, universal gesture of the 
book – in leaflets, brochures, articles, and placards. (Benjamin, 1996: 
444)  
 
The political tone of the above extract reflects Benjamin’s early conviction that modern urban 
experience can inspire critical – and social – engagement that, against the elitism of tradition, 
would bring forth a new politics of modern subjectivity. However, the enthusiasm that was 
indicative in his early work was succeeded by skepticism. This was especially so in regards to 
how technology was employed within capitalism. In his last work, The Arcades Project, 
Benjamin explored the potential of new technology to reconfigure politics, but was by no 
means naively optimistic. In this characteristically unfinished volume of ‘literary montage’, 
Benjamin questions whether the technological reconfiguration of tradition would lead to the 
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renewal, or the destruction of humanity. As Caygill (2000: 28) observes, by then Benjamin 
had recognised that “through the power of technology it is possible to create giant auratic 
works of art – cities and entire peoples – who are simultaneously present and absent to 
themselves”. This realisation was reflected in Benjamin’s critical stance towards the then 
contemporary fascist regimes, which, through the politicisation of art and use of modern 
technology, deliberately created auratic effects at large scale92. As also discussed in section 1, 
in the late essay ‘The Storyteller’93, Benjamin expressed nostalgia for the pre-modern ‘lived 
experience’ (Erfahrung), which was lost to modernity. However, hints of skepticism towards 
modern technological achievements are already detectable in his earlier works, such as One-
Way Street:   
 
Just as all things, in an irreversible process of mingling and 
contamination, are losing their intrinsic character while ambiguity 
displaces authenticity, so is the city [...] The insecurity of even the busy 
areas puts the city dweller in the opaque and truly dreadful situation in 
which he must assimilate, along with isolated monstrosities from the 
open country, the abortions of urban architectonics. (Benjamin, 1996: 
454)  
 
However great the disillusionment that Benjamin had experienced towards the end of his 
life94, his view of a critical modern urban experience has been highly influential for modern 
and contemporary culture; shaping, for instance, theories and discourses that address the 
                                                           
92 See ‘The Work of Art in Mechanical Reproduction’, in (Benjamin, 1992: 211-244). 
 
93 Published in 1936, the same year as ‘The Work of Art in Mechanical Reproduction’. 
94 Benjamin committed suicide in 1940, after being captured by Nazi soldiers at the French/Spanish border, during 
his attempt to take refuge to the US. 
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impact of technology on perception, and the political potential of art and architecture95. 
Furthermore, the Romantic influences of Benjamin’s aesthetics are recognisable in modern 
aesthetic theories, particularly those that discuss the idea of ‘experience’ in art, and the 
relation between ‘feeling’ and ‘form’96.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
95 Contemporary discourses in art theory are preoccupied with ideas about the politics of aesthetics and the role of 
art in enabling and creating ‘relations’. Relevant recent publications include Relational Aesthetics (1998) by 
Nicolas Bourriaud, and The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (2000) by Jacques Rancière. 
96 Modern publications on aesthetics that deal with relevant ideas are: Art as Experience by John Dewey (1934), 
and Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art by Suzanne Langer (1953). 
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‘One-way street is my street now’ 
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We decided to go for a walk without  talking through it  first .  The  
others had  been silent  for quite a while and the record  wasn’t playing 
any more.  I got into that  old  mood again for a night walk in 
underwater Athens. A strong feeling,  to get away with you, to swim 
again in the night, to cross the city with you beside me. That’s why when 
we were wearing the diving suits we didn’t exchange a single word. The tanks we were 
carrying were heavy and made our bodies lean forward a bit. We found ourselves quite 
unexpectedly in the darkness at the bottom of the sea, alone and frightened, as the house 
stood behind us, like something very strange and unfamiliar. The streets were dimly lit and 
from the rooftops of the buildings little bubbles were rising in flocks. I nodded at you to 
follow me as I was maneuvering through the obstacles. Just  after Omonia square , 
at the beginning of Athenas street,  we met that blind man,  sitting in 
the same old corner, with a black mask on, diving suit , flippers,  
oxygen and a little tin box for our charity. That incident must have 
seemed funny to you , because I  think you laughed. You were anyway 
right, because  how could we give  him any money trapped in our 
suits? I  felt  bad though about al l  that.  The  blind man was stuck in an 
eternally  pointless waiting and as if that  wasn’t enough,  he didn’t 
even hold an accordion, he didn’t  have  the possibility to play music 
for us, to trumpet  his wish in our ears. He seemed to me unbearably 
lonely  and for the first time I  hated our underwater condition.  We  
were already arriving at  Kotzia square and were reaching the Town 
Hall .  Then I  noticed that on its roof two seaweeds had grown, big  and 
silent. Water was moving them rhythmically and from time to time 
their ends were touching. Sea-horses, eels, starfish, became 
entangled with our flippers and then flew away. At that moment I realised 
that you were afraid and I felt a strong urge to fly away myself. Your fear would have 
seemed strange though if I didn’t know you, but then I didn’t need language, words, voices – 
with or without the transparent oxygen bubbles that were encircling us, spectacular 
bubbles, I could spot your teeth shaking behind the glass of your mask. I saw fear in the 
lowering of your eyes, that moment when your nostrils start trembling. I then felt like 
grabbing you violently, holding you tight next to me and go on kissing you for hours. How 
could I shelter my passion though in the waters and all this wetness….How could I channel 
my kisses to you anyway in this fucking underwater city? Near the end of Athenas 
street, a big oyster broke into pieces beneath my foot. I  started 
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feeling cold , as I looked at the shining of  a thousand pieces on the 
floor,  the moment before the water swept them away towards another 
part of the  city. So when you rested your hand on my hair,  when you 
kept close  to me there  near Metropoli ,  I  wasn’t cold then,  I got warm. 
When the glass in our masks touched and I  looked at you,  I felt  safe 
in the pools of your eyes – even if  I couldn’t  touch them, kiss them 
like I used to – I felt  safe. And out there, in the large courtyard of the church, while 
seahorses were playing with your hair, I remembered you again, just like in old times, in 
my arms, “faster, faster…” – that trumpeting to speed up. I remembered then your words, 
your demand to stay where I was, after I came, to keep you perforated, mine, wide open. 
And as the bubbles were multiplying around us, as the seahorses were rattling, galloping 
over our heads, “faster, faster…” – I remembered your wish to keep you mastered, 
defenseless, conquered there on your back in the seat, with a hoarse voice, beloved, 
pleading, voice of my lust even if it was raining out there, even if it was raining outside, 
heavily, wildly. Until I held you again by the hand and led you ahead. In Syntagma 
square,  you waved me over to make your usual  phone call  home. We 
squeezed inside the phone booth, besieged by advertisements, chairs,  
small  tables.  You took your mask off , slowly you dialed the number.  
The booth was waterproof  and you spoke  without  bubbles,  outside the  
moon was sinking little by little behind the big buildings, squelching 
in the waters, bleeding, scratched.  You smiled as you hang up the 
phone and I kissed you guilti ly,  in a restrained,  telephonic way. Your 
lips had  a bitter taste,  a  saltiness and as we were  now walking 
towards the Royal Garden,  behind the mask I  was licking that 
saltiness,  with delight. The Garden, my god, that night looked like a marooned, 
silent, sea forest. I was watching with awe the tall soaked trees, palpitating uneasily. 
Surprisingly the door to the Garden was open and we climbed over. The Garden seemed to 
me like a huge and extraordinary aquarium. Yes, the Garden was miraculously 
magical  that night, swaying back and forth in the heart  of  the city,  
breathing like a young child’s lung . The  rapid movement  reminded 
me suddenly of your ‘curly  double door’, that place where you keep 
exclusively  for me, the  lost valleys at the hidden corners of your 
body.  I shuddered,  touching that  part of your body. Two molded lips 
of wet cotton that keep behind them all the chaos, that’s  how the  wet 
lips of  your entrance seemed to me that night.  That’s why I stopped 
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you as we  were walking and I pulled  you to sit  back on the bench,  to 
watch the purple  moon that was coming down damp among the wet 
trees of the Garden. Eels and flocks of  wide headed and slick fish 
were crashing into our masks smearing , revealing a blurred  and 
unfamiliar aspect of the dark Garden.  We had an unpleasant  feeling 
as we left  the garden, because it  was as attractive as no other place. 
We headed towards the columns of Olympian Zeus, intending to turn towards Plaka and go 
back home. We saw up in the sky some dark stains that must have been dolphins, as we 
reached the columns. The melancholic colours of the depths of the sea were making the 
pillars look sublime. You thought that they were a thousand miles high, growing above the 
surface of the water, connecting the mysterious waters and the sky. Leaving the columns 
behind us, turning right into the narrow streets of Plaka and while your breast – always 
unmistakable – was pointing straight ahead, we kept going in the water, passing obstacles, 
bubbles, fish and shells, going back home, which was waiting for us shipwrecked, at the 
other end of the city.97  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
97 This extract is a short story entitled ‘Sto Vytho’ (‘At the Bottom of the Sea’) by Greek author Vangelis 
Raptopoulos. It is published as part of a collection of stories by the same author entitled Kommatakia (In Pieces); 
see (Raptopoulos, 1995: 73-77). The text was translated from the original Greek text (attached in Appendix) by the 
author of this thesis. 
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When the flâneur is also a good diver; when planning has a story to tell; and how 
mapping can be totally subjective  
 
In 1833, two German trained architects, Stamatios Kleanthes and Gustav Schaubert, 
submitted their third consecutive proposal for the planning of modern Athens: the capital-to-
be of the newly formed Greek state. It was in 1832 that the two young architects were first 
commissioned by the provisional Greek government to prepare plans for the new city. As 
historian Eleni Bastéa (2000: 74) mentions, their first two designs largely evolved out of an 
archaeological map of Athens by the British surveyor William Martin Leake. These 
masterplans proposed that the new city be planned around the classical antiquities and 
superimposed onto the existing Ottoman town. However, their ‘triangular’ neoclassical design 
of 1833 was to be the most influential. Turning all perspectives toward the Acropolis, and 
proposing a brand new avenue, Ermou street, across the old Turkish town – “yet refraining 
from encircling its girth” (Boyer, 1994: 163) – the design proposed a radical alteration to 
‘erase’ all formal traces of the Ottoman past. As Kleanthes later recounted, there was never a 
detailed program for the new city; the architects were simply tasked to provide a design that 
would be “equal with the ancient fame and glory of the city and worthy of the century in 
which we live” (Bastéa, 2000: 18).  
M. Christine Boyer interprets the success of the proposal as being due to the 
colonalising tendencies of affluent Western Europe: the intention to appropriate the history of 
classical Athens into the Western representational order and impose it on a colonised and 
dominated East. According to Boyer (1994: 163), “modern Athens was a disgraceful sight” for 
the West, since it carried too many traces of the Turkish culture; thus, it had to be 
reconstructed “with its Eurocentric focal point drawn on the enlightened times of antiquity”. 
Several similar ideas have been argued by Bastéa, who has also described the regular, 
orthogonal design by Kleanthes and Schaubert, as a reflection of the newly founded regency’s 
intentions to modernise the Greek nation: “by introducing the machinery of a Western state” 
(Bastéa, 2000: 20). For Bastéa, Western planning interventions in Africa, Asia and South 
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America expressed the same colonising attitudes; caring less about the urban realities of the 
colonising nations, and more about testing contemporary Western urban theories on the new 
sites. Western European planners ordered cities in a regular, rational grid, and separated the 
functions and the residents of the cities into distinct zones (Bastéa , 2000: 83).  
Walter Benjamin expressed a similar critical stance towards neoclassicism. In One-Way 
Street, he was deeply critical and aphoristic in his descriptions of the nineteenth century 
bourgeois interior as a dark, colonial phantasy: “Behind the heavy, gathered Khilim tapestries, 
the master of the house has orgies with his share certificates, feels himself the eastern merchant, 
the indolent pasha in the caravanserai of otiose enchantment, until that dagger in its silver sling 
above the divan puts an end, one fine afternoon, to his siesta and himself” (Benjamin, 1996: 
447). In The Arcades Project, he referred to Haussmann’s boulevards as “the apotheosis of the 
bourgeoisie’s worldly and spiritual dominance”, “draped across with canvas and unveiled like 
monuments” of Napoleonic imperialism (Benjamin, 1999c: 12). As Susan Buck-Morss 
observed in her book on The Arcades Project, for Benjamin neoclassicism was another 
“ideological attempt to represent the unbroken pedigree of bourgeois civilisation and the eternal 
verity of Western imperial domination” (Buck-Morss, 1999: 26).  
 Looking at the 1877 modified plan of Athens, traces of the Kleanthes and Schaubert 
plan are still quite distinct, for instance, the neoclassical ‘triangle’ is kept in place; and 
subsequent modern developments of the city centre would be largely shaped around it.  
 
§ 
 
The narrator/walker of the first story begins his ‘underwater’ journey inside the ‘triangle’ of 
the city. He sets off from Omonia square, the site of the king’s palace in the original 
Kleanthes and Schaubert plans. It was for this reason that the square was initially named ‘Otto 
square’, after king Otto, the first king of Greece. The name of the square changed to Omonia 
(‘Concord’) square, after the king’s dethronement. It is there that the narrator/walker meets a 
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blind beggar, who wears a diving suit. Shortly after this encounter, the narrator continues 
down Athenas street. This street was designed as one of the three major boulevards, 
connecting the palace, as originally located in Omonia square, with the foot of the Acropolis 
Hill (Bastéa, 2000: 78). On Athenas street, the narrator/walker passes the Town Hall, a 
neoclassical building built in 1872. The underwater Town Hall of the story has seaweed on 
the roof. Continuing on his journey, the narrator/walker passes by Metropoli, the Athenian 
cathedral, which was also designed by European architects in 186298. Outside the cathedral, 
he shares an intimate moment with his girlfriend; and again at Syntagma (‘Constitution’) 
Square. It was there that the royal palace was finally constructed, a neoclassical building that 
was later to become the parliament of the republic. The narrator/walker finally ends his drift 
in the Royal Garden, originally the garden of the palace; it is nowadays a public park.  
 
§ 
 
Michel de Certeau’s idea of the transformative operation of stories is rooted in his theory that 
significant places can be continuously redefined through cultural signification, spatial 
occupation, and representation; the latter including storytelling and narrativisation.99 In the 
story, the narrator/walker appropriates the ‘official’ public space of the city, by inscribing his 
personal narrative, through an emotional and physical journey. Following De Certeau’s idea 
of spatial appropriation through narrative, it could be argued that in this way, the 
narrator/walker performs a transgressive activity: he/she “turns the street into a living room”, 
                                                           
98 Initially commissioned to Theophil Hansen, the design was later modified by Greek architect Demetres Zezos, 
and, after his death, by F.L.F. Boulanger, until its completion in 1862 (Bastéa, 2000: 161-163). 
99 In the chapter ‘Spatial Stories’ in the book The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel De Certeau discusses this 
theory extensively. To develop his argument for the operative role of narratives in spatial reconfiguration, he 
makes a distinction between the concept of ‘place’ (lieu) and the concept of ‘space’ (espace). According to De 
Certeau (1984: 117), “a place is the order (of whatever kind) in accord with which elements are distributed in 
relationships of co-existence. It thus excludes the possibility of two things being in the same location (place). The 
law of the ‘proper’ rules in the place…It implies an indication of stability”; furthermore: “A space exists when one 
takes into consideration vectors of direction, velocities, and time variables. Thus space is composed of 
intersections of mobile elements. It is in a sense actuated by the ensemble of movements deployed within it…In 
contradistinction to the place, it has thus none of the univocity or stability of a ‘proper’”. 
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or, in the traditional flâneur’s manner, he/she “reverses an established distinction between 
public and private spaces” (Burgin, 1996: 145), between official history and personal 
memory; thus, further destabilising and reconfiguring hierarchical significations.  
In fact the flâneur and the story’s narrator/walker occupy not dissimilar 
environments. The major redevelopment of Paris during the second half of the 19th century 
under prefect Baron Haussmann, had been influential for the planning proposals of modern 
Athens. As Bastéa (2000: 144) mentions, Otto, the first king of Greece, consulted 
Haussmann’s publications about the project100. As Simon Sadler (1998: 99) notes, 
Haussmannn’s approach of tabula rasa (meaning ‘blank slate’) was later criticised by French 
critical thinkers, such as Bataille and Foucault, for suppressing incidents and places that 
contradict narratives of authority: Haussmann turned “Ile de la Cite into an administrative 
desert” (Sadler, 1998: 99). Similarly, Kleanthes and Schaubert eradicated all traces of 
Athens’s Ottoman past.  
Sadler has further criticised such practices for possessing an underlying intention to 
turn the city into a mnemonic (a ‘memory aid’), by creating ‘chains’ of monuments or sites as 
a kind of ‘text’ that would profess ‘official’ history and knowledge. In this context, Sadler 
describes the Situationist practice of dérive, the aimless walking in the city, as a way to 
inspire the subversive activity of ‘re-inscribing’ monuments to ‘official’ history with 
subjective meaning (Sadler, 1998: 99). I believe that this critical interpretation falls within De 
Certeau’s theory of subjective appropriation through occupation of public urban space. De 
Certeau went further to discuss the practice of walking as an act of ‘re-inscription’ – and so a 
transgressive activity and a political intervention – through rendering space visible through 
the creation of new ‘paths’, of alternative ‘routes’ through space; however enduringly 
reversible or flexible. As mentioned by Steve Pile (1996: 117), for De Certeau, the walker’s 
anarchical spatial mobility subverts the institution of spatial practices as ‘citation’ of the 
                                                           
100 According to Eleni Bastéa (2000: 144), France was the country most frequently mentioned in the daily press 
regarding cultural and architectural issues. In 1869 ‘Aion’ reported that Prefect Haussmann of Paris was replaced 
by Cevreau, “the famous prefect of Paris under Napoleon III, Haussmann, published two volumes…he sent a copy 
of these volumes to King Otto via the then-consul of Greece in Paris” (Bastéa, 2000: 144). 
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already there; and so allows for space to be a lived reality – or in his own words, “practiced 
place” (De Certeau, 1984: 117).  
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Basically  I thought  that running was allowed in the centre  of  Athens.  
That’s  why as I was running up  Academias street , I  was struck by 
surprise,  as they say,  when that  guy with the bowler hat and the sack 
spat on me.  This was strange, it  wasn’t  as if we had collided, sending 
his hat  and sack crashing to the ground; and so what was the  
misunderstanding about, and why did he spit on me and shouted:  
“Don’t  you know that it ’s  forbidden to run in the centre of Athens?” I  
was taken by surprise, that’s  all!  I wasn’t looking for a fight because 
I was hungry,  I wanted a cheese  pie and I  didn’t  have enough money 
– I was fifty pennies short  – and where  was I supposed to find  you in 
that crowd, how could I  spot you within those noisy crowds, moving 
like a herd  of  ants on the beloved  body of Athens? Anyway you know well 
how to hide – I’ve told you so many times – and (coincidence?) you always seem to do so in 
the most inappropriate circumstances, always at times when I want you and need you 
immensely, when I am expecting you all lit up and beautiful, to fill in my void and eliminate 
my tyrants. And perhaps now I didn’t need you so much for the fifty pennies – the change 
of a whole life – but just like that, just to be on my side, to run with me on the street, so that I 
don’t wander around alone amongst so many people, so that I don’t get spat on by whoever.  
 I  slowed from a run, I  walked slowly up  Academias street, the 
torturing one-way street. The  people  around me seemed to be 
acquiring a heaviness,  stronger facial features in their slow 
movement. Advertising labels were flickering all  around me like 
spots on the night’s face,  I  was developing small  prickly  thorns. 
Far away,  very far behind me, the  guy with the bowler hat and the 
sack,  frozen, in the middle of the pavement, misplaced, and me,  
unaccustomed with his spit  on my cheek, my forehead and my 
jumper,  stigmatised, stained.  I am sick of  the traffic, I  am bored  
with repetition. I  keep his medals on me,  I don’t  wash myself , I  
don’t rinse  myself,  like at the times when my hands smell  of  your 
aroma and I don’t wash them so that they always smell  like  that, to 
preserve you. 
 Finally, after lots of twisting and turning, I find the bookshop. I go inside with the 
saliva on me and I ask for the book with my name on (it is my book) and I get a negative 
answer. – “Is it out of stock?” – “We don’t have it” – “What do you mean you don’t have it?” 
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– “We don’t have it”. There is no such question, there is no such book and I start running 
faster and faster. Everything runs around me at a great speed, the book shelves turn 
upside down, they fall down, so many books and mine is nowhere to be seen. Everything 
turns upside down, money from the till hits the ground with metallic sounds. – “What do 
you mean you don’t have it?” and the salesman looks at me embarrassed, unarmed, 
mainly so, unarmed and I load my gun, I open my mouth, I lift up the cock, ready. I see 
him folding in two and falling dead on the floor.  
 On the way back I  keep misbehaving. Academias street is  a one-
way street and I  go the wrong way up,  I go faster than the speed 
limit, my book gets published before I  even write it , I  keep 
misbehaving. Near the  Opera I  meet the man with the bowler hat  
and the  sack still  immobile. I  stop to wipe the  sal iva on him, to 
repay my old  debts,  to get rid  of  what I  owe. Then I leave again. Now I am 
rather calm. I find you near Kaniggos square. You wear your tight skirt, the pretty gold 
pin on your hair. You shine through the night. I hold your hand. I don’t run, I am not 
hungry, I am not scared. You shine through the night and I recognise that superiority of 
yours. I have no need for misbehaving now, for debts and credit. One-way street is my 
street, now that I want and don’t want to publish the book, that I want and don’t want to 
be hungry, or in debt in public!101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
101 See Raptopoulos (1995: 51-54). This extract is the short story ‘Monodromos’ (‘One-Way Street’), also included 
in the collection Kommatakia (In Pieces). It was translated from the original Greek text (included in Appendix) by 
the author of this thesis. 
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How one can go the wrong way up one-way streets  
 
In this story, the narrator/walker runs up Academias (‘Academy’) street, a one-way avenue 
that runs parallel to the other main central Athenian avenue, Panepistimiou (‘University’) 
street. Both street names refer to two major civic buildings, which lie in between them: the 
Academy of Athens and the University building, both designed and constructed in the 
nineteenth century. Along with the National Library, located next to them, these buildings 
were designed to form a neoclassical ‘architectural trilogy’, which would represent the 
official history and cultural power of the modern Greek state102. Nevertheless, the actions of 
the narrator/walker do not fit within the Situationist description of modern urban experience: 
in Michel Colle’s words, “the state of total and passive submission of the man in the street 
placed before the architectural phenomenon” (in Sadler, 1998: 7). He rather ‘misbehaves ’, 
as he states, by running, instead of walking; and going ‘ the wrong way up’ .  
De Certeau (1984: 117) argued that the walker transforms the street, as geometrically 
defined and treated through modern urban planning. He called this practice the ‘rhetorics of 
walking’, a practice of ‘inscription’ that is not abstract, but indispensably linked with the 
walker’s physical mobility: through his/her movement on the streets, the walker “condemns 
certain places to inertia or disappearance and composes with others spatial ‘turns of phrase’ 
that are ‘rare’, ‘accidental’ or ‘illegitimate’” (De Certeau, 1984: 99). From this perspective, 
the narrator/walker of the story disturbs the ‘stability’ of the ‘proper’ that Academias street is 
according to official discourses; and through “the ensemble of his movements”, he actuates 
‘space’ within it (De Certeau, 1984: 117). In this way, De Certeau would argue that he 
transgresses the ‘already there’, the ‘place’ of the street that is constructed by power 
discourses103, in order to reveal the street as a terrain for critical subjectivity.   
                                                           
102 As Bastéa (2000: 156-161) calls them, in the chapter ‘The Athenian Trilogy: University, Academy, Library’. 
The three buildings were designed by the Danish architects Hans Christian and Theophil Hansen. 
103 Throughout the twentieth century, the street has been associated with movement and circulation, and it has been 
discussed as “the great modern dream of mobility” (Berman, 1988: 326), and as a ‘flexible’ terrain: “Contrary to 
the buildings, which almost always belong to someone, the streets in principle belong to no one” (Perec, 1999: 47). 
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 Contrary to the proclamation of the planning officials in nineteenth century Athens 
that the street was “an artistic…and an administrative question”104, the narrator/walker acts in 
recognition of the critical potential of the experience of the modern street. In later writings, 
the writer of the story will describe uncanny, nightmarish street environments that often lead 
his protagonists to act out of character or the ordinary; unusual things always happen “out 
there in a street, somewhere in the centre of Athens” 105. 
 
§ 
 
“Any human movement, whether it springs from an intellectual or even a natural impulse, is 
impeded in its unfolding by the boundless resistance of the outside world. A shortage of 
houses and the rising cost of travel are in the process of annihilating the elementary symbol of 
European freedom, which existed in certain forms even in the Middle Ages: freedom of 
domicile. And if medieval coercion bound men to natural associations, they are now chained 
together in unnatural community. Few things will further the ominous spread of the cult of 
rambling as much as the strangulation of the freedom of residence, and never has freedom of 
movement stood in greater disproportion to the abundance of means of travel.” (Benjamin, 
1991: 454)  
Benjamin’s One-Way Street can be considered, among other things, to be an 
investigation of the experience of resistance to movement in modern urbanism. In the above 
quote, which forms part of his critique of German modernism, in the fragment ‘Imperial 
                                                           
104 The quote is from a letter by the Minister of the Interior, Ioannis Kolettes: “The question of street alignments is 
a complex one; it is an artistic question and an administrative question” (Bastéa, 2000: 110). However, as Bastéa 
(2000: 109-110) notes, reasons of “beautification, cleanliness, or facilitation of transportation” (Bastéa, 2000: 115) 
were given only to disguise economic and political motives behind the proposed street layouts. In this sense, 
Bastéa, (2000: 110) further notes similarities between the case of Athens and Prefect Haussmann’s monumental 
redesign of Paris under Napoleon III (1853-70), which was carried out by private developers, pointing at 
tendencies of favoritism and profiteering in regards to both projects. 
105 In Raptopoulos’s novel O Ergenis (The Bachelor) (1993), as well as in his short story ‘Aquaforte’, the 
protagonists commit suicide after undergoing self-reflective ‘journeys’, whilst walking or driving in the city of 
Athens. The quotation by Raptopoulos (1993: 22) was translated from the Greek by the author of this thesis. 
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Panorama: A tour through the German inflation’, he described a shift in the experience of 
movement: from the pre-modern experience that unfolded in opposition to a substantial entity, 
‘the outside world’, to the modern urban experience of movement, the resistance of which 
cannot be identifiably caused by a substantial entity. In which case, as Caygill (1998: 130) 
argues, “The experience of resistance does not rest on there being something – a substance – 
which resists us, but is a symptom of an intangible obstacle to our movement.” Caygill (1998: 
130) further relates the modern urban experience of resistance to Benjamin’s concept of 
‘porosity’106: which refers to the seemingly transparent and fluid modern urban environment. 
In a passage from ‘Imperial Panorama’, Benjamin (1996: 454) describes “the perpetual 
process of mingling and contamination” that takes place in modernity, where, like “all 
things”, cities “are losing their intrinsic character and ambiguity displaces authenticity”. This 
‘porous’, ambiguous urban condition, in which fixed ‘authenticities’ are undistinguishable 
from what is transitory, may be experienced by the city dweller as a source of threat and 
insecurity: “There is no longer a substantial entity which resists our movement, but an 
ambiguous and inauthentic experience of blockage which resists our comprehension”107 
(Caygill, 1998: 130-131).  
Nevertheless, Benjamin suggests that this sensation of resistance can also be 
experienced as an opportunity for a creative response and improvisation. To support this 
argument he discusses the city of Naples, where porosity results “from the passion for 
improvisation, which demands that space and opportunity be preserved at any price” 
(Benjamin, 1996: 416-417). Benjamin observes that in Naples, the porosity of the city 
provides the conditions for the unexpected; encouraging inventive and flexible responses of 
spatial occupation and use: “As porous as stone is the architecture. Building and action 
interpenetrate in the courtyards, arcades and stairways. In everything they preserve the scope 
                                                           
106 This concept first appears in the ‘Naples’ essay, but it pertains other ‘city portraits’ by Benjamin, as well as 
One-Way Street. 
107 Caygill (1998: 121) also notes in reference to the ‘Naples’ essay: “In the description of the city there is no 
distinction between what is fixed and permanent and (its feared opposite) what is transitory – rather everything is 
in a continual process of discontinuous transformation”. 
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to become a theatre of new, unforeseen constellations. The stamp of the definitive is avoided” 
(Benjamin, 1996: 416). In the above conditions, Caygill (1998: 122) identifies a ‘speculative’ 
spatial experience, in which “every position is in a process of negotiating its relations with 
other positions”. Furthermore, by comparing the Neapolitan environments of porosity to 
Haussmann’s Parisian boulevards, he observes that Naples offers “no fixed spatial form 
which governs the location of participants” (Caygill, 1998: 122); whilst “transitions between 
different parts of urban space are not smooth and continuous, but multifarious, sudden and 
abrupt” (Caygill, 1998: 122-123). Caygill (1998: 123) argues that this is the “experience of 
shock”, in which Benjamin recognised a distinctly critical potential. Inspired by the effect of 
modern art techniques (i.e. montage), Benjamin advocated the ‘shock’ that, as an experience, 
encouraged creative and critical agency, rather than passive responses to a phenomenon. 
In explicit political terms, Benjamin further argued that it was precisely this 
‘experience of shock’ that modern urban planning was meant to abolish. In Convolute E of 
The Arcades Project, he made multiple references to published materials on Haussmann’s 
project: “‘Strategic basis for the perspectival articulation of the city. A contemporary seeking 
to justify the construction of large thoroughfares under Napoleon III speaks of them as 
“unfavourable ‘to the habitual tactic of local insurrection.’” Marcel Poëte, Une vie de cité 
(Paris, 1925), p. 469. “Open up this area of continual disturbances.” Baron Haussmann, in the 
memorandum calling for the extension of the Boulevard de Strasbourg to Châtelet. Emile de 
Labédollière, Le Nouveau Paris, p. 52. But even earlier than this: “They are paving Paris with 
wood in order to deprive the Revolution of building materials. Out of wooden blocks there 
will be no more barricades constructed.’’ Gutzkow, Briefe aus paris, vol. 1, pp. 60-61. What 
this means can be gathered from the fact that in 1830 there were 6,000 barricades.” 
(Benjamin, 1999b: 121). Benjamin points out that the boulevards were not constructed solely 
for technical, or aesthetic reasons, but in order to facilitate certain political purposes: namely 
preventing the inevitable insurrection of the proletariat population of the inner city quarters. 
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 Therefore, it seems that the regulation and resistance of movement in modern 
urbanism operates and occurs on differing levels; which, rather than presenting obvious, 
substantial entities of opposition, employ ambiguity. In this framework, subjectivity in the 
pre-modern sense, of the ‘fixed’, ‘authentic’ viewpoint, is challenged. For Benjamin, there are 
two possible responses: the first to insist upon fixed identities; whilst the other is to embrace 
ambiguity as an opportunity for inventiveness – or, in Caygill’s words, “The first option 
defends a given identity to the point of psychosis, while the second risks identity for the sake 
of its transformation” (Caygill, 1998: 130-131).  
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It’s raining tonight. It rains really heavily, I am not kidding. It rains cats and dogs! Through 
the glazing of the telephone booth, among thousands of long distance talks on the phone 
with you, I watch the raindrops all around, looking for you. I  cal l you from here,  
from Areos Square,  you don’t answer.  Your phone rings and nobody 
answers.  I get  out and wander in the park. Rain soaks me thoroughly . 
My clothes are soaking up the  heavy raindrops.  I  wander, my feet 
taking me here and there for no reason.  I miss you. I go back again. I dial 
the twelve numbers: the code for the foreign country and then your number. Tens of beats 
resonating in my ears, dull booms and bangs. Then you answer and the reception is 
automatically lost. Just a “Hello?” of yours impregnates the cables reaches deep inside me. 
Then nothing. I call again, and again; and always as soon as you answer the reception is 
lost. That, you know,  is terrible  in an orange phone booth. Unbearable.  
Because  tonight the  rain grates my skin and I  desire you.  I miss you 
terribly  tonight and I can’t  stand the distance anymore, your going 
away,  the separation. That’s  why I  run away.  At Mouseio there  isn’t  a  
single soul.  The  small  tables and the chairs are soaking wet. The 
telephone booth  sobs with emptiness. The  red  light is on but I  can’t  
get through.  I am looking for you, as you dissolve in the darkness. At  
Kaniggos square  the machine is broken down, crumbling. It  keeps 
my twenty in,  I  beat  and kick it . It  gives me back the money and I go. 
I hate Athens when I  wander around on my own in the rain. I  hate it .  
It  becomes an empty silence  that multiplies your absence . It  becomes 
a conduit of the void,  of  my loneliness.  I feel the dirty grime of the road 
sticking to me. The passersby chase  after me hurriedly, holding up 
their umbrellas. I  stumble on their warm breaths.  
 I  come out at Omonoia square.  Rain falls  heavier now and I  
am soaked to the bone.  I  go down the  stairs. They sell newspapers, 
bagels and salepi .  People,  voices are all around me, I  hear the 
Metro coming. I find a telephone for long distance calls. I put a twenty in, I dial the 
number, you answer the phone. Rain inside me. Water making small pools. Underground 
holes that flood with muddy waters. Do you hear me? I can no longer stand this 
disjoining situation. I can’t bear it anymore, you being there and me here, at the other 
end of the world. Do you hear that? What about your studies and all that bullshit that 
you’re telling me? Give it all up and come back. Can you hear me, eh? You can hear me. 
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Talk to me. I can’t bear it anymore, I’m telling you. I can’t stand it. Don’t deny me that, no. 
Twenties over. The red light is on. Your voice descents into the bottomless abyss between 
us. The phone call is over and the receiver needs to be put back in its place. The rain falls 
heavier. It rains cats and dogs.108     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
108 See Raptopoulos (1995: 51-54). This extract is the short story ‘Yperastiko’ (‘Long Distance Call’), also 
included in the collection Kommatakia (In Pieces). It was translated from the original Greek text (included in 
Appendix) by the author of this thesis. 
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When the street is a state of mind; how stories can become tactics; and why 
walking is political  
 
“In modern Athens, the vehicles of mass transportation are called metaphorai. To go to work 
or come home, one takes a ‘metaphor’ – a bus or a train. Stories could also take this noble 
name: every day, they traverse and organise places; they select and link them together; they 
make sentences and itineraries out of them. They are spatial trajectories […] Every story is a 
travel story – a spatial practice” (De Certeau, 1984: 115). Here, De Certeau describes an 
intrinsic link between narrativisation – or storytelling – and mobility in modern urban space. 
The cities that inspired Benjamin’s ‘thought-images’ offered a sensuous, tactile 
navigational experience: in order to orient oneself, one must ‘feel’ one’s way through Naples 
or Moscow. Benjamin recognised that these cities were in constant flux, which, although 
differently caused and manifested, encouraged spatial mobility and improvisation109. From 
Benjamin’s perspective, these cities encompassed processes of perpetual re-inscription and re-
configuration via spatial occupation. In this sense, it can be argued that these urban 
environments are ‘anti-historicist’, since they allow for continual configuration through 
immediate spatial experience: they do not provide sites onto which a monumental historicism 
can be permanently inscribed; but are in a process of constant transformation, “not according 
to a plan but according to improvisations, whose motivation remains inscrutable and whose 
consequences are unforeseeable” (Caygill, 1998: 124). Similarly to stories, which are 
reconfigured as they are told, these cities are reconfigured as they are experienced, practiced, 
and lived. 
  
§ 
 
                                                           
109 Caygill (1998: 124-128) compares the experience of mobility in Moscow and Naples. 
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In his inner city journey, the narrator/walker of the stories, appropriates the official, historicist 
construction of the city: in De Certeau’s terms, as a ‘proper’ place, by creating alternative, 
subjective routes that incorporate ‘accidents’, ‘ruptures’; or ‘turns of phrase’110. Pile has 
discussed such activities as a kind of ‘politics of resistance’. Furthermore, he suggests that 
resistance can be considered as the recognition of how power relations can be “incomplete, 
fluid, and liable to rupture”; thus, resistance is defined through the meanings taken on by 
social actions in everyday life, rather than the actions themselves (Pile, 1997: 14). From this 
perspective, Pile thinks that urban planning as “a spatial technology of domination” (Pile, 
1997: 3) can be resisted through various ‘tactics’ of appropriation: through practices that 
“create new meanings out of imposed meanings” via spatial appropriation that “re-work[s] 
and divert[s] space to other ends” (Pile, 1997: 16). For Pile, subjectivity plays an important 
role in such urban practices and processes. Since ‘resistance’ is not merely conceived to be 
changes in external physical space, Pile (1996: 255) argues that resistance must engage with 
“the spaces of the subject, but also the ways in which people move through spaces which are 
constitutive of subjectivity”. He further argues that, for this reason, “identification, desire and 
fantasy in psychic life” (Pile, 1996: 255) should be acknowledged as significant constituents 
of urban spatial practices.  
 Following similar lines of argument, postmodern criticism can be said to have 
stressed the need for subjectivity to inform politics. In a postcolonial context, Frantz Fanon 
has pointed out that the intrinsic potential for resistance can lie within the psychical 
manifestations of practices of ‘colonisation’ by hegemonic norms and values (Fanon, 1986). 
Furthermore, in the context of globalisation, Fredric Jameson has proposed ‘an aesthetics of 
cognitive mapping’, which enables the subject to actively intervene in the globalised 
environment of alienating ‘postmodern hyperspace’ (Jameson, 1991). It is most interesting to 
note that, within these discourses, antithetical distinctions between the ‘local’ and the 
                                                           
110 De Certeau (1984: 117-118) distinguished between ‘place’, as constructed by official discourses, and ‘practiced 
place’, as practiced through lived experience and everyday practice. He also mentioned actualising ‘space’ and 
‘spatialisation’ through movement, as going against the construction of the city as a ‘proper’.  
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‘global’, the ‘body’ and the ‘city’, become ambivalent. As Pile comments, these entities do 
not appear on natural scales anymore, but are rather formed out of the tensions that they 
contain. Echoing Lefebvre, he argues that, “all scales ‘speak’ of the ‘production of space’, not 
only as an echo of domination, but also as a possibility of resistance” (Pile, 1997: 13).  
 
§ 
 
The city has been given many descriptions in modern and postmodern urban discourses. It has 
been said that: “The urban terrain is an emotional concrete condition”, and that “The city is a 
state of mind”111. Therefore it has been discussed, not as “merely a physical mechanism or an 
artificial construction” (Pile, 1996: 245), but also as a complex set of relationships that come 
together through diverse networks; namely economic and administrative, but also symbolic 
and representational (Donald: 1999). Thus, the city is discussed in terms of subjective 
experience, which acknowledges the significance of the relationship between the urban 
subject and the specific geography of the modern city112. As Marx stated: “Men can see 
nothing around them that is not their own image; everything speaks to them of themselves. 
Their very landscape is alive” (in Sadler, 1998: 77). Such an approach to the city makes an 
active and creative urban existence possible, transforming the places of power into terrains of 
subjectivity; or, into places that one wouldn’t want to leave, as, in the writer’s own words, 
they are ‘as attractive as no other’.  
 
 
                                                           
111 The first quote by architect Adam Caruso is included in his article ‘La ville émotionelle’ (‘The emotional city’). 
It was translated into English from the French by the author of this thesis. The second quote by geographer R. E. 
Park of the Chicago School is included in his 1925 essay “The city: suggestions for investigation of human 
behaviour in the urban environment”; quotation is included in (Pile, 1996: 245). 
112  “To be an urban subject means something – and the geography of the city means something: whether it is in 
Freud’s uncanny story of dreadful delight or in the freedom it gives for people to lose themselves and look anew. 
The streets become a map of visible and invisible relations of meaning, identity and power into which the subject 
is placed and has to find their way around – and possibly, one day, to escape” (Pile, 1996: 245). 
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Fig. (4) 
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‘An avenue that is like me’113 
 
                                                           
113 Parts of this chapter were published in (Nigianni, 2006); the article is attached in Appendix.  
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Cities are  like people,”  my father used to say and I knew he was 
telling the truth – he  seemed like a whole city himself.   
   He had big palms, wide forehead, long and thin lips, boldly curved eyebrows, eyelids that 
added a sense of mystery to his look and his voice could be heard as far as the most 
distanced neighborhood, which I, quite often, dared to reach.  
   “That’s the way it  is!”  my grandfather would agree with him, and go 
on saying:   “Each city has its  own story,  just like  people do!” 
  Grandfather had deep lines around his eyes,  his neck stuck out  from 
his buttoned-up shirt all  wrinkled,  his fingers had taken that yellow 
colour of  the tobacco and marks of an old  i llness scarred  his nostrils.  
   When I looked at my grandfather, it  was as if I  was reading a book 
full of  adventures and unexpected incidents.   
They used to talk about their home country. It was a city, a city whose name reminded me 
of one of the three Magi who worshiped Jesus Christ. A city spread along a coast, decorated 
with polygonal balconies and satiated with sherbets and sweets with strange names and 
thick tastes.  
     “The houses I used to have were taken away from me” – I think my grandfather used to 
mutter. So I realised they were talking about a city that I would never meet. 
     My mother would open –  especially at nights with a full  moon – an 
old wooden chest decorated with thin iron bars.  
     “Look, look!” she'd invite me and I'd stick my whole face into a wooden tip filled with 
foxed books, colourful flowers made of starched fabric, hats in strange shapes, dresses in 
bright colours and then I'd stretch out my hands trying to reach the bottom, probing it 
carefully in case a splinter prickled my hand, and mother would always advise me:  
     “Gently, gently now! Gently we touch the things that carry inside them our dreams, our 
hopes and our passions!» 
     Gently , softly  my hands were fumbling and trying out touches and 
shapes, ti ll  they'd  reach that circular object, the one wrapped up  in a 
cotton cloth…And I  would feel  it ,  my palm was so small  I  almost 
couldn’t grasp it ,  but I 'd  finally manage to grab hold of it , to hold it  
firmly,  to drag it  out in the  pale light which reigned the room –  the 
light of a full  moon and an acetylene lamp.    
     The cloth had small red and white squares and its edges were tied in a loose knot. A cloth 
taken from a kitchen’s hook. That’s how it must have been! But was it ever possible?  
     My mother, shaking her head, would say:  
     “You know, houses are quick to spite you, if you strip them!” 
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     But I was just as headstrong! Whatever I touched, I wanted to know the use of. Under the 
piece of cloth, I could guess the shape of the object and its kind. 
     “Come on, open it!” my mother’s order sounded dipped in sorrow. “Open it!” 
      I'd obey. I'd undo the knot, letting the edges of the cloth fall downwards and in my palms 
I'd see a piece of rock. A rock from a road. It must have been a dirt road. A road that'd raise 
dust in the summer and'd be filled with small pools of water during the days of rain. The 
road of a city that no longer existed. 
     “This is m y country now… What’s left of it!” my mother'd choose words that'd cut into 
my heart and stay there, etched forever. 
     So my mother's country was a city too – always the same city.  
     Well –  I used to wonder –,  can a city be  sometimes the eyelids that 
hide a mystery, sometimes the  scars an old i llness leaves on the 
nostrils  and sometimes a stone  taken from a quiet little street? 
     “Everything was burnt down! …”Wherever you touch it, memory hurts, there is only a 
little sky…” my grandfather used to sigh, deeply he sighed, as if that very moment he had in 
front of him the images of panic, of fire, of terror! 
     “Memories never leave us!” my father would add and then he'd remember an old tune 
and would start singing it. And mother would smile: “They become tales and legends!” I'd 
hear her whispering. All these things were a city. A city that vanished in flames, that saw 
its wealth being raided and watched those who loved it abandon it piled up in caiques, ships, 
barges and boats, swimming next to dead bodies and barrels that once – two days ago – 
were carrying in their circular bellies oil, olives and wine… 
     The city was dying and its swan-song was one of flame and ash.  
A city – the city of the ones I loved. A city I will never know... 
     “This wood that would refresh my forehead 
     the hours of noon that used to burn my veins   
     It would burst into foreign hands. Take it, I’m offering you a present, 
     Look, it’s the wood of a lemon tree …” – I don’t remember who it was that passed on to me 
this piece of advice, this legacy. A heavy burden. Heavy food. But I had a sturdy stomach. I 
could digest anything. I can still digest everything, even now. 
 “Well, I have to find a city of my own then!” I'd say to myself all determined, some nights 
when everything was really quiet, so quiet in fact that dreams wouldn’t come near me out 
of fear that even their light step would stir the calm of the half-closed shutters and the 
peaceful sound of the sleeping birds . 
     A city, then, that  would be  my own. A city made for me. A city that 
would be like me.  A city… Perhaps the city I was born in…But of 
 112 
course,  that’s  the one.  The city  I was born in and growing up in… The 
city I intended to spend the  rest of my life in . 
     The city  that lay at the bottom of the hill  where I lived.   
     A beautiful city.  A lively city. Big…God, how big! 
     So big itself and I so small!…  
     But how could it be possible for a boy to resemble to a city, a boy who, when darkness fell, 
would contemplate the shadows of the dead and shiver, who would remember the screams 
of the displaced and panic?  
     The city I  wanted to be like,  would have –  I imagined – all  the small  
corners where  we stash away our toys, all  the  small terraces from 
where we can gaze  far off  towards our dreams,  al l  these hidden alleys 
that carry the smell  of  our loved  ones.   
     “But cities aren’t children that injure their knees on the first fall! Cities are more like 
creatures that look towards the future planning victories! And you discover them… “once 
you let your heart and your thought become one” – I think it was my dearest aunt that once 
explained to me how she herself had chosen the place she believed was more like her.  
     Therefore, a city not to play “hide and seek” in, neither to jump up and down to the 
rhythm of a nursery rhyme. A city that would match the shape of my maturity. 
     “But you have to plan ahead!” my father would make sure he passed on the rules of a 
certain social propaganda. 
     To decide upon – that’s what I had to do – the boundaries of my own future.  
Out of a whole city I'd have to pick one single place.  
     Squares signal freedom. 
     Avenues aim at success. 
     Commercial streets offer comfort. 
     Some neighbourhoods cover the need for love.  Others lead you to 
the heights of  social  success. 
     I'd ask my mother to take me with her on her weekly days out. 
     On the main streets, I got to know the clamour of the big stores, the bureaucracy of the 
public-service buildings, the luxury of the luminous cafés.  
     All these were situations that either scared me or left me indifferent.  
     “Well”, as if a voice was explaining to me, 
     “We always set out to return 
     To solitude, a fistful of earth, to the empty hands.” 
     Our house waited, steaming with the smell of pastries and the suffocation of old 
furniture. 
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     So I persuaded my father to take Sunday walks with me in other people’s 
neighbourhoods. 
     Buses gasped on uphill roads; matches that fascinated those who'd accepted the identity 
of the fan, were played in stadiums; cinemas offered their enchantment only as long as 
they had their lights switched off.  
     All these things bore elements of what I desired or repressed, but they weren’t me. I 
couldn’t possibly be anything like any of those things. 
      “…People strangers 
     In rooms in streets under the pepper trees 
     While the headlights of cars massacre 
    Thousands of pale masks” who would whisper those words in my ear – and when? 
     Was the city hiding from me or was it I that refused my standardization? 
     “Yet, once I loved Syngrou Avenue 
     The big road’s double swaying  
     That left us magically by the sea” – the prophecy had been written and it was only a 
matter of time until I discovered it. The same cannot be said of the impulsion towards that 
which would become my destiny. 
     The day would come then, when I 'd discover and love  Syngrou 
Avenue,  this long and straight road  which headed to the sea. I  would 
believe… 
     When was it  that I  first though I had the  desire – and the ability – 
to be like it?  
     It  must have been in those years when I would quiver at the sight 
of a naked female arm and my whole body was convinced that it  was 
carrying inside it  a victorious army commander.  The boy was 
becoming a man,  and sitting at a table out on the street, surrounded 
by flowerbeds, little ponds and ducks, the elegant lady was sipping her 
ice cream soda, leaving on the white straw the  mark of her red lips.  
     “…This rose it’s yours, it’s yours 
     You can take it 
     Now or later, whenever you want to”  – that same woman led me to the big 
hall , through huge automobiles, full of shining nickel and perfectly 
round lights and bumpers. 
      Cars possess the magic of an everyday adventure, if you can learn how to tame them 
and then take them and let them roll you down roads that don’t reveal their end. 
      I  asked  to know the name of  that  road  in front of the  big hall , the 
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one full  of cars.  A straight wide road  it  was, and no matter how much 
I stretched and stretched, I couldn’t see its  end.  A road that  only a 
car such as those in that big  hall  deserved to tame and so I asked 
again, I  pulled on my mother’s hand.  
    “Tell  me,  how's this road called?”   
    “Syngrou avenue,” the lady with the red lips smiled and bent  over 
me. “Do you know where  it  leads to?”  
      My eyes started their journey at the dimple of her neck, jumped 
over the shiny obstacle of a little cross and tried to follow the line 
which seemed to separate her two breasts. 
     “To the sea!” and her arm stretched out over the beautiful bright 
blue of a car and pointed to one direction…Under her short sleeve, the 
colour of her armpit peeked through, a timid pink.  
     “Break Ariadne’s thread and look! 
     The blue body of the mermaid” 
     I shivered. 
     Syngrou Avenue – just  like my gaze –  started mere steps from 
where I  was standing and disappeared towards some unknown beach. 
     And so I  thought –  no, I decided – that this  was the road I  should  
be like.   
     I stepped outside onto the pavement. My father followed me.  
     “One of these days I'll take you for a walk down the very end of this road…Down to the 
sea,” that large palm of his was playing with my short-cut hair.  
      “I think I am like Syngrou Avenue”, I whispered; so softly did I 
whisper, that no one heard me but myself, or did I?.. .  Maybe I never 
heard those words, maybe I never spoke them. Maybe I only ever 
thought about them... Yes, that 's right: I only ever thought about them!  
 So, out of a whole city, I chose one road. The straightest, the 
longest, the dullest , least remarkable one. But one nonetheless 
favoured by the stunning cars; one bold enough to fall  into the sea's 
embrace! Into the blue body of a mermaid! I chose a man's road.. .114 
 
 
                                                           
114 In (Kontoleon, 1999: 37-43). The short story was translated from the original Greek text, included in Appendix, 
by literary translators Iraklis Padopoulos and Katerina Sykioti.  
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How can bodies resemble cities; when exploring the city is like opening an old 
chest; when one meets an avenue for the first time 
 
From the title, the narrator of the story already expresses the idea that there is a fundamental 
and essential, empathetic relationship between urban space and its inhabitants. He begins his 
narration by describing his family’s physical features; his father’s ‘boldly curved 
eyebrows’ and ‘eyelids that added a sense of mystery to  his look’, as well as his 
grandfather’s fingers, which ‘had taken that yellow colour of the tobacco’ and the 
‘marks of an old i llness ’ that ‘scarred his nostri ls’. The writer then goes on to 
intermingle these physical features with the city: ‘Well  – I  used to  wonder –  can a city  
be sometimes the eyelids that hide a mystery, sometimes the scars an old 
illness leaves on the nostri ls…?’   
 The ideas of an intertwinement and mirroring between body-scape and city-scape 
have been discussed by philosopher Elizabeth Grosz (1995: 104), who describes  “constitutive 
and mutually defining” relations between the body and the city. In the essay ‘Bodies-Cities’, 
Grosz (1995: 105) argues that such relations escape all ‘causal’ or ‘representational’ models: 
meaning that there is neither, a purely external relation between the body and the city, nor a 
simple mirroring of the body in the built environment. Instead, she suggests that space is 
correlated to the subject; rather than being an empty receptacle, space is closely dependent on 
its ‘contents’, while the ways in which it is perceived and represented depend on the subject’s 
relation to those contents.  
As the story develops, it becomes clear that the interconnection between spatiality and 
the embodied subject makes possible a dynamic and transformative spatial inhabitation. As 
Grosz (1995: 92) argues, “space makes possible different kinds of relations, but in turn it is 
transformed according to the subject’s affective and instrumental relations with it”; thus, the 
body is marked by the city, but the body in turn shapes the city.  
 
§ 
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The narrator describes how he was introduced to the vital connection between his body and 
space when he was still a young child, by listening to the stories of his family about their 
long lost home city. A memorable object, a stone from one of the city’s roads, helps bring the 
memories back and acts as a catalyst for storytelling. The narrator gives a detailed description 
of his efforts to retrieve the stone from the depths of a wooden chest, filled with other family 
belongings that were salvaged during the war115. In his search, he has to engage in a blind, 
tactile hunt through the space of the timber box, until he finds his way to the special object: 
an object that his mother called  ‘her country’ . Therefore, this early embodied subjective 
spatial experience operates in a twofold way: as a bodily practice that privileges senses other 
vision; and, an imaginative practice, as the chest and the stone refer symbolically to a lost 
home city.  
The conception of space as experienced, dreamed, imagined and remembered, rather 
than as architectural and geometrical, has been discussed by philosopher Gaston Bachelard. 
For Bachelard, this is the only way to approach the ‘intimate dimension’ of space. In his book 
The Poetics of Space (1958), he demonstrated how the feeling of ‘intimacy’ is related to 
certain domestic spaces that also function as places to ‘hide’ and ‘shelter’ memory: the 
drawer, the chest or the wardrobe116. He also describes those spaces as experienced through 
an embodied imagination: “I alone, in my memories of another century, can open the deep 
cupboard that still retains for me alone that unique odor, the odor of raisins drying on a 
wicker tray” (Bachelard, 1994: 13).  
It is such an intimacy with the city that the narrator aims to explore: ‘The city I  
wanted to be l ike,  would have – I  imagined – a ll  the small corners  where 
we stash away our toys,  a ll the small terraces from where we can gaze far  
off towards our dreams, a ll  these hidden alleys that carry the smell of our  
                                                           
115 Here I refer to the Greek-Turkish war in Minor Asia in 1912. After the defeat of the Greek army, the Greek 
population was forced to abandon the area and to seek refuge in Greece.  
116 In the chapter ‘Drawers, chests and wardrobes’, Gaston Bachelard (1994: 86) wrote: “‘We shall never reach the 
bottom of the casket’. The infinite quality of the intimate dimension could not be better expressed.” 
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loved ones. ’ And he is about to discover that navigating through the space of the city is to 
be a surprisingly similar experience to his tactile and embodied search through the old 
wooden chest. 
 
§ 
 
“For children are particularly fond of haunting any site where things are being visibly worked 
on. They are irresistibly drawn by the detritus generated by building, gardening, housework, 
tailoring, or carpentry. In waste products they recognise the face that the world of things turns 
directly and solely to them. In using these things, they do not so much imitate the works of 
adults as bring together in the artifact produced in play, materials of widely different kinds of 
new, intuitive relationship. Children thus produce their own small world of things within the 
greater one” (Benjamin, 1996: 449-450). Benjamin was fascinated with the great creativity 
and inventiveness children show in their use of objects and the spatial environment. In One-
Way Street, Benjamin makes multiple references to children’s spatial experience through 
play. These experiences, usually in interior settings, are described as tactile, immersive, and 
empathetic. In the fragment ‘Child hiding’, a game of hide-and-seek in a modern apartment 
evokes experiences of de-materialisation and absorption: “Here he is enclosed in the material 
world. It becomes immensely distinct, speechlessly obtrusive […] Standing behind the 
doorway curtain, the child himself becomes something floating and white, a ghost […] And 
behind a door, he himself is the door – wears it like his heavy mask, and like a shaman will 
bewitch all those who unsuspectingly enter” (Benjamin, 1996: 465). On the other hand, the 
dresser drawers of the ‘Untidy child’ “must become arsenal and zoo, crime museum and 
crypt. ‘To tidy up’ would be to demolish an edifice full of prickly chestnuts that are spiky 
clubs, tinfoil that is hoarded silver, bricks that are coffins, cacti that are totem poles, and 
copper pennies that are shields” (Benjamin, 1996: 465). These experiences of identification 
and mingling with the inanimate world resemble the modern urban experiences of being 
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“closely mingled with people and things” that Benjamin (1999a: 33) described in ‘Moscow’, 
as well as in One-Way Street: “Just as all things, in an irreversible process of mingling and 
contamination, are loosing their intrinsic character while ambiguity displaces authenticity, so 
is the city” (Benjamin, 1996: 454). 
There is an obvious critical aspect in such experiences and practices. Leach (2000: 
30-31) described the empathetic, mimetic appropriation of interior spaces and objects in 
Benjamin’s descriptions of children’s play as ‘creative’. Gilloch (2002: 103) sharing a similar 
view, notes that, for Benjamin, “On his or her various ‘hunts’, the child transforms not only 
the object world, but also the moribund spaces of the city – not least the nightmarish 
bourgeois interior, a setting where ‘luxury’ ensures impoverishment.” Furthermore, this 
‘creative’ and ‘appropriative’ engagement questions and subverts prescribed spatial practices 
associated with certain socio-cultural attitudes. For the ‘Untidy child’, ‘untidiness’ is a form 
of rebellion towards bourgeois cleanliness: “The child has long since helped at his mother’s 
linen cupboard and his father’s bookshelves, while in his own domain he is still a sporadic, 
warlike visitor” (Benjamin, 1996: 465). Or, for the ‘Pilfering child’, ‘stealing’ candy becomes 
a sensual, almost sexual, act, which is subversive of propriety: “Through the chink of the 
scarcely open larder door, his hand advances like a lover through the night. Once at home in 
the darkness, it gropes toward sugar or almonds, raisins or preserves. And just as the lover 
embraces his girl before kissing her, the child’s hand enjoys a tactile tryst with the 
comestibles before his mouth savours their sweetness” (Benjamin, 1996: 464). 
 
§ 
 
The narrator’s early intimate spatial experiences in his home surroundings are followed by 
the exciting city explorations of his early youth. Further on in the story, he recalls the 
eventful discovery of his favourite avenue during one of his journeys out in the city: ‘The 
day would come then that I ’d discover  and love Syngrou avenue… When 
was it that I  first thought I  had the desire –  and the abi lity – to be l ike it?  
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It must have been in those years when I would quiver at the sight of a  
naked female arm and my whole body was convinced that i t was carrying 
inside it a victorious army commander. ’ Spatial apprehension is described, once 
more, primarily as a bodily and imaginary experience; the writer’s sexual awakening coincides 
with his discovery of the ‘long and straight road which headed to the sea .’ A 
particular incident charged with eroticism will further trigger off feelings of empathy and 
identification with the place: ‘My eyes started their journey at the dimple of her 
neck, jumped over the shiny obstacle of a little cross and tried to follow the 
line which seemed to separate her two breasts.. . Syngrou Avenue – just like 
my gaze – s tarted mere steps  from where I  was standing and disappeared 
towards some unknown beach. And so I  thought – no , I  decided – that this  
was the road I should be like.’  
 
§ 
 
In her essay ‘Into the Labyrinth’, Elizabeth Wilson (2000: 150) describes the “sophisticated 
urban consciousness, which reached a high point in central Europe in the early twentieth 
century” as “essentially male”. According to Wilson, it was accompanied by “sexual unease” 
and preoccupied with “the pursuit of sexuality outside the constraints of the family” (Wilson, 
2000: 150). Wilson (2000: 150) also notes the problematic representation of the presence of 
women in the modern city: “Woman is present in cities as temptress, as whore, as fallen 
woman, as lesbian, but also as virtuous womanhood in danger, as heroic womanhood who 
triumphs over temptation and tribulation”. Paradoxically, in Benjamin’s case, as well as hers, 
it was a woman who initiated the children to the city’s “fateful pleasures to be enjoyed” and 
“enormous anxieties to be overcome” (Wilson, 2000: 146):  “Now let me call back those who 
introduced me to the city. For although the child, in his solitary games, grows up in closest 
proximity to the city, he needs and seeks guides to its wider expanses, and the first of these – 
for a son of wealthy middle-class parents like me – are sure to have been nursemaids” 
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(Benjamin, 1999b: 595). In the flâneries of Benjamin’s adulthood, the female urban presence 
acquires a clearer socio-political significance, which, at the same time, manifests in a spatial 
and performative manner: “There is no doubt, at any rate, that the feeling of crossing for the 
first time the threshold of one’s class had a part in the almost unequaled fascination of 
publicly accosting a whore on the street. At the beginning, however, this was a crossing of 
frontiers not only social but topographic, in the sense that whole networks of streets were 
opened up under the auspices of prostitution. But what is really a crossing? Is it not, rather, an 
obstinate and voluptuous hovering on the brink, a hesitation that has its most cogent motive in 
the fact that beyond this frontier lies nothingness? But in great cities, there are countless 
places where one stands on the edge of the void; and the whores in the doorways of tenement 
blocks and on the less sonorous asphalt of railway platforms are like the household goddesses 
of this cult of nothingness” (Benjamin, 1999b: 600). For Benjamin, the female becomes an 
embodiment of the two main sources of contradiction within modern urbanism: sexuality and 
democracy. For this reason, Wilson (2000: 153) proposes that women, “a symptom of 
disorder, and a problem” in the city, are placed at the centre of any future, radical approaches 
to city planning.  
 
§ 
 
The literature characteristic of the modern Greek period has demonstrated a specific 
sensibility towards the relation between urban space and subjectivity117. It often offers 
depictions of the modern city as ‘body’, and Athens, especially, has been repeatedly described 
as “a living organism, an erotic body”, which interacts experientially with the writer 
(Papageorgiou, 2000: 525). The references to the poet George Seferis in the story about 
                                                           
117 As mentioned by Vitti (1978: 387-389), after the early works influenced by romanticism and neo-realism, the 
Greek literary production since the 1920s has demonstrated a great interest in the phenomenon of urbanism, which 
has been represented through subjective narratives following the technique of the ‘stream of consciousness’ – as 
employed by James Joyce and Virginia Woolf. 
 121 
Syngrou avenue further evoke influences by symbolism, surrealism and psychoanalysis118. 
Seferis described Syngrou avenue in a couple of his poems as an indifferent modern space; 
however, bearing a latent eroticism119. He describes Syngrou as an escape from the urban 
‘labyrinth’ of the city centre that leads to the sea, an element symbolically associated with 
sexual pleasure (Koliva, 1985: 198).  
 These depictions of the road by Seferis become more significant when contextualised 
within the early Athenian modernisation that took place between the 1930s and the 1950s. 
This was a period of intense urbanisation in Greece; succeeding a number of major historical 
events, such as the Balkan, Asia Minor, and First World Wars. Among other things, these 
periods of unrest and violence caused, both, a big influx of refugees, whilst at the same time 
an increase in the volume of internal immigration to the capital city of Athens. During this 
period, it became obvious that Athens would never be the city-symbol that the nineteenth 
century neo-classicists dreamt about; instead, it was rapidly transforming into a modern 
fragmented city, and expanding chaotically in all directions (Papageorgiou, 2000: 517-519). 
This situation was, however, welcomed in the modern Greek literary production. Young 
writers, eager to embrace modernism, acknowledged a poetic quality to the newly emerging 
modern urban spaces, such as the motorway, which were acquiring an integral function within 
the city. As Vasiliki Koliva comments, “The avenues appeared frequently in novels of this 
period”, and “they indicated passage, transition, wanderings related to a psychological trial”, 
as well as “a wish to escape” (Koliva, 1985: 198). Related symbolically to the modern urban 
experience of mobility through their obvious connection with the car, avenues provided 
powerful poetic images of freedom of movement. 
                                                           
118 As Vitti (1978: 393-411) notes, George Seferis, as well as poets Andreas Empeirikos and Odysseus Elytis, were 
part of the so-called ‘generation of the 30s’, a literary movement which was influenced by French literature and 
surrealism.  
119 In the poem ‘A word for summer’: “And yet I used to love Syngrou avenue/ the double rise and fall of the great 
road/bringing us out miraculously to the sea/the eternal sea, to cleanse us of our sins.” (Seferis 1995, 89); similarly 
in the poem ‘Syngrou Avenue, 1930’: “when you let your heart and your thought become/one/with the blackish 
river that stretches, stiffens and/goes away:/Break Ariadne’s thread and look!/The blue body of the mermaid” 
(Seferis 1995: 41) Both these poems are quoted by Kontoleon in the story. 
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 Syngrou avenue was one of the first fast motorways to be constructed in Athens. 
Originally conceived and designed in the late nineteenth century, it was fully constructed by 
1904 to connect the city centre with the coastal suburb of Phalero120. The ‘s traight road,  
direct and unswerving’ that is Syngrou avenue becomes celebrated in Greek literature 
as another embodiment of modernity: a symbol of the modern pleasures of the car and speed, 
heading towards the sea, and, for many users, reinforcing associations with masculinity and 
sexuality. Novelist George Theotokas, celebrating the “concept of the modern element of 
culture”, wrote of Syngrou avenue: “Day and night Syngrou Avenue flows toward the coast 
of Phalero carrying along the newborn and as yet unexpressed rhythms of a strong lyricism 
looking for strong poets” (in Papageorgiou, 2000: 519). Seferis later subtitled his own poem, 
called ‘Syngrou Avenue, 1930’, “To George Theotokas, who discovered it” (in Papageorgiou, 
2000: 519-521).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
120 Biris (1999: 188) mentions that the avenue was designed between 1876-1878 by Ioannis Genisarlis, surveyor 
and professor in the Athens Polytechnic. Biris (1999: 252) further notes that the cost of the project was covered 
mainly by the donations of the wife of Greek banker and philanthropist Andreas Syngros. 
 123 
The decision had been made and the exploration would soon follow. Besides, the time had 
come for me to open my wings.  
     “The house 
      Full of grilles and distrust when you examine it closely 
     In its dark corners  
     'For years I used to go to bed early,' it whispers” 
     So, I would conquer the whole world, yes I would – my teenage decisions were 
determined by my body’s transformations.  
     As I  was changing , the Avenue was changing.  We were both 
discovering the seductions of  the night.  
     But  before revealing to me the secret sins of love,  it  rewarded me 
with the sight of a church built  of brown stone  and three or four 
little houses snuggly perched amid those  cliffs  that had  been – as if 
by mistake – planted in the middle of the  valley, instead  of  on a beach 
and left  to keep company, not  to sea-gulls  and fishing boats, but  to 
sparrows and green buses.  
    The unexpected fascinated me and danger attracted me, like the small magnet 
used by my mother’s dressmaker did the pins.  
One time I  dared to take the  last late-night bus and from behind the  
window panes I was trying to make out the shapes of those who could 
offer anyone –  even me? – the kind of love  called  “paid”.   
     I'd learnt to regard paying for love as a sign of toughness and masculinity.  
     “But if I don’t pay, what woman will sleep with me?” a soldier had confessed to me one 
night in the army, while he was keeping guard, three to five a.m.     
     The cigarette in his mouth was about to burn his lips and traces of a careless midwife 
had flattened the curves of his face. 
      Along with a packet of cigarettes, I offered him some money and promised him the 
hospitality of the road I thought was like me. 
     “And all this is an old story that no longer interests anyone;   
     We‘ve hardened our hearts and grown up.” 
     Poor soldiers, unloved teenagers and romantic dreamers… 
     As I was growing up,  my face was changing. 
     Besides,  Syngrou Avenue too knows how to change faces. It  taught 
me to do the same.   
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     During the  day, the road dons the suit of an entirely respectable  
business and locks itself  up in air-conditioned offices or shines 
behind squeaky clean shop-windows. 
     It  exchanges money, sells  tickets – the smell  of lager but  a distant 
memory for now –,   it  advertises cars and, as the trees shed a useless 
shadow,  faceless tourists cannot  decide on whether or not they 
should  use  their cameras. Syngrou Avenue has nothing worth  seeing 
to of fer them. Only there,  near the end,  only there where  the end is 
near, there  is  a change of scenery:  a  beach;  one  however that is  
remote,  dirty and finally useless,  any trace of beauty it  does have , 
serving no purpose whatsoever..   
     The blue mermaid has been forsaken…perhaps it is elsewhere that those who are truly 
keen should look for her.  
     Ah,  how right I was – I say to myself  – on the choice of the road 
that is like me. Everything this road does, I  do too…And I do it  
eagerly  and with conviction.  
     But  alas, the night always returns. And with it , so do my guilts. 
     «We looked for metamorphosis in our youth  
     with desires that played like big fish 
     In seas suddenly shrinking…» 
     To this day, I  haven't  managed –  and I  doubt  if there's anyone who 
has – to successfully  record all the details that have been engraved 
on the  two sides of the avenue. After all ,  it 's not as if the people  you 
meet on it  are ever really just the  walking type, there to enjoy a quiet 
strol l . All of them – men more often than not  – have an ulterior 
motive. Some of  them are  there to sell ,  others to litter; some of them 
look to get aroused, others to offer arousal .  
    The Avenue is not fond of bright lights. A couple of distant neon lamps along with the 
headlights of the cars whizzing by are all it needs. Nevertheless, every now and then, 
the passer-by wil l come across the big bright bi llboards of the famous 
bouzoukia ,  the live-music venues that are the heart of  Greek night-li fe; also 
known as those places that commercialise joy.  If you are lucky – this is  after all one 
of the few attractions the Avenue has to offer – you could run into one of the stars of this 
kind of entertainment: women or men whose eyes have lost the gift of modesty, whose ears 
have lost the ability to process sounds of lower volume than that of a microphone. Still, 
these are the deities of our age, complete with a 'best-before' label, and those who meet 
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them have every right to feel blessed, like the old pilgrims to the Holly Land who were 
graced with the rare chance to catch a fleeting glimpse of an angel. Such deities owe their 
immense popularity to the type of songs they somehow manage to pull off. Songs that chain 
you down rather than lift you up, like, for instance, those my father used to sing on Sunday 
mornings during the 50’s. Those kind of songs light fireworks and promote face powder 
and make-up cream.  
      Syngrou Avenue is a place that never relaxes – another thing we 
have in common.  It  never sleeps.  Its bustling  act ivity in the morning 
creates the conditions that will ,  come the night, create the  need to 
live it  up and revel ti ll  dawn.  
      In other words – at night the road  gives back all the dirt ,  the day 
has thrown at  it . 
     And I 'm just not sure  whether the bodies hanging about  like cheap 
merchandise  should be  mocked and scoffed at or whether they are 
the ones who mock and scoff,  a  daily  reminder of  the pathetic lives of 
those who need to buy.   
     In any case, at nights, I can hardly distinguish which type of walker (or maybe user?) of 
the road I was like. I belong – I like to think – to the buyers, if only the potential ones. But 
the smell of exhaust fumes and a couple of saliva stains on my jacket suggest otherwise, 
making me shudder at the ever more plausible thought that slowly but steadily I am 
drifting towards the ranks of those that sell themselves. 
     “And the bodies like broken branches 
     like roots uprooted.” 
     But if I think twice about it, I start laughing. I start laughing and clapping my hands. I 
sing one of those songs with the empty words that don’t make any sense, they ‘re there just 
to give you something to follow the rhythm with. I’m glad. Relieved. Relaxed. I did very 
well – I congratulate myself – to decide to identify with Syngrou Avenue.  An 
avenue digests everything and can be blamed for nothing . An avenue 
like that doesn’t need  to prove its  identity. It  is  what it  is:  self -
sufficient and alone –  a road  with very few side-streets. Those who 
decide to walk on it , have neither the desire, nor the means to 
escape.  They have no choice  – once  they enter – but to reach its  end.  
Unless they're  willing  to risk the humiliation or the danger of a 
subway.  Syngrou is  a road that  accepts things as they are. And it  
contains all  sorts of things.  
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     As for me…Yes, believe me. I’m telling the truth when I claim I think I am like Syngrou 
Avenue.  
     But, allow me one question…Which road are you like?  
     No need to get all tense now! I’m only joking. 
     “All this was fine, all this, a casual stroll.” 
     From the days of the city that is no more and of the people who had identified with it, to 
our days, the days of those who choose to go down – all grown-up now – a straight road, 
direct and unswerving. A road that disappears into the sea… With no desire to go on, nor 
regard for what comes after. A road that has forsaken the mermaid.  
     “And at the bottom, almost hidden, the sleepless worm.” 
     So you see, at the risk of becoming disagreeable, I have to insist: Syngrou Avenue is like 
me. And it is like you too. Trust me, I'm somewhat of an expert on the matter…I think this 
much I have managed to prove to you. 
     “Talking does no good 
     …Each dreams separately without hearing  
anyone else’s  nightmare.” 
     That  wise  poet had said  all  this.  Do not doubt him. All  I did was 
give a very subjective opinion, with nothing to back it  up.  Just an 
opinion… I  may be wrong.  May be. 121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
121 (Kontoleon, 1999: 43-47)  
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When an avenue is like you and me  
 
As the story unfolds, the narrator appears to describe a process of identification with Syngrou 
avenue.  In its most contemporary condition, the avenue is represented as a living organism 
that has been growing along with its occupants: ‘As I  was changing, the avenue was  
changing’ . In the narrator’s account, the avenue has ended up incorporating and reflecting 
elements of his and others subjectivity, and often, their own ‘double’ existence. While 
predominantly an office area in the morning, Syngrou avenue becomes an entertainment 
centre in the evening, attracting crowds to the various leisure venues, such as, multiplex 
cinemas, music halls and clubs, that line the sides of the avenue. It is also known for lap-
dancing bars and prostitution that proliferate the side streets. As the narrator recounts, during 
the day the avenue is a commercial, banal modern space, where nothing is worth seeing and 
photographed; whereas, at night, it reveals another, ‘hidden’ condition related to bodily 
pleasures. This can be understood as a repressed spatial ‘other’; the ‘unconscious’ condition, 
not quite visible during the day, which is, nevertheless, inseparable from, and a dependent of, 
the morning routine.  
 
§ 
 
The idea that a ‘fusing’ of body and built environment takes place in the city is well 
established. From as early as the period of Julius Caesar’s Roman Empire and his master 
architect Vitruvius, the body was not perceived as simply something to be contained by 
architectural space, but rather it was understood as the model according to which architecture 
should be created122. During the Italian Renaissance, architects and theorists went further by 
applying this idea to the city. Leon Battista Alberti, for example, wrote that “the city is like a 
                                                           
122 Both the Roman architect and, later, Leonardo da Vinci – with his famous drawing of the outstretched body of a 
man contained by the circle and the square – suggested that there should be a ‘harmonious’ analogy between 
buildings and the human body. As Burgin (1996: 141) notes, in his third book Vitruvius described, “how the 
outstretched limps of a ‘well-formed man’ subtend the circle and the square”. 
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large house and the house like a small city”, but ultimately “every edifice is a body” (in 
Burgin, 1996: 142). As Victor Burgin (1996: 143) has pointed out, anthropomorphic 
illustrations of cities from the Renaissance period express this concept visually through the 
corporeal city; as well as the ideology of a time: “man […] is literally ‘the measure of all 
things’”. Philosopher Henri Lefebvre, however, argued that this pre-modern embodied 
perception of the city soon gave way to a visual-geometric one; the body gave its place to the 
eye123. This shift, which he describes as largely resulting from Enlightenment thought, 
postulating that tactile or other corporeal experience should be suppressed in order to rely on 
visual orientation124, has since given way to an optical-geometric spatial perception. 
Subsequently, Lefebvre argued that the resultant spatial production is the origin of what he 
calls ‘abstract space’, and the de-corporealised and de-corporealising space of modernity.  
 Psychoanalysis has provided an exception among the dominant discourses on modern 
space dependent upon the body-mind binary125, since, early on, it has acknowledged the body 
as a spatio-temporal entity126. Sigmund Freud’s first investigations into the formation of the 
‘ego’ in relation to the body, especially the erotogenic zones and the sexual drives127, as well 
as his conception of the spatial dimension of the ‘psyche’128, were highly influential in 
                                                           
123 Largely due to the fact that the city was until then almost undifferentiated from the countryside, therefore also 
from ‘nature’, which was fundamentally connected to the ‘body’. Lefebvre discussed this in chapter 4 of The 
Production of Space; see Lefebvre (1995: 229-291). 
124 Lefebvre (1991: 289) wrote: “Was there a precise threshold crossed … Was there an exact moment when 
phallic-visual-geometric space vanquished earlier perceptions and forms of perception?” As Kathleen Kirby (1996: 
52) argues, he further places this shift around the French Revolution.  
125 In the essay ‘The Body and Geography’ (1995), Robyn Longhurst notes that social sciences were developed in 
the 19th century according to the dominant conception of the separation of the mind from the body. About the 
science of geography in particular, Kristin Ross (1993: 360) has further argued: “Its object of study is ‘landscape’, 
which is constituted under ‘natural’, non-historical conditions that bear nothing of the social and economic 
contradictions that contribute to the formation of space.”  
126 As Grosz (1995: 85) mentions, by considering the sexual drives and erotogenic zones of the body as 
“instrumental in the formation of the ego and the positioning of the subject in the structure of society and the 
family as a whole”, psychoanalysis recognised the body as a spatio-temporal being. 
127 Freud argued in 1923 that “The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego”, then four years later he added: “the ego 
is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly those springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be 
regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body” (in Grosz, 1995: 85). 
128 In 1938, Freud (2001: 300) wrote as a note: “Space may be the projection of the extension of the psychical 
apparatus. No other derivation is probable. Instead of Kant’s a priori determinants of our psychical apparatus. 
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informing ideas on spatio-temporal corporeality. Subsequent work by Jacques Lacan, in 
particular his theory of the ‘mirror stage’, addressed further issues of corporeality and 
spatiality in relation to the formation of identity. 
 Working in response to such an intellectual context, Bachelard proposed a 
‘topoanalysis’, in reference to ‘psychoanalysis’. Bachelard’s theory was based upon a 
conception of place as ‘psychic’: as not only – or necessarily – physical, but as a ‘surface’ 
onto which mental ‘images’ referring to a locality appear129. ‘Topoanalysis’, therefore, 
searches for the “placial properties” of certain images (Casey, 1997: 288), such as those of the 
‘home’ or ‘house’, challenging the role these images play in our experience of the world, by 
extending spatialities of ‘intimacy’130.   
 
§ 
 
In the essay Berlin Chronicle, Benjamin describes purposely getting lost in the streets as a 
child to avoid attending a service at the synagogue. Although at first he was not fully 
conscious of his motives, the young Benjamin soon began to enjoy his ‘misbehaviour’: 
“While I was wandering thus, I was suddenly and simultaneously overcome, on the one hand 
by the thought, ‘Too late, time was up long ago, you’ll never get there’ – and, on the other, by 
a sense of the insignificance of all this, of the benefits of letting things take what course they 
would. And these two streams of consciousness converged irresistibly in an immense pleasure 
that filled me with blasphemous indifference toward the service, but exalted the street in 
which I stood, as if it had already intimated to me the services of procurement it was later to 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Psyche is extended; knows nothing about it.” In the posthumously published An outline of psychoanalysis, Freud 
further adopted “the hypothesis…of a psychical apparatus extended in space, expediently put together, developed 
by the exigencies of life” (Freud, 2001: 196). 
129 Although located in a philosophical tradition that draws upon Aristotle’s concept of place as ‘surface’, 
Bachelard’s definition moves away from the Aristotelian sense-bound notion of place (as a container and as 
sensible). Bachelard draws instead upon Freud and Jung to propose the soul as ‘place’ or ‘set of places’, in this 
way also opposing Descartes, who recognised no psychic spatiality; see Casey (1997: 287-288). 
130 Bachelard (1994: 8) described ‘topoanalysis’ as “the systematic psychological study of the localities of our 
intimate lives.” 
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render to my awakened drive” (Benjamin, 1999: 630). This experience of the street, endowed 
with an intimate, and almost spiritual, quality, further reveals an underlying sexuality. In the 
same work, Benjamin makes repeated reference to the sexual ‘adventures’ of his adulthood in 
the streets of Berlin and Paris131.   
 
§ 
 
Lefebvre’s critique of modern space as ‘abstract’ is in parts psychoanalytically inspired. In 
the essay ‘Lacan and Geography: The Production of Space Revisited’, Derek Gregory (1997: 
220) argues that Lefebvre’s theorisation of the formation of modern space through processes 
of ‘visualisation’ and ‘de-corporealisation’, as discussed by Lefebvre, is directly inspired 
from Lacan’s ‘mirror stage’ theory. Although Lefebvre’s The Production of Space does not 
contain many explicit references to psychoanalysis132, the vocabulary and metaphorical 
structure bear obvious influences. For instance, and according to Gregory, Lefebvre discusses 
modern space as a collective Lacanian mirror. Thus, modern space is described in a similar 
way to Lewis Carroll’s “looking-glass”, through which the subject, deprived from its 
traditional conjunction with the body, “passes…and becomes a lived abstraction” (Lefebvre, 
1991: 314); a mere ‘sign’, thus its mirror reflection133. Furthermore, Lefebvre’s overall 
argument is underpinned by the idea that the ‘abstract’ space of modernity is formed as a 
homogeneous, controlling entity, operating through the relegation of the body; but, most 
importantly, the sexual body. In its place, modern space celebrates the ‘Phallus’, as conceived 
                                                           
131 Mainly references to street prostitution; see (Benjamin, 1999: 598, 600-601) 
132 In one occasion Lefebvre (1991: 99) actually uses the term “psychoanalysis of space”, while he refers to Lacan 
only in footnotes; see (Lefebvre, 1991: 5, 36, 185) 
133 Lefebvre (1991: 313-314) writes: “So what escape can there be from a space thus shattered into images, into 
signs, into connected-yet-disconnected data directed at a ‘subject’ itself doomed to abstraction? For space offers 
itself like a mirror to the thinking ‘subject’, but, after the manner of Lewis Carroll, the ‘subject’ passes through the 
looking glass and becomes a lived abstraction.”  
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within the Lacanian schema134, the abstract symbol of power and masculinity135. Lefebvre 
names this condition ‘Phallocentrism’, and he observes its manifestation in various aspects of 
modern space; for example, in the dominant vertical spatialisation (i.e. high-rise buildings), or 
in the constant expansion of the scale of the built environment, which reinforces visual spatial 
comprehension.  
In particular, Lefebvre is interested in the assertion of control through 
‘Phallocentrism’, by the use of “walls, enclosures, and façades” to “define both a ‘scene’ 
(where something takes place) and an ‘obscene’ area, to which everything that cannot or may 
not happen on the scene is relegated” (Lefebvre, 1991: 39). Back to the story, the narrator, in 
his own words, claims: ‘Besides, Syngrou Avenue too knows how to change 
faces . It taught me to do the same.’  This ‘duplicity’, as Lefebvre calls it, becomes a 
fundamental characteristic of modern urban space, which, by selectively embracing and 
excluding things, an ‘underground life’ in the city is created. This can be understood to 
constitute a kind of inseparable ‘unconscious’ that comes back to haunt the city136; as 
described in the story: ‘Its bustling activ ity  in the morning creates the 
conditions that wil l, come the night, create the need to  l ive it up and revel  
ti ll dawn. In other words – at night the road gives back all the dirt , the day  
has thrown at i t. ’  
 In addition, Lefebvre argues that the city’s spatial ‘double’ is, however, highly 
controlled via the modern urban planning practice of ‘zoning’. ‘Zoning’ involves the drawing 
of absolute boundaries between apparently contrasting uses; for example, work-related 
activities are distinguished and isolated from residential activities, and so are cultural from 
                                                           
134 See Lacan (1989: 320)  
135 Lefebvre (1991: 97) argued that, although abstract space presents desire “with a ‘transparency’ which 
encourages it to surge forth”, in the homogenising space of abstraction “desire encounters no object, nothing 
desirable, and no work results from its action”. Furthermore, Lefebvre (1991: 288) argued that the void is filled by 
the ‘Phallus’ and its heavy load of myth, rendering abstract space apart from a “representation of space (geometric 
homogeneity)”, a ‘representational space (the Phallic)”, as well, apart from “an arena of practical action”, also “an 
ensemble of images, signs and symbols”.  
136 Lefebvre (1991: 36) wrote: “Every society and particularly the city, has an underground and repressed life, and 
hence an ‘unconscious’ of its own.” 
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commercial. Therefore, ‘stratified’ places are produced; among which, are places especially 
designated for pleasure and sexuality, often associated with ‘leisure’, such as holiday 
resorts137. Hence, as Lefebvre (1991: 310) states, the ‘Phallus’ in ‘abstract’ space is isolated, 
being projected “into a realm outside the body”, then it is fixed in space and brought “under 
the surveillance of the eye”; or, as recounted in the story: ‘Squares signal freedom. 
Avenues aim at success. Commercial streets offer comfort. Some 
neighborhoods cover the need for love. Others lead you to the heights of  
social success.’   
 
§ 
 
However, in the story, the avenue is represented as if it transcends all the rules of 
‘abstraction’. According to the narrator, the official environment of the day of high-rise office 
buildings and high-speed traffic, coexisted harmoniously with the environment of erotic 
pleasures of the night, forming an ‘organic’ entity. Moreover, in the periphery of these 
contrasting spatial practices, other micro-practices and cultures thrive: ‘But before 
revealing to me the secret sins of love, i t rewarded me with the sight of a  
church built  of brown stone and three or four l itt le houses snuggly  
perched amid those cliffs that had been – as if  by mistake – planted in the 
middle of the valley , instead of on a beach and left to keep company, not to  
sea-gulls and fishing boats, but to sparrows and green buses .’ By allowing for 
the interpenetration of different uses, this multi-layered, complex environment annuls 
‘zoning’. Thus Syngrou avenue does not remain a functional, ‘Phallocentric’ space, as the 
“straight and with great width” road that was designed to carry traffic from the inner city 
(Biris, 1999: 189), ‘a  road for  a  man’ , nor the ‘readable’ object that was open to the 
survey of the eye as in the young narrator’s (masculine) gaze. Instead, it becomes a truly 
                                                           
137 “Typically, the identification of sex and sexuality, of pleasure and physical gratification, with ‘leisure’ occurs 
in places specially designated for the purpose – in holiday resorts or villages, on ski slopes or sun-drenched 
beaches. Such leisure spaces become eroticised, as in the case of city neighbourhoods given over to nightlife, to 
the illusion of festivity” (Lefebvre: 1991, 310). 
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permeable environment, which allows for “juxtapositions”, “proximities” and “emotional 
distances and limits” to show through (Lefebvre, 1991: 288). As the narrator admits at the end 
of the story, it is ‘an avenue that digests everything’, ‘accepts things as they  
are’,  and ‘contains all sorts of things’ .  
 The concept of the permeable condition of the modern city has been widely 
discussed. Benjamin’s observations of the ‘porous’ environment of Naples, that he described 
as a place where “building and action interpenetrate […] to become a theatre of new, 
unforeseen constellations” (Benjamin, 1996: 416), enabled him to formulate the argument that 
‘porosity’ conditioned the critical occupations of urban space, derived from improvisation and 
shock. On a similar note, contemporary theoretical discourses138 have described modern urban 
space as ‘permeable’, ‘porous’, and ‘palimpsestic’. For instance, De Certeau (1984: 201-202) 
described the history of the city as a ‘palimpsest’139: “This place, on its surface, seems to be a 
collage. In reality, in its depth it is ubiquitous. A piling up of heterogeneous places. Each one, 
like a deteriorating page of a book, refers to a different mode of territorial unity, of 
socioeconomic distribution, of political conflicts and of identifying symbolism”. Pile (1996: 
241), making an obvious reference to Freudian psychoanalysis140, has also recognised a 
‘permeability’ in modern urban space, showing mechanisms of the ever-competing 
“conscious, preconscious, unconscious; with shifting, positioning and fighting between them 
in a struggle for control and expression” (Pile, 1996: 243). Victor Burgin (1996: 151) has also 
compared modern urban space to a structure of a living organism “punctured by pores and 
                                                           
138 Such as social theory, urban geography, and visual theory. 
 
139 A member of the Freudian school of Paris, De Certeau (1984: 202) wrote in regards to place: “The village, the 
neighbourhood, the block are moreover not the only things that make the fragments of heterogeneous strata 
function together…It would be more appropriate to appeal to the oneiric (but theoretical because it articulates 
practice) model evoked by Freud in discussing the city of Rome, whose epochs all survive in the same place, intact 
and mutually interacting”.  
140 Who compared the layered structure of the psyche with the structure of the modern city. Using Rome as an 
example, Freud argued that, as beneath the ground of the modern city lie traces of the ancient Rome, which are 
also to be found on the surface of the city, in like matter childhood experiences are never eradicated, instead they 
quite often erupt in the present; see (Pile, 1996: 241). 
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orifices”. This ‘porous’ spatiality141 allows for past spatial formations that have been 
concealed under modern space to be revealed into the present, calling into question the 
homogeneity and effectiveness of the “panoptical-instrumental space of colonialist capitalist 
modernity” (in Gregory, 1997: 228). Burgin further considers modern space to have an impact 
on subjectivity; modern space is “a space in which the subject itself is soluble”, a space that is 
at once “the source of bliss and of terror” (Burgin, 1996: 155). In the context of the above 
theories, it seems that the political potential created by the ‘porosity’ of modern urban space 
is due to a relationship with ‘interruptions’ and ‘dislocations’ that display layers of past 
spatial formations; and so reveal and reconstitute modern urban space as a discursive 
production that further has a transformative impact on the subject. 
 It is important to note that the latter appears in the story about Syngrou avenue: 
‘porosity’ is described as if extending from the macro-level of the built environment to the 
micro-level of the body, which is reconfigured by the process of transcending the narrator’s 
subjective ‘I’. However, in reference to Lefebvre’s theories discussed in this chapter, the 
narrator, going through the ‘looking-glass’, does not find the mere ‘sign’ of himself, but an 
intertwinement between a palpable, sensual/sexual space and his own body. In reality, 
Syngrou avenue is most widely known for the transvestite prostitution that has gradually 
dominated its side streets and the part of the avenue nearest the coast142. This paradoxical, but 
real, transgression of the ‘Phallus’, which occurs simultaneously on the intimate level of the 
body and on the wider socio-political level of the city, is rather revealing. Firstly, it 
demonstrates a certain fluid, mutually constitutive interaction between cities and bodies; as 
Grosz (1992: 242) describes: “neither the body nor its environment can be assumed to form 
                                                           
141 A term borrowed from Benjamin, who used it in the essay ‘Naples’. Burgin discusses Benjamin’s ‘porosity’ in 
the context of Lefebvre’s conception of space as an extension of the body; he quotes Lefebvre: “space is ‘first of 
all my body, and then it is my body counterpart or ‘other’, its mirror-image or shadow: it is the shifting 
intersection between that which touches, penetrates, threatens or benefits my body on the one hand, and all other 
bodies on the other’.” (in Burgin 1996, 151)  
142 For more on transvestitism and Syngrou avenue, see the autobiography of Kostas Taktsis (1989) To Fovero 
Vema (The Terrible Step). 
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an organically unified ecosystem”, but “rather produce each other as forms of the hyper-real”. 
Secondly, this transgression identifies a subversive spatial inhabitation: Syngrou avenue 
interacts with the erotic body, as depicted in the story, not only to produce desire, but also to 
generate bodies; which, as Iain Borden (2001: 12) suggests, “have a dynamic operation in the 
city” in terms of the “production of meanings, subjects, relations, uses and desires”. Then, a 
‘lived’ body-space relation is restored through transgressions of the non-sensual modern 
space of abstraction, only to become a site for further social and political transgressions.    
 Lefebvre (1991: 363) had envisaged a future “diversification of space”. In this future 
spatial condition, there would be “fixed, semi-fixed, movable or vacant” appropriated places, 
which would not obey the functional distinctions of abstraction, and where the façade, which 
produces the ‘obscene’, would be abolished (Lefebvre, 1991: 363); thus, the body and its 
sexual pleasures would be restored making a “mobilisation of ‘private’ life” possible 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 363). In some respects, the spatial cultures of Syngrou avenue are close to 
the Lefebvrian dream; the narrator/writer represents these cultures by developing his narrative 
around the body-city relationship, whilst further placing emphasis on the sexual body through 
his narration of “an erotic event in which the categorical distinctions that separate body […] 
and city dissolve” (Burgin, 1996: 141). In this way, the narrator/writer represents the 
‘repressed’, ‘hidden’ spatial cultures of sexuality. Therefore, the central role that sexuality 
plays in subjectivity, therefore in the ways one experiences space is revealed to the reader. 
 
§ 
   
“Cities become truly ‘habitable’ when they are ‘marked by a memory or a story, signed by 
something or someone” (De Certeau, 1984: 106). In The Practice of Everyday Life, De 
Certeau condemned the “logic of techno-structures”, which, he argues, deprive urban spaces 
from the stories and legends that “haunt” them (De Certeau, 1984: 106). Had De Certeau read 
the story about Syngrou avenue, one can imagine that he would have appreciated the author’s 
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rejection of technocratic references and favour of subjective experience. I argue that the 
narrator/writer describes urban space as discursively produced, which derives from the 
intimate intertwinement between subject and space. This intertwinement reveals physical and 
cultural ‘layers’, ‘contradictions’, and ‘juxtapositions’, which further are imbued with a 
socio-political significance. For De Certeau (1984: 129-130), narrativity is ‘delinquent’, since 
stories can re-organise and reconfigure spaces, and ‘mobilise’ places. De Certeau (1984: 130) 
further (fore)saw the critical social implications of spatial narrativity: “Social delinquency 
consists in taking the story literally, in making it the principle of physical existence where a 
society no longer offers to subjects or groups symbolic outlets and expectations of spaces”. 
And although he was not clear as to what kind of actual changes would be necessary to 
produce ‘delinquent’ narrativity on the general social level, De Certeau (1984: 130) was sure 
that the subjective body would play an important role on the spatial level; as he stated: “one 
can already say that in matters concerning space, this delinquency begins with the inscription 
of the body in the order’s text. The opacity of the body in movement, gesticulating, walking, 
talking its pleasure, is what indefinitely organises a here in relation to an abroad, a 
‘familiarity’ in relation to a ‘foreigness’.”   
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Tirelessly the process of thinking makes new beginnings, returning in a roundabout way to its original 
object. This continual pausing for breath is the mode most proper to the process of contemplation. For 
by pursuing different levels of meaning in its examination of one single object it receives both the 
incentive to begin again and the justification for its irregular rhythm.  
- Walter Benjamin (1998: 28) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 138 
[Epilogue]  
 
In this thesis, I have attempted to reveal connections on a conceptual level between diverse, 
and perhaps disparate, material. Comprised of texts written at different periods, the 
composite, and in parts fragmented, nature of the thesis is reflective of a – Benjaminian – 
desire to trace ‘constellations’143: in other words to link, rather than to separate and classify. 
With this desire, I have attempted to follow Benjamin’s favourite method of criticism by (re-) 
employing ‘textual montage’. Consequently, by taking a conceptual approach to my subject, 
my discussion has tended towards criticism, rather than a strictly historical analysis. In this 
respect, I rejected the Kantian idea of ‘disinterested’ judgment, which presupposes “a learned 
interpreter who veils his investments in the service of objectivity” (Jones, 1999: 39), since it 
provides for fixed, ‘truthful’ interpretations. Instead, I have aimed to foster an open-ended, 
interpretive engagement, which is demonstrative of my own working processes – identifying 
with shifting authorial positions. The purposely ‘performative’ nature of the thesis, a text of 
an ‘open-ended’, and heterogeneous character144, has produced, in this way, many diverse 
meanings that have been and are yet to be created and recreated; thus, the growth of the 
‘constellation’, through the added meanings, is potentially infinite. 
Hence, there were no references to theorists of the Frankfurt School, which Benjamin 
has traditionally been associated with, nor any contextualisation of Benjamin’s ideas within 
the scholarly framework of these thinkers. Instead, the ‘constellation’ grew, indicating and 
unearthing unexpected (and often unsuspected) conceptual connections amongst the work of 
Benjamin, the Romantics, and the more recent critical theorists of urbanism: Lefebvre, De 
Certeau, and Pile. Furthermore, references to the rationale of phenomenologist Bachelard, 
                                                           
143 I here use the term in reference to Benjamin’s notion of ‘constellation’, mentioned in writings such as The 
Origin of German Tragic Drama and The Arcades Project. Gilloch (2002a: 20) describes the Benjaminian 
‘constellation’ as: “a figure constituted by a plethora of points which together compose an intelligible, legible, 
though contingent and transient, pattern”. In this thesis, it is also mentioned in an excerpt by ‘Naples’ on p. 79. 
 
144 In his introduction to (Kant, 2003: x), Caygill describes Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a ‘performative’ 
text, of an ‘open-ended’ and ‘heterogeneous’ character; and by quoting the translator of the text Kemp Smith, he 
claims that it is “not the exposition of a single unified system, but the record of Kant’s manifold attempts to 
formulate and solve his many-sided problems”. 
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psychoanalysts Freud and Lacan, the psychoanalytically inspired Burgin, as well as the 
feminists Grosz and Wilson, have contributed to the creation of a unique conceptual 
framework. By adopting such an approach, that follows Benjaminian ideas of immanence, 
montage and interrelation, I believe I have been able to pursue an interpretive methodology 
that supports the main arguments that this thesis has set out to develop, whilst remaining 
appropriate in scope to my subject of study.  
Thus, I have been able to trace links between the experience of the city as a critical 
subjective practice and a collection of divergent spatial practices and cultures - as set out, 
initially, to be the main research objective. Furthermore, and perhaps most interestingly, the 
exploration of these links has revealed possible ‘scenarios’/propositions that could inform a 
new approach to urbanism. I would like to highlight the following as the most significant: 
a) As mentioned in the introduction (pp. xi, xv), and discussed largely in section 2, a ‘neo-
Romantic’ approach to urban cultures and practices can be pursued by taking experience as 
the focus of the urban condition. In this context, following Benjamin and Lefebvre, 
experience is conceived as a lived reality and a practice; essentially drawing upon Romantic 
ideals that recognised the interdependency between empiricism and rationality, cognition and 
reflection, as well as the self-transformative potential contained within experience that is 
conceived in these terms. In an arts and design context, such an approach could open up new 
possibilities for the contemporary practices of spatial production and interpretation. 
b) As discussed in section 2, especially in chapter 3 (pp. 54, 58, 60), tactility, proximity, 
immersion and immanence are, within the Romantically-inspired, Benjaminian concept of 
experience, indispensable modes of modern urban experience. It was further discussed that 
such modes encourage improvisational and participatory attitudes towards architecture and 
public space; which, if fostered in the contemporary urban environment, could provide 
alternative, non-prescribed ways of spatial occupation. 
c) The idea of the ‘thought-image’ was also discussed in section 2 (pp. 44, 60) as a way of 
representing the experience of the city that is essentially anti-historicist, deriving from 
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immediate experience, deploying juxtaposition and dependency upon contingency. This kind 
of representation could be adopted by spatial practices and critical/theoretical discourses that 
follow emergent, neo-Romantic approaches.  
d) As mentioned in the introduction (p. xxiii), and discussed in section 1, the 
author/critic/researcher, as an experiencing subject, can provide significant critical insight – 
by drawing upon their own immediate experience. As further argued in section 1, particularly 
in chapter 2, adopting an experiential approach, the historian and critic can play an important 
role in the production of open-ended and collective processes of historiography.  
Furthermore, drawing upon the above conceptual framework, I have pursued the 
other main objective of the thesis, which had originally been set out to be a critical discussion 
of modern Athenian urbanism. In this context, I have examined, and demonstrated, certain 
aspects of Athenian urbanism that cannot be understood via a historicist trajectory, or a social 
scientific methodology. Therefore, I have discussed: proximity, juxtaposition, and 
fragmentation as significant, characteristic qualities of the modern Athenian urban fabric; and 
performative and improvisational spatial practices as emergent from, and interdependent with, 
this particular built environment; as well as the general anti-historicist attitude evident within 
Athenian spatial cultures of production and occupation. 
As discussed and described in detail in the introduction, the inquiries and propositions 
developed in this thesis came out of a step-by-step process, which did not follow a prescribed 
or preconceived methodology: but rather a methodology that was invented and constructed 
along the way. Retrospectively ‘mapping’ this process once again, I see three distinct stages 
of development, which can be outlined as follows: a) the initial stage of tracing the research 
questions through researching, selecting the fictive texts, and studying cultural and visual 
theories addressing issues of subjectivity and space; b) the subsequent stage of deploying 
these theories to create interpretations of the selected literary narratives, and to develop the 
propositions; c) the final, and most significant, stage of contextualising, epistemologically and 
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methodologically, the research questions and refining the aforementioned propositions by 
drawing upon Benjamin’s philosophy of experience and Romantic aesthetics.  
It is important to note that, as mentioned at the beginning of this epilogue, the 
methodology of this thesis was purposely conceived and applied, at the last stage, as an 
ongoing and open-ended process. Inspired by Benjamin’s advocacy of critical interpretation 
via methods of writing in an experimental, fragmented manner, and via the creation of textual 
‘montage’, I aimed: firstly, to create a text that allows for a ‘performative’, 
critical/interpretative reading – especially so, in the second part of the thesis; and secondly, to 
follow a critical methodology of writing, by demonstrating my own working processes, as 
well as shifting – at times even seemingly to the contradictory – authorial positions. I believe 
that, in this way, I have also contributed a new methodological perspective to the established 
discourses of contemporary arts and design criticism, which tend to draw upon either a 
historicist, or social scientific framework, as mentioned in the introduction (p. xi). 
Despite the apparently heterogeneous character of the thesis, I can now recognise the 
pursuit of a certain unity in my text. In my discussion of modern urbanism through literary 
narrative, and by deploying philosophical, as well as cultural and visual theory discourses, I 
have attempted to explore relationships between subjects as ‘bodies’, and urbanism in its 
physical particulars (such as urban formations, architecture, materiality), but also in its more 
abstract aspects (such as space and movement). It is within this context that I wish to envisage 
the future possibilities of the research. The advocation of an aesthetics of urban experience 
based on immediacy, subjective participation and improvisation, could be a desirable critical 
alternative to the passive spatial practices of designed environments, as well as to the 
prescribed ways of making meaning of these environments.  
Nevertheless, if, approaching the end, I am allowed to be self-critical and self-
reflective, I will ask myself whether the desire to find unity in ‘conclusion’ may foster a 
certain nostalgia: “As Novalis claimed, ‘all philosophy is homesickness’” (Lang, 1999: 22). 
But then again it may not be. It is up to the reader to decide! 
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